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Abstract 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
(FDI) 
by 
HAITAO LIANG 
 
 
Adviser: Dr. Merih Uctum 
 
 
At first, a literature review of over 150 articles on the determination of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) proposes the main determinants of FDI. A meta-analysis tests 
the reliability of the previous studies on FDI.  
Then, a cluster analysis on FDI data reveals the necessary to segment economies, 
especially by income level, in FDI analysis.   
A large number of studies emphasize FDI determinants but ignore the income 
distribution on the results, which biases the estimates. In Chapter 3, I correct for 
heterogeneity due to income distribution by using the Blundell-Bond System GMM 
(Generalized Method of Moments), which controls for endogeneity problem as well. I 
categorize the countries according to their level of development: high, middle and low 
income. I further break down the middle income category into upper and lower segments. 
I consider level effects and various interactive effects.  
I find that income levels play a significant role in FDI determination model. 
Controlling for income levels corrects the sign and the magnitude of a number of 
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estimates. In particular, results show that low income countries attract more FDI, ceteris 
paribus. This result is in stark contrast with the traditional consensus that capital flows to 
rich countries (Lucas 1990). Moreover, modeling income levels shows that lagged FDI 
has consistently positive effect on FDI, which is a dynamic model structure. Consistent 
with the literature, market potential and education boost FDI and results are robust to 
income levels. FDI increases with risk levels because during financial or economic crises 
it replaces other investments. Tax rates overall exert downward pressure on FDI, but 
mostly when the middle and low income levels are controlled for. This article also 
supports the Tariff Jumping FDI argument in middle and low income economies, 
according to which, FDI is a potential substitute for international trade. My results reject 
the hypothesis of the wealth effect of exchange rate, and there is weak evidence that the 
depreciation of local currency discourages FDI in particular in poorer countries. Results 
are stable for different specifications of income dummies (one intercept dummy, two 
intercept dummies, and slope dummies, etc).  
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Chapter1: Evaluation of Econometric Studies on the 
Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): 
Literature Survey & Meta-Analysis of Two Determinants 
 
 
The development of literature on the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
can be divided into three stages: studies in the 1960s (Beginning), studies in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Development), and the literature since the 1990s (Mature). After an overview 
of the data, the dependent variables, the independent variables, and the methodologies in 
the three generations of research, a specific model with commonly used explanatory 
variables is recommended.  
This is followed by a meta-analysis of the research to test how often the potential 
publication bias (towards reporting significant or common results) may influence the 
measurement of the effects of the market size and exchange rates on FDI. The results 
support the premise that there are genuine associations between market size and FDI as 
well as between exchange rates and FDI. Nevertheless, there is potential publication bias 
co-existing with genuine association in literature on market size’s effect. Particularly in 
studies on the effect of market size on FDI into developed countries, publication bias is 
clearly identified by meta-analysis, but I find that there is no publication bias in the 
literature on the effect of exchange rate on FDI. 
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) occurs when the residents of one country acquire 
control over a business enterprise in another country.  
Richard E. Caves et al., World Trade and Payments: An Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is widely perceived as a powerful development engine 
for many receiving (host) countries. It adds to gross capital formation, improves balance 
of payments, and creates jobs in the receiving countries. Equally important are other 
consequences- the spillover of technological know-how and business skills and increase 
of dynamic competition and efficiency, etc. They are crucial for a quick and fundamental 
take–off for development in host economies. Since the 1960s a voluminous literature has 
examined various aspects of FDI.  This chapter offers a survey and analysis of the major 
advances in ascertaining the determinants of FDI inflows.  
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1.2 The First Generation Models: Beginning in the 1960s 
The FDI literature starts with study of US FDI in Europe, emphasizing the effects of 
international trade and host GNP on FDI and mainly1 using the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method.  
The first well-known article on FDI flows was motivated by the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in the 1960s. Scaperlanda (1967) studies how the 
establishment of the EEC would shift the FDI allocation in Europe. Regressing the ratios 
of the US FDI in non-EEC and in EEC countries to total FDI on a linear time trend, he 
rejects the hypothesis that EEC's creation caused a reallocation of FDI.  This linear 
bivariate OLS regression has provoked substantial and sustained academic interest. 
Wallis (1968) undertakes a similar study for different periods and found a significant 
difference between the 1951-58 and 1959-64 regressions.  d'Arge (1969, 1971a, 1971b) 
and Schmitz (1970) add relative ratio of profit rate of FDI in EEC and EFTA, intercept 
and slope shift variables (between two time periods of 1951-58 and 1959-64) to the 
analysis and conclude that the formation of Customs Unions or placing tariffs on U.S. 
exports to a foreign country is likely to increase U.S. FDI to that area, even though the 
effects of the slope-shift variable and the profit item are ambiguous2.  
An article by Bandera and White (1968) is one of the first formal studies to reveal 
the importance of the host country’s income as a major determinant of FDI. The authors 
regress the level of the U.S. FDI into European countries, and its annual changes, on the 
                                                 
1
 Mainly, in most cases, refers to the scenario in a given article based on slightly different model 
specifications applied to the same data set. In other cases, mainly refers to the scenario in an article with the 
same model specification but a different data set or an article with both different model specifications and 
different data sets. 
2
 The results are ambiguous when both significant and insignificant results with generally equal weight are 
reported. 
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host nation’s GNP with mainly significantly positive results. However, both the annual 
earnings of FDI and the international liquidity of the host country and their annual 
change, when similarly regressed, yield mainly insignificant conclusions. Since then, the 
market size of the host countries, commonly represented by their GDP or GNI, has 
become one of the most important independent variables to explain FDI flows. 
Scaperlanda and Mauer (1969) and Goldberg (1972) update the analysis by 
Bandera and White by including not only the EEC’s GNP and its annual change, but also 
the ratio and the change of the ratio between exports from US to EEC and EEC internal 
exports, but find them insignificant.  
At the same time, many researchers concentrate on the performance of FDI, such 
as the sales, exports, and profitability of FDI enterprises, or the return on the FDI in the 
host countries, instead of FDI flows. Mason (1968) is one of the people to initiate this 
academic field.3  
 
 
                                                 
3
 United Nations (1992) publishes a comprehensive summary on this field, which covered many 
developments during the 1960s. 
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1.3 The Second Generation Models: Development in the 1970s and 
1980s 
 
During this score of years, many researchers follow the first generation models but bring 
in some new observations. Hawkins and Macaluso (1977) include the U.S. outward FDI 
into Japan and Canada. Schmitz and Bieri (1972) add the data on FDI in Canada to their 
research. Culem (1988) uses six industrialized countries for a small panel study on 
bilateral flows of FDI. Gorecki (1976), Ray (1977) and Baldwin (1979) turn their 
attention towards larger sets of countries with industry level data. In addition to the 
country level data, firm level information becomes the focus of many economists. Horst 
(1972) investigates firm level FDI for 1191 U.S. manufacturing corporations, and Bond 
(1981) analyzes the FDI firm level information in Puerto Rico. Grubaugh (1987) uses a 
random micro sample of U.S. firms that filed reports with the SEC in 1982.  
New dependent variables are also introduced. Horst (1972) applies two-step 
analysis to FDI research, in which the coefficients of 20 industrial dummies are obtained 
from step one to regress the decisions to be multinational, that is, the coefficient in this 
step-one regression is the propensity to invest abroad. Gorecki (1976) replaces the 
traditional dependent variable, the value of FDI, by the count of the number of foreign 
enterprises entering Canadian manufacturing industries. Bond (1981) regresses the firm 
survival dummy on a set of firm level information. Moreover, Grubaugh (1987) creates 
the firms’ multinational indicator which is equal to 1 if a ratio of assets of a firm’s 
foreign subsidiaries to total firm assets is equal to or higher than 10%. 
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The second generation of studies introduced a number of new explanatory 
variables. Many studies at this time emphasize industry and firm-specific variables. R & 
D expenditure is used by Horst (1972), Gorecki (1976) and Grubaugh (1987) with mainly 
significant and positive results. They also include industrial dummies (for resource 
sectors, labor or advertising intensity, etc.) in their studies with ambiguous results. 
Grubaugh (1987) also analyzes product diversity, obtaining a positive correlation with 
FDI. The size of FDI enterprises in the host economies is applied by Horst (1972), Ray 
(1977), and Lunn (1980 and 1983) in their model with mainly negative or insignificant 
results. Baldwin (1979) discovers that industries with high concentration ratios and those 
employing large numbers of skilled labor attract more FDI. Similarly, Culem’s model 
(1988) includes labor cost and labor cost differential, but reports ambiguous results. 
Moreover, the age of the FDI (the length of FDI history) has been found to have an 
ambiguous effect on FDI by Bond (1981) and Ball and Tschoegl (1982).  
From the 1980s onwards, trade openness (Goldberg and Saunders, 1981), 
exchange rate (Cushman, 1985), interest rates (Cushman, 1985, Culem, 1988), foreign 
capital price (Cushman, 1985) and inflation rate in host country (Schneider and Frey, 
1985) have become important determinants in FDI models.  
The first manifestation of political economy variables also goes back to the 1980s; 
multilateral aid, and the type of government and political system turn out to be 
statistically significant in explaining FDI (Schneider and Frey, 1985); bilateral aid 
coming from Western countries and multilateral aid have a stimulating effect on FDI, but 
help from communist countries has a negative effect. Political instability significantly 
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reduces the FDI. A tax exemption dummy is found to have a significant and positive 
relationship with FDI firms’ survival dummy4 in Bond’s research in 1981.  
In most articles, these new variables coexist with the established explanatory 
variables, i.e. host country’s GDP, exports, trade barriers, relative labor cost, lagged FDI. 
Among them, host GDP dominates the results with its very significant coefficient in most 
cases. 
Even though OLS remained the main methodology in the 1970s and 1980s, some 
new econometric tools had been introduced during the 1980s in order to accommodate 
more complicated and sophisticated model specification and solve econometric 
challenges (heteroscedasticity, correlations, endogeneity, non-linear regression, or 
dichotomous dependent variables, etc.) For example, Generalized Least Squares used by 
Horst (1972), Goldberg and Saunders (1981), and Culem (1988); Two Stage Least 
Squares by Scaperlanda and Balough (1983); Probit in Bond (1981); and Logit applied by 
Ball and Tschoegl (1982) and Grubaugh (1987). These new econometric methods do 
provide more significant results. 
                                                 
4
 =1 if the surveyed firms are still in operation, and 0 if the firm has ceased operations. 
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1.4 Third Generation Models: Mature in the 1990s and Beyond (till 
2008) 
 
The period after 1990 has seen a massive expansion in the scope and increasing 
sophistication in the literature studying FDI, which can be discussed with respect to the 
econometric methods, the data, the dependent variable and the array of explanatory 
variables.  
 
 
Methodology Used in FDI Studies 
Besides the traditional panel data estimation methods, researchers have paid much more 
attention to the latent variable models to analyze the “discrete” or “limited” FDI data5. 
Kogut and Chang (1991), Blonigen and Feenstra (1996), Blonigen (1997), Keller 
and Levinson (1999), and Castellani and Zanfei (2002) have applied Negative Binomial 
model in their research. A similar method, Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model, is 
used by Keller and Levinson (2002). In addition, List (1999), Keller and Levinson 
(1999), and Tomlin (2000) also choose Poisson or zero inflated Poisson models. Some 
other Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) methods have been used in articles by 
                                                 
5
 The detailed econometric methods used for the latent variable model are as follows: Probit models in 
Chen (1992), Altomonte (2000), Smarzynska and Wei (2000, 2001), Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), and 
Habib and Zurawicki (2002); Tobit used by Campa (1993), Eaton and Tamura (1994, 1995, and 1996), 
Hines (1996), Lee and Mansfield (1996), Tomlin (2000), Wei (1997a and 2000), Asiedu and Esfahani 
(2001), and Jensen (2002); Logit in Sylvia and Harianto (1995), Friedman et al (1996), Cleeve (1997), 
Klein et al (2000), Seyf (2001), Baek and Kwok (2002), Ito and Rose (2002), and Makino et al (2002); 
Multinomial Logit in Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996), Mariotti and Piscitello (1999), Lopez-Duarte and 
Garcia-Canal (2002), and Louri et al (2002); Conditional Logit applied by Coughlin et al (1991), and Ford 
and Strange (1999); and Heteroscedastic Extreme Value (Generalized Conditional Logit) Model in Suazo 
(2002). 
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Kogut and Chang (1996, partial MLE), and Dilyard (1999, exact maximum likelihood 
method6). 
 
Other methodologies involve Seemingly Unrelated Regression (Dewenter, 1995), 
Three Stage Least Squares (Bende-Nabende and Ford, 1998), Instrumental variables 
(Lucas, 1993, Hines and Rice, 1994, Alesina and Dollar, 1998, Altshuler and Grubert, 
1998, Hines, 1998, Benassy-Quere et al, 2001), Generalized Methods of Moments (Keller 
and Levinson, 1999), the Principal Component analysis (Sagari, 1992, Wheeler and 
Mody, 1992, Lucas, 1993, Seyf, 2001), and Extreme Bound Analysis (Chakrabarti, 2001, 
Bandelj, 2002). These special methods satisfy the unique requirements of different 
econometric scenarios.  
More recently, Enders and Sandler (1996), Barrell and Pain (1996), Sarno and 
Taylor (1999), Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000), Buch (2001), Basu et al. (2001), and 
Ramirez (2002) have conducted Time Series and Stationarity Analysis in FDI. 
Furthermore, Enders and Sandler (1996), Jun and Singh (1996), and Lipsey (2000a) 
include Granger Causality tests in their studies. 
In order to tackle the bias due to presence of the lagged dependent variable as a 
regressor in panel data, Cheng and Kwan (2000), Keller and Levinson (2002), Carstensen 
and Toubal (2004) and Anghel (2006) applied a new GMM estimation process created by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Uctum and Doytch (2008) also 
                                                 
6
 The exact maximum likelihood method includes the initial likelihood term, as opposed to the other 
approximate maximum likelihood methods, in which the initial likelihood term is either dropped or treated 
in an ad hoc manner. The exact maximum likelihood method can achieve small-sample bias reduction and 
efficiency gains (Beach and MacKinnon, 1978, and Diebold and Schuermann 1996). The Partial MLE is 
established based on three assumptions on a likelihood hazard specification thus the model can be 
simplified to estimate partial instead of full maximum likelihood functions. 
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apply Blundell and Bond system GMM method to analyze the effect of FDI. This 
Blundell-Bond System GMM method will provide robust estimation in the dynamic FDI 
models. This method will also be applied in Chapter 3 of this paper to study FDI inflows. 
 
 
Data Scope of FDI Studies 
In contrast to the first and second generation researches that predominantly emphasize the 
FDI coming from and going into the U.S., the third generation FDI literature expands the 
analytical scope to many different regions in the world.  
While large panel studies by Wheeler and Mody (1992), Harrison and Revenga 
(1995), Wei (1997a, 1997b, 2000), UN (1998, 1999), Alesina and Dollar (1998), Lipsey 
(2000a), Kucera (2002), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), and Balasubramanyam et al. 
(2002) create a global perspective on the FDI, smaller regional researches specifically 
emphasize developing or emerging economies7. 
Some analyses have also examined FDI into more specific regions (groups of 
countries) such as: FDI to African countries (Morisset, 2000, Asiedu, 2002), FDI into 
Asian economies (Sylvia and Harianto, 1995, Lipsey, 1999a, Baek and Okawa, 2001), 
and Latin American economies (Tuman and Emmert, 1999). Other researchers (Goldberg 
and Klein, 1997, Dilyard, 1999, Sarno and Taylor, 1999, and Ito, 1999) combine some 
Asian and Latin American countries for study. In addition, developed Europe is always a 
focus for FDI analyses (Froot and Stein, 1991, Barrel and Pain, 1997, Ford and Strange, 
                                                 
7
 Researches emphasizing developing or emerging economies include Edwards (1990), Lucas (1993), 
Hanson (1995), Summary and Summary (1995), Jun and Singh (1996), Wilhelms (1998), Gastanaga et al 
(1998), Noorbakhsh et al (2001), Basu et al (2001), Benassy-Quere et al (2001), Asiedu (2002), and Harms 
and Ursprung (2002). 
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1999, Bevan et al, 2002, Barrell and Pain, 1998). With the dramatic geo-political change 
in the 1990s, researchers have naturally paid their attention to FDI in transition 
economies (Jensen, 2002, Anghel, 2006) and FDI into Central and Eastern Europe 
(Selowski and Martin, 1997, Altomonte, 2000, Ziacik, 2000, Holland et al, 2000, Bevan 
et al, 2002, Bandelj, 2002, Janicki and Wunnava, 2004, Carstensen and Toubal, 2004, 
Anghel, 2006). Moreover, FDI in Mediterranean countries has been analyzed by Mintz 
and Tsiopoulos (1997) and FDI inflow to Arabian countries has been investigated by 
Shrestha and Onyeiwu (2002). 
 Others have studied FDI at the country level. Following the rapid increase of 
Japanese FDI in the latter half of 1980s, Japanese inbound or outbound FDI has attracted 
many researchers8.  
FDI inflows or outflows from the United Kingdom have been investigated by 
Goldberg and Kolstad (1994), Milner and Pentecost (1996), Barrell and Pain (1997), 
Cleeve (1997), Billington (1999), and Girma (2002). FDI concerning the other developed 
countries is also covered, such as Canadian FDI by Froot and Stein (1991), and Goldberg 
and Kolstad (1994); outbound FDI from Italy by Mariotti and Piscitello (1999); Spanish 
outbound FDI in Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2002); and Inward FDI in Greece by 
Louri et al. (2002).  
In addition to the above FDI concerning developed countries, the recent rapid 
development across world has led to an acceleration trend of both inward and outward 
FDI in developing economies. FDI into Mainland China, the largest FDI recipient in the 
                                                 
8
 Studies on Japanese FDI include Kogut and Chang (1991), Froot and Stein (1991), Goldberg and Kolstad 
(1994), Eaton and Tamura (1994, 1995, and 1996), Sylvia and Harianto (1995), Dewenter (1995), Pugel et 
al (1996), Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1996), Kogut and Chang (1996), Blonigen and Feenstra (1996), 
Blonigen (1997), Cleeve (1997), Goldberg and Klein (1997), Hines (1998), Ford and Strange (1999), 
Tuman and Emmert (1999), Ito (1999), Seyf (2001), Baek and Okawa (2001), and Park (2003). 
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developing world, has been examined by Cheng and Kwan (2000), Sun et al. (2002), 
Fung et al. (2002), and others. Taiwan, in addition, has attracted researchers into its 
inward or outward FDI (Tsai, 1991, Chen, 1992, Tu and Schive, 1995, Chow, 1996 and 
2010, Bende-Nabende and Ford, 1998, Makino et al, 2002). Latin American countries are 
a focus for many studies not only due to their vast foreign indirect investment but also 
because of the huge FDI in these economies. Ramirez (2002) sheds light on FDI inflows 
to Mexico and Suazo (2002) studies FDI in 13 regions in Chile. 
 However, since the United States is the largest player in the global markets 
(Lipsey, 1999b), it is not surprising that in the third-generation FDI literature, FDI in and 
out of the United States has been studied much more often than any other countries or 
regions in the world. Both the entire U.S. and specific areas have been examined9.  
 Additionally, some researchers have focused on FDI at the firm level. These 
studies include Grubert and Mutti (1991), Altshuler and Grubert (1996, 1998), Asiedu 
and Esfahani (2001) and Baek and Kwok (2002) on U.S. Transnational Corporations; 
Feliciano and Lipsey (2002) concerning foreign takeovers and establishment of new 
firms in U.S.; Castellani and Zanfei (2002) on 32 largest U.S. and European companies in 
the electronic sectors; Smarzynska and Wei (2000, 2001) and Anghel (2006) on surveyed 
European firms; and Klein et al. (2000) on Japanese firms and banks. Finally, Ito and 
Rose (2002) analyze the FDI location strategies of the global Tire giants. These firm level 
researches have contributed a critical part in FDI determination models: the micro-
economic (firm-characteristic) arguments. 
 
                                                 
9
 Coughlin et al (1991), Friedman et al (1996), and List (1999) analyze some specific areas in U.S. and 
Tomlin (2000) studies some specific American industries. 
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Dependent Variable 
FDI determination models in the third generation treat various aspects and characteristics 
of FDI as the dependent variables, as well as using the traditional measures, such as: 
annual FDI inflows in Barrell and Pain (1996), Lipsey (1999b), and Blonigen and Davies 
(2001); first-difference of FDI flows in Goldberg and Kolstad (1994), Enders and Sandler 
(1996), Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000), and Ramirez (2002); and net annual FDI flows in 
Cassou (1997), Buckley and Castro (1998), Altshuler et al. (1998), Hines (1998), Lipsey 
(1999b, 2000b), Tuman and Emmert (1999), and Chakrabarti (2001). Cumulative FDI 
inflows or FDI stock have been analyzed by Grubert and Mutti (1991), Wei (1997a, 
1997b, 2000), Barrell and Pain (1998), Benassy-Quere et al. (2001), Bandelj (2002), and 
Park (2003). Chow (1996) studies FDI in different industrial sectors. 
In addition to the use of aggregate FDI, per capita FDI has been examined by 
Hanson (1999), and Harms and Ursprung (2002).  
The foregoing studies have used actual FDI as a dependent variable; in contrast, 
contractual (announced) FDI is the topic in Baek and Kwok (2002).  
Researchers have also analyzed the ratios of different FDIs, especially the specific 
FDI relative to the aggregated value of FDI. For example, the ratio of FDI in each state to 
the total FDI in the U.S. (Hines, 1996); the ratio of host FDI inflows to world total FDI 
inflows (Kucera, 2002); and the ratio of the host country’s FDI to total home countries’ 
FDI (Edwards, 1990, Goldberg and Kolstad, 1994, Hines, 1998). Habib and Zurawicki 
(2002) create a new target variable, comparing the host country's share in global FDI with 
its share in the home country's total outgoing FDI. Additionally, Lee and Mansfield 
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(1996) target the percentage of firm-level FDI that devoted to sales, distribution outlets, 
primary production, and assembly facilities. 
In addition to these various comparisons within FDI, other studies focus on the 
relation of FDI to the size of the economy. The ratio of FDI to host GDP has been studied 
by Edwards (1990), Harrison and Revenga (1995), Alesina and Dollar (1998), Gastanaga 
et al. (1998), UN (1999), and Asiedu (2002). Froot and Stein (1991) examine FDI inflow 
as a percent of host GNP. Park (2003) studies Japanese FDI outflows over sales. The 
economic size-normalized FDI can be treated as a FDI propensity: regardless of 
economic size, the higher this ratio, the higher the propensity of the economy to attract 
FDI. 
Some studies have examined the components of FDI such as transfer of funds 
(Cassou, 1997), loans to FDI enterprises over these enterprises’ total assets (Altshuler and 
Grubert, 1996), new plant (Friedman et al., 1996), mergers and acquisitions (M&A, 
Friedman et al., 1996, Klein and Rosengren, 2000 and Feliciano and Lipsey, 2002) and 
real estate purchases as a component in total FDI (Klein and Rosengren, 2000 and 
Feliciano and Lipsey, 2002). Hines and Rice (1994), Altshuler et al. (1998), Lipsey 
(1999a), and Keller and Levinson (1999) analyze the investment stock, the total assets 
and fixed assets of FDI enterprises.  
A number of articles study FDI transactions (the count of FDI projects) rather 
than the value of FDI (Coughlin et al, 1991, Froot and Stein, 1991, Kogut and Chang, 
1991, Campa, 1993, Blonigen and Feenstra, 1996, Friedman et al, 1996, Blonigen, 1997, 
List, 1999, Tomlin, 2000, Seyf, 2001, and Castellani and Zanfei, 2002). For example, 
Suazo (2002) investigates the 640 FDI projects’ regional selection dummies in Chile. 
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Klein and Rosengre (2000) also look at the number of FDI projects using Japanese banks 
as their main banks. 
Several studies have focused on the probability aspect of FDI. Chen (1992) 
addresses the intention of Taiwan’s investors to invest abroad, and Makino et al. (2002) 
study the location choice of Taiwan’s outward FDI. Several other articles also draw some 
general conclusions from the probability that a firm would invest abroad (Belderbos and 
Sleuwaegen, 1996, Kogut and Chang, 1996, Cleeve, 1997, Ford and Strange, 1999, 
Altomonte, 2000, Smarzynska and Wei, 2000, 2001, Ito and Rose, 2002). More 
specifically, Sylvia and Harianto (1995) analyze the probability that Japanese firms will 
choose certain FDI strategies (goals being markets, strategic assets, or efficiency). Asiedu 
and Esfahani (2001), Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2002), Baek and Kwok (2002), 
and Louri et al. (2002) explore the topic of choices of ownership structure of FDI 
enterprises in host countries.  
In contrast to the other FDI researchers, Mariotti and Piscitello (1999) examine 
FDI divesting, and the survival, failure or restructuring of Italian firms’ FDI projects.    
 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Since 1990, there has been increased interest in bringing new explanatory variables into 
FDI determination studies. The following provides a brief, selective summary of recent 
developments regarding the explanatory variables: 
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Lagged FDI and Other FDI Related Variables 
Notably, lagged FDI has a consistently significant and positive effect on FDI, 
whether it is specified as flows or stocks, inflows or outflows, value or count of projects.  
It is the main explanatory variable in Tu and Schive (1995), Barrell and Pain 
(1996), Kogut and Chang (1996), Barrell and Pain (1998), List (1999), Bandelj (2002), 
Girma (2002), and Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2002). However, other studies have 
different results. Kudrle (1995) reports an ambiguous effect for lagged FDI. Gastanaga et 
al. (1998) find that both total and manufacturing FDI from the U.S. as a percentage of 
host GDP (lagging 1 period) have negative or insignificant effects on the ratio of 
aggregate FDI inflows to host GDP for 49 less-developed-countries (LDCs) in the next 
period. In addition, UN (1998) and Lipsey (1999a) find that the unexplained component 
of FDI has a positive effect on FDI in the next period. One possible interpretation is that 
the unexplained residuals are representing the effects of unspecified determinants of FDI, 
especially the political, social, and cultural factors which is difficult to be quantified into 
regressions. 
Other FDI-related variables are also studied. Sagari (1992) determines that FDI in 
other sectors has a significant and positive effect on FDI in the banking industry. 
Findings concerning the important relationship between FDI and other types of global 
investment have been summarized by Lipsey (1999b). He notes that other types of 
international investment (short-term capital, or long-term capital excluding FDI, or 
portfolio capital10) have significant relationships with inward and outward FDI. 
                                                 
10
 Short-term capital refers to an investment period less than a year. Long-term capital is for an investment 
period longer than a year. For portfolio capital, the investment goal does not involve management- i.e. 
either no voting shares or only under 10% voting shares change hands. 
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Furthermore, using years of experience of FDI and the ratio of FDI to total assets, 
Cleeve (1997) demonstrates that these variables significantly affect the selection of the 
joint venture as FDI structure. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) incorporate age of FDI 
enterprises in their model and derive a significant and positive effect on FDI, but the age 
of FDI is found to be insignificant in Makino et al.(2002).  
Sylvia and Harianto (1995) report that the percentage of Japanese ownership of 
the FDI electronic firms encourages these Japanese FDI firms to chose low-cost supplier 
strategy (efficiency seeking motivation) or export-market penetration strategy (market-
seeking motivation) but has an insignificant effect on the choice of strategy of “upgrading 
of products and technology” (strategic asset seeking motivation). Mariotti and Piscitello 
(1999) include FDI start-up size, FDI entry mode dummies and affiliates diversification 
in their model with significant effects in most cases. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) show 
that the number of foreign subsidiaries and its quadratic form have ambiguous effects on 
FDI. Sun et al. (2002) examine the effect of the ratio of the accumulated FDI in China to 
Chinese domestic investment with basically negative results, whereas Blonigen and 
Davies (2000) calculate the ratio of the host country's FDI stock to its GDP and reveal 
that its impact on FDI is mainly significant and positive.  
Finally, Goldberg and Kolstad (1994) have estimated the effects of volatility 
(standard error) of FDI and the first difference of the volatility of the FDI and derive 
insignificant results in most cases. 
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Exchange Rates  
Exchange rate is one of the best-known explanatory variables for FDI determination 
models, but its expected effect on FDI is twofold.  
Froot and Stein (1991) wrote an influential article on the effect of exchange rates 
and conclude that the logarithm of real value of the dollar has a significantly negative or 
insignificant effect on U.S. FDI inflow, which “lend(s) some credence to popular claims 
that a depreciated currency can give foreigners an edge in buying control of productive 
corporate assets.”  This view is affirmed by Kogut and Chang (1996) who show that the 
exchange rate between host and home countries (the ratio of the home country's currency 
to the FDI host country's currency) has a significant and negative effect on FDI. 
Furthermore, both Ito (1999) and Baek and Okawa (2001) report that home currency per 
US dollar has mainly a significant and negative effect on Japanese FDI into Asian 
economies. However, Baek and Okawa (2001) find that the host currency per US dollar is 
not a significant determinant of FDI. They also discover that the difference between the 
nominal and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates of the home currency per US$ has a 
significantly negative impact. In contrast, the difference between the nominal and PPP 
rates of the host currency per US$ has an insignificant effect. Tomlin (2000) studies a 
trade-weighted exchange index of the U.S. dollar (a rise in the index indicates a real 
appreciation of the dollar). The conclusion is that the exchange index has a significantly 
positive effect on FDI into the U.S. 
Many researchers have investigated the effect of the volatility of the exchange 
rate on FDI with different conclusions. The standard error of the exchange rate has been 
examined by Goldberg and Kolstad (1994), who find a positive effect on FDI, but Tomlin 
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(2000) and Baek and Kwok (2002) find insignificant results. Goldberg and Kolstad 
(1994) discover that the first difference of the standard error of exchange rate has an 
insignificant or negative relationship with FDI. Benassy-Quere et al. (2001) calculate 
coefficients of variation and correlation of the nominal exchange rate (host currencies 
against home currencies) and get significantly negative effects on 17 OECD countries’ 
FDI in 42 developing economies. Baek and Kwok (2002) report that the ratio of the FDI 
announcement-year’s average exchange rate to the average rate for the previous 3 years 
has an insignificant effect on FDI.   
Other exchange-rate-related variables have also been extensively analyzed. 
Harrison and Revenga (1995) include in their research the adjusted dollar index, an 
indicator of the degree of distortion of the price structure of the tradable goods. They 
have discovered that this index has a negative effect, but the first difference of the value 
has an insignificant effect on FDI. They also include in their model dummy variables for 
multiple exchange rates in the international economy (for host imports, exports, capital 
transactions, etc.). The results are generally undetermined or insignificant. In addition, 
Benassy-Quere et al. (2001) generate a new variable, the logarithm of the real exchange 
rate of the host country relative to that of the home country, with a significant and 
positive effect on 17 OECD countries’ FDI in 42 developing economies. Gastanaga et al. 
(1998) investigate the black market premium of exchange rates in 49 less-developed 
countries, with insignificant results.  
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New GDP or GNP Related Variables 
In addition to the traditional GDP and GNP, numerous new GDP or GNP related 
variables have been created since 1990, which are mostly expected to be positively 
related to FDI. 
The effect of the share of the components of GDP or GNP has been studied 
extensively. 
Both Edwards (1992) and Harrison and Revenga (1995) demonstrate that the ratio 
of the host government consumption to GDP has ambiguous effects on FDI. 
In the case of the industrial production to GDP ratio, Edwards (1990) discovers 
that the variable has a mainly positive relationship with FDI inflows. Harrison and 
Revenga (1995) find that the mining industry's production relative to GDP is in the main 
positively correlated with FDI inflows, while the reverse is true for the agricultural 
industry. 
Bevan et al. (2002) find that the private sector’s share of GDP in the host country 
has a significant and positive effect on FDI in 12 Eastern European transitional countries. 
Per capita GNP or GDP is also included in the third generation models. Eaton and 
Tamura (1994) point out the significant and positive effect of per capita GNP in the home 
country. This conclusion is confirmed by Blonigen and Davies (2000).  
The relationship between home and host GDP or GNP has also been explored. 
Blonigen and Davies (2000) show that the sum of the host and home countries' level of 
real GDP has a significantly positive relationship with FDI. They also conclude that the 
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square of the difference between FDI host and home country's GDP11 has a significant 
and negative effect on FDI. In addition, they analyze some interaction variables 
concerning either the sum of or the difference between home and host GDP, with mostly 
ambiguous effects. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) argue that the absolute difference 
between home and host GDP per capita, which “is included to capture the macro 
environmental differences between the host and home countries,” has a significantly 
negative or insignificant impact on FDI. 
Asiedu (2002) treats the logarithm of the expression (1/host GDP per capita) as a 
proxy of return on investment12 in the host country and finds it has a significantly 
positive effect on the ratio of net FDI flows to host GDP for 71 developing countries in 
the world. 
Gastanaga et al. (1998) apply the rational expectations assumption and add the 
future growth rate in GDP to their models, with insignificant or significantly positive 
effects. However, they find that the growth rates lagged one period are mainly 
significantly negative determinants of FDI, while with a lag of two periods effects on FDI 
are insignificant. 
Wei (1997a) uses host population as an instrument for host GDP and reports that 
it has mainly significant and positive effects on FDI. 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 This framework was proposed by Markusen and Maskus (1999a, 1999b). They proposed that FDI is 
positively correlated with the size of host and home countries but negatively correlated (non-linear) with 
the difference of home and host economies. 
12
 The expression (1/host GDP per capita) may signify other things, for example, probability of future 
return or stability of return or the potential economic growth rate, etc.  
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Education 
Education level of host workers, for example average years of schooling, has a positive 
effect on FDI in Eaton and Tamura (1994, 1995, and 1996), Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), 
Castellani and Zanfei (2002). Hanson (1995) affirms the view that higher adult literacy 
has a significant and positive effect on inward FDI. However, Morisset (2000) shows this 
argument is incompatible with the trend of the FDI inflows to African countries.  
The conclusion on the effect of school enrollment rate on FDI is two-pronged. 
Tuman and Emmert (1999) report an insignificant effect of host secondary school 
enrollment on FDI. Reaching an opposite conclusion, Fung et al. (2002) show that the 
ratio of students enrolled in higher education to its total population in China has mainly 
significant and positive impact on contractual FDI inflows. But Kucera (2002), 
generating a new uneducated rate, which is the rate of non-enrollment in secondary 
education (as a ratio to total population in that age group) in host countries, finds a 
mainly insignificant effect on FDI. Kucera (2002) also examines the ratio of female to 
male educational attainment and the female/male literacy ratio and still gets mainly 
insignificant effects on FDI.  
 
Risk Related Social-Political Variables  
Risk related social-political variables have been extensively analyzed since the 1990s for 
their effect on FDI. However, for most risk related variables, results are mixed.  
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This paper covers some critical risk factors in the investment climate for FDI, e.g. 
legal system, political and social stability, corruption, bureaucracy, democracy, and 
transition economies13.  
The literature on the effect of the legal system on FDI provides divergent 
conclusions. Altomonte (2000) finds an insignificant relationship between a legal 
variable index and FDI, while Buch (2001) illustrates that a dummy for the origin of the 
legal system (which is of English, French, or German origin) has a significant and 
positive effect on FDI and Bevan et al. (2002) discover that indexes of legal 
extensiveness and effectiveness have positive effects on FDI. On one hand, Wilhelms 
(1998) and Alesina and Dollar (1998) conclude that the strong rule of law in the FDI host 
country has a significant positive effect on FDI. On the other hand, Asiedu and Esfahani 
(2001) argue that this effect has significantly negative effect on the choice of “wholly 
owned” as ownership of foreign subsidiaries by US Transnational Enterprises (TNEs). 
Gastanaga et al. (1998) analyze the contract enforcement index and nationalization risk 
index for less-developed countries from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence 
(BERI). Both of these range from 0 (if enforcement is poor or risk is high) to 4 (if 
conditions are good). The conclusion is that good contract enforcement (i.e., low risk) has 
a significantly positive effect on FDI.  
Intellectual property protection is a critical part of a legal system from the 
economic perspective and has drawn the attention of researchers. Weakness of 
intellectual property protection depresses inbound FDI according to Lee and Mansfield 
(1996).  
                                                 
13
 In this analysis, risk related variables are listed and classified approximately with general non-economic 
definition or common sense. There are may be some overlapped domains of different risk related variables. 
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According to Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), legal limitation of equity (measured by 
the percentage of U.S. parent firms in the host country that have been asked to limit their 
equity in their foreign subsidiaries) has a significant negative effect on American FDI in 
42 countries. However, the risk of expropriation has an ambiguous effect on FDI. 
Variables for political stability and social order yield conflicting results. Edwards 
(1990) finds an index of political instability to have a mainly negative effect and 
frequency of unexpected government changes has a uniformly negative effect on FDI 
inflows, while the effect of an index of political violence is insignificant. Jun and Singh 
(1996) and Sun et al. (2002) confirm that political risk and operation risk (a country's 
general business climate) generally discouraged FDI. Along similar lines, reports from 
both Harms and Ursprung (2002) and Habib and Zurawicki (2002) show that the absence 
of political risk encouraged FDI inflows. Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal (2002) show 
that the host country’s risk has a significant effect on the mode of Spanish FDI (joint 
venture, full or partial acquisitions). However, other analyses (Tu and Schive, 1995, Wei, 
1997b, 2000, and the United Nations, 1998) conclude that political stability’s effect on 
FDI is undetermined.  
Besides the level of risk index, transformations of the risk index, e.g. the 
difference and the standard deviation of risk indexes, are also scrutinized. Habib and 
Zurawicki (2002) find that the absolute difference between home and host political 
stability (measured by a political risk index created by Political Risk Services) has an 
insignificant effect on FDI. Altomonte (2000) proves that the standard deviation of the 
time series of production indices of the manufacturing sector, which can also be regarded 
as an instability indicator, has a significantly negative effect on FDI.  
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Some researchers turn their attention to the degree of violence in host countries. 
Tuman and Emmert (1999) find that both the “War / Unpacted Regime transition14” 
dummy (coded 1 for host countries experiencing a defeat in foreign war and Unpacted 
regime transition) and host economies’ annual civilian and combatant deaths caused by 
revolutionary movements are negatively correlated with Japanese FDI. In addition, 
Enders and Sandler (1996) studied the first difference of the number of transnational 
terrorists in Spain, with significantly negative results. However, Tuman and Emmert 
(1999) also discover that host “Coup/Attempt” in 12 Latin American countries has a 
significantly positive effect on Japanese FDI into these Latin American countries. The 
authors explain the unexpected sign may result from that “firms do not view military 
action as a threat to stability.” In other words, firms are supportive of military rule 
because military regimes protect property rights. In addition, from Wei (1997b), Japanese 
firms are more adapt to corruption government, which is a main trigger for political 
instabilities.   
The question of the effect of democracy on FDI is of keen interest to FDI 
researchers. Alesina and Dollar (1998) address this question by showing that the effects 
of democracy and civil liberties indexes (from Freedom House) on the ratio of FDI to 
GNP are insignificant for global economies. Similarly, Kucera (2002) reports that both a 
political rights index (from Freedom House) and the FACB index (measures of Freedom 
of Association and Collective Bargaining) have mainly insignificant effects on FDI. 
Nonetheless, liberalization is found to be encouraging FDI by Selowski and Martin 
(1997), Bende-Nabende and Ford (1998), Balasubramanyam et al. (2002) and Harms and 
                                                 
14
 The authors include unpacted transition cases where the military is defeated and forced to exit without an 
agreement over property rights, political processes, and amnesty for the military. 
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Ursprung (2002). Furthermore, Harms and Ursprung (2002) show that the average level 
of political repression and civil repression in FDI host developing countries (from 
Freedom House) has a significantly negative effect on FDI inflows.  
Not surprisingly, evidence from a number of studies shows that corruption 
generally discourages FDI (Wei, 1997a, 2000, Wilhelms, 1998, Smarzynska and Wei, 
2000, 2001, Balasubramanyam et al., 2002, and Jensen, 2002), however, some 
researchers do report different results. For example, Wei (1997b) does find that a 
corruption index (from Business International, the higher value, the more corruption) in 
the host country has a mainly positive effect on Japanese FDI, while Gastanaga et al. 
(1998) suggest that absence of corruption has mainly insignificant effect on FDI in less-
developed countries.  
Similarly, Harms and Ursprung (2002) confirm that the sum of indexes of 
corruption, bureaucracy and law-and-order tradition in host countries has insignificant 
effects on FDI.  
In addition, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) report the positive effect of the absolute 
difference between home and host CPI (Corruption Perception Index compiled by 
Transparency International [TI]) on FDI. They also find that the country dummy for the 
presence of organizations like TI in the FDI host country has a significantly positive 
impact.  
In addition to studying corruption as an independent determinant, Wei (1997a, 
1997b, 2000) has also shed light on the effect of the interaction of corruption and other 
variables. Wei (1997a) finds that the interactive variables of corruption with dummies for 
home countries in East Asia and in the U.S. have mainly insignificant effects on FDI. 
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However, the effect of the interactive variable of host corruption and a Japan investor 
dummy is mainly positive, which suggests that Japanese investors would generally invest 
more in the corrupt countries than the other investors would. 
Host governments’ bureaucracy has been found to be a negative driver of FDI. 
Wei (1997b) proves in a cross-section study that “Red Tape” (bureaucratic obstacles) in 
the FDI host country has a mainly negative effect on FDI.  
Host country’s debt is another variable that has been used to gauge the country-
risk and is expected to be negatively related to FDI, as shown by Klein et al. (2000). 
However, Lucas (1993), Jun and Singh (1996), Dilyard (1999) and Shrestha and 
Onyeiwu (2002) find debt risk has either ambiguous or insignificant effects on FDI.  
 
Taxes 
Tax rate is also analyzed in FDI literature with negative effect on FDI in most cases.  
Among the many tax related variables in FDI literature are the tax rate on 
dividends, the corporate or income tax rates, the deviation from the average of the 
corporate tax rate, the reciprocal of the average effective corporate tax rates, the share of 
tax revenue in the host GDP, and the square of the tax variables15.  
These variables generally have a significant and negative effect on FDI inflows. 
However, ambiguous effects of certain tax variables on FDI have also been reported; 
examples are per capita state and local taxes in the U.S. (Coughlin et al, 1991, Friedman 
                                                 
15
 The details of the tax related variables are the marginal effective tax rate (Mintz and Tsiopoulos, 1997), 
the host withholding tax rate on dividends (Altshuler and Grubert, 1996), the host corporate or income tax 
rates (Grubert and Mutti, 1991, Hines and Rice, 1994, Altshuler and Grubert, 1996, Cassou, 1997, Wei, 
1997a, 1997b, 2000, Lipsey, 1999a, Smarzynska and Wei, 2000, 2001), the deviation from the weighted 
average of the state corporate tax rate (Hines, 1996), the reciprocal of the host average effective corporate 
tax rates (Grubert and Mutti, 1991), and the share of the tax revenue in host GDP (Wilhelms, 1998). Hines 
and Rice (1994) also included the square of the tax variables in their article. 
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et al, 1996, List, 1999), tax incentives in Taiwan (Tsai, 1991, Tu and Schive, 1995) and 
the type of the tax system in host countries (Klein and Rosengren, 2000). Lipsey (1999a) 
also finds the similar results in an analysis on host taxes on US affiliates (FDI from the 
U.S.). 
Other studies introduce new tax-related variables. Altshuler et al. (1998) establish 
a new set of independent variables, the logarithm of one minus average effective tax rates 
for FDI enterprises: mainly positive effects are found. Furthermore, withholding tax rate 
on dividends has also been found by Altshuler and Grubert (1996) to have a positive 
effect.  
In order to tackle the effect of taxation on FDI from a new standing point of tax 
treaty, Blonigen and Davis (2000) create a dummy for a U.S. bilateral tax treaty with a 
given partner country. They report that the dummy’s effect on FDI is mainly insignificant 
(with a few positive cases), but the length of time that a treaty has existed has a positive 
effect on FDI in most cases. However, this result could be influenced by a lagged FDI 
paralleling the duration of the tax treaty. Similarly, Bandelj (2002) finds a positive effect 
of investment treaties on FDI. Hines Jr. (1998) argues that a dummy for tax-sparing in 
host economies is positively correlated with Japanese FDI. Keller and Levinson (1999) 
also include a new explanatory variable, tax effort in the host state (an index calculated as 
actual tax revenues divided by those that would be collected by a model tax code)16, and 
find a positive effect on FDI in the U.S. 
 
                                                 
16
 Tax effort comes from “State Fiscal Capacity and Effort” 1988 by Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations. From Keller and Levinson (1999), “This variable measures the extent to 
which a state utilizes its available tax bases. It is a state’s actual revenues divided by its estimated capacity 
to raise revenues based on a model tax code, multiplied by 100. The national average is 100.” 
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Tariff and other Trade Barriers 
The research on tariff’s effect on FDI leads to varied conclusions. In the work of Grubert 
and Mutti (1991), Jun and Singh (1996), and Hasnat (1997), a mainly positive effect is 
reported, which supports the “tariff-jump” FDI argument (FDI undertaken to avoid 
tariff). Others, however, report mainly insignificant results (Kudrle, 1995, Harrison and 
Revenga, 1995, Milner and Pentecost, 1996, and Castellani and Zanfei, 2002). And Chow 
(2010) concludes that FDI has a complementary effect on home country’s export, 
rejecting the “tariff-jumping” hypothesis. 
Studying the effect of non-tariff barriers, Kogut and Chang (1991) construct a 
dummy indicating official quotas and voluntary restraints on home country’s exports. At 
first, they found the dummy to have a consistently significant and positive effect on FDI 
in host economies, but this effect was not maintained in their subsequent research (Kogut 
and Chang, 1996). Blonigen and Feenstra (1996) analyze protection dummies (for anti 
dumping duties or Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements for a US industry) and find 
mainly positive effects on Japanese FDI in the U.S. Buch (2001) finds that control on 
capital account transactions has a clearly negative effect on FDI.  
 
Interest Rates 
Contrary to standard theory regarding interest rates, a study of net interest expense in the 
FDI home country by Altshuler and Grubert (1996) finds a positive effect on FDI, and 
Shrestha and Onyeiwu (2002) show that a greater lending rate of host commercial banks 
increases FDI. Feliciano and Lipsey (2002) also discover that the real interest rate in the 
host country has positively affected FDI in the U.S. Home country interest rate, however, 
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does not have an influence. It seems that the financial resources funding FDI do not come 
from short-term financial market in either home country or host country. How to finance 
FDI? For Mergers and Acquisitions, most deals are in type of exchanges of stocks instead 
of cash purchase, thus no extra fund is needed for FDI investors. For green-field FDI, the 
funding may mainly come from accumulation of profits or stock sales instead of 
borrowing from short-term money market. 
 
Labor Cost and Wages  
The argument in the literature on wage’s effect on FDI is two-pronged. 
Chow (1996) finds that lower labor cost does motivate Taiwan’s FDI in Malaysia. 
Barrell and Pain (1998) consider relative labor cost, defined as the labor cost in a host or 
home location relative to the cost in other host or home locations in Europe, respectively. 
They find the host relative labor cost has a negative effect on FDI, while the home 
relative labor cost has a positive effect, thus confirming the argument that FDI is cost 
driven. This conclusion is affirmed by two subsequent analyses. Kucera (2002) creates 
the logarithm of wages as a share of value added in host manufacturing industries, and 
finds mainly negative effects on FDI. Castellani and Zanfei (2002) determine that 
average wages of all workers in the host country as a share of average wages of all 
workers in the home country have a mainly negative impact on the number of FDI plants 
of the 32 largest electronic firms in the U.S. and Europe.  
However, Baek and Okawa (2001) reach ambiguous results when they measure 
the effect of an index of host wage or labor costs relative to such costs in home countries. 
Girma (2002) finds that the average wage rates of the group of operatives and of the 
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group of administrative, technical and clerical workers in the UK have insignificant 
effects on FDI inflows. 
Finally, Lucas (1993) summarizes effects of several labor cost variables on FDI in 
seven eastern and southeastern Asian economies. Results are contradictory: the principal-
component variables for labor cost (mainly negative), lagged labor cost (mainly positive), 
capital rent over labor cost (mainly negative), and lagged capital rent over labor cost 
(insignificant results).  
 
Openness to International Trade 
Openness to international trade has drawn extensive attention in FDI literature in the 3rd 
generation of FDI determination models. Most analytical results reflect openness’ 
positive effect on FDI.  
Harrison and Revenga (1995) demonstrate that the index of openness (the 
summation of exports and imports vs. GDP) in host economy has significantly positive 
effect on FDI. And Blonigen and Davies (2000) have found a positive effect of home 
country’s index of openness. Similarly, Habib and Zurawicki (2002) discover that the 
absolute difference between home and host's index of openness has a mainly positive 
effect. But Harrison and Revenga (1995) report that changes in the index of openness are 
statistically insignificant.  
The positive effect of open-trade policies on FDI or the negative effect of trade 
restrictions is asserted by many researches. For example, Harrison and Revenga (1995) 
do show that the dummy of restrictions on trade payments in respect of host current 
transactions has a negative effect on FDI. Altshuler et al. (1998) record that the effect of 
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the trade restriction regime ranging from 0 (most open) to 3 (most restrictive) is negative. 
In addition, Harms and Ursprung (2002) find that a host trade openness indicator 
(reflecting the low trade barriers, such as low tariff rates, low black market exchange 
premium, and fewer restrictions on capital movements.) has a positive effect on FDI 
inflows. But, Lee and Mansfield (1996), putting openness indicators of the host country 
practices (free import, price controls, profit repatriation controls) into their model, obtain 
insignificant results.  
Bandelj (2002) also reports that the openness of host government's FDI policy has 
an insignificant effect on FDI inflows to Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
Besides the ten groups of most commonly used explanatory variables cited above, 
a number of other factors are analyzed in FDI literature: 1) international trade variables 
(export comparative advantage indicator, dependence on imported raw material, net 
energy imports, terms of trade, trade open year, labor emigration), 2) new public finance 
variables like government expenditure, 3) new financial variables (stock market, credit 
and debt, money supply, and capital), 4) human capital (population and density) and 
employment, 5) industrial characteristics (industrial shipments, industrial organization, 
company characters, profits), 6) social-political variables (diplomatic variables, 
transition, and culture), 7) distance and geographic location (common borders dummy), 
8) infrastructure, 9) natural resources and environmental protection, 10) science and 
technology, and 11) various dummies (country and time).  
All these new studies, representing the contributions of various authors, have 
permeated our understanding of the FDI sphere. 
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1.5 Conclusions on Literature Survey 
After over 40 years of development, literature on the determinants of FDI has evolved 
into an extensive and prosperous field.  
The dependent variables can be divided into three categories: the absolute or relative 
measure of the value of FDI (inflow, outflow, inward stock, and net FDI), the entry count of 
FDI projects, and various firm-level characteristics of FDI (belong to TNC (Transnational 
Corporation) or not, intention to invest, FDI strategies, performance, etc.)17.  
The researchers extensively applied various econometric methods such as OLS, MLE, 
or Time Series to analyze FDI. GMM (Blundell-Bond System) is a newly developed of 
research tool in this area. 
The commonly used explanatory variables, as shown in the foregoing literature 
survey, are host countries’ market size (GDP, GNP, or industrial outputs), previous FDI 
(lagged dependent variable), human capital (education) and wages, risk, tax, tariff, exchange 
rates, interest rates, trade openness, and dummies (country and time). These extensively used 
explanatory variables are also recommended for the FDI determination model in Chapter 3. 
This recommendation generally matches the combination of the conclusions from 
Blonigen (2005) and Chakrabarti (2001)’s comprehensive literature surveys. However, 
this recommendation differs obviously from the United Nations’ (1992) summary which, 
at that time, was mainly limited to the second generation models.   
 
 
                                                 
17
 Many firm-level characteristics of FDI are qualitative, for example, FDI strategies. In addition, some 
FDI-related characters (e.g. intention to invest and FDI strategies) may be the outcome associated with 
other firm characteristics and FDI determinants. 
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1.6 Meta-Analysis of the Studies on Two FDI Determinants 
 
Scientists have known for centuries that a single study will not resolve a major issue. 
Indeed, a small sample study will not even resolve a minor issue. Thus, the foundation of 
science is the cumulation of knowledge from the results of many studies. 
Hunter and Schmidt, Methods of Meta-Analysis 
 
The previous literature survey gives an overview of the FDI determination models based 
on over 150 articles. A following question is “Are these studies reliable?” One way to 
assess the validity of the FDI literature, specifically concerning publication bias, is to 
undertake meta-analysis. 
Meta-regression analysis (meta-analysis) may take the general form of regression 
of a variable of interest on a set of variables from a body of related studies. Meta-analysis 
techniques may be used to evaluate the reliability of results from a set of statistical 
articles, for example, to test for publication bias, a tendency of academic journals or 
researchers to report only “statistically significant” results or those confirming 
preconceived theoretical expectations.  
 Publication bias is a typical problem in quantitative research. Publication bias, 
given continuing use of journals for validating research quality, will lead to an artificially 
limited pool of statistically significant studies or reports confirming the popular theories 
which drops many valuable empirical findings. Thus, publication bias will exaggerate the 
significant results, emphasize mainstream theories, ignore implications of insignificant 
findings or alternative arguments and distort policy inferences. Because of the 
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vulnerability of an empirical literature to publication bias, the test of publication bias is 
needed for any formal conclusions from empirical studies. 
Card and Krueger (1995), following the main methodology used by Begg and 
Berlin (1988) in Biology, have conducted a typical meta-analysis in Economics to 
examine the relationship between sample size and statistical significance in minimum-
wage studies and found evidence for potential publication bias. This paper will follow 
Card and Krueger’s (1995) methodology to test the potential publication bias of studies 
of the effect of market size and exchange rates on FDI. 
According to Card and Krueger (1995), in OLS regressions, adding to sample size 
(and increasing degrees of freedom) should lower the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients and raise the absolute t values of the regressors, under the two conditions that 
the model’s structure does not change and the additional data are independent. These 
authors have pointed out a stronger relationship that “the absolute value of the t ratio 
should vary proportionally with the square root of the number of degrees of freedom, and 
a regression of the logarithm of the t ratio on the logarithm of the square root of the 
degrees of freedom should yield a coefficient of 1.”18  
This reasoning can be illustrated by the following formulas. The t values of 
explanatory variables in regressions can be calculated by equation (1), where n is sample 
size, k is the number of independent variables (including constant term), B is the 
coefficient, SE(B) is the standard error of the coefficient, e is the stochastic error term, 
and x is the mean deviation of the independent variable X. 
                                                 
18
 The strong relationship between degrees of freedom and t value indicates no publication bias and a 
genuine association in literature. While the weak relationship (that degrees of freedom have positive effect 
on t value) may indicate co-existence a genuine association and a publication bias in literature. 
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The test for publication bias is based on the following equation (2) which is the 
logarithm transformation of equation (1): 
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 The reasoning of equation (2) is as follows: if sample size n or the degrees of 
freedom (n-k) rise, the accuracy of coefficient estimates will also rise, that is, there will 
be lower standard errors and higher t statistics. 
εαα +−+= )log(10|)log(| knt b                     ---------- (2*) 
                                                                     
Therefore, Card and Krueger (1995), Stanley (2001), and Doucouliagos (2005) 
propose to apply the coefficient of the logarithm of the square root of degrees of freedom 
in equation (2*), which is an estimation transformation from equation (2), to test for the 
existence of publication bias, genuine empirical effects, or both. According to Stanley 
(2001), equation (2*) is also known as Meta-Significance Testing (MST).  
ε is an error term in equation (2*). The error may come from many resources, for 
example, the estimation of T ratio in FDI literature. If FDI determination model has 
econometric issues, such as multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, 
specification problems of inclusion of unimportant regressors or exclusion of critical 
explanatory variables, their T ratios will be biased, which affects the meta-analysis. In 
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addition, how researchers studied FDI may affect meta-analysis test: for example, the 
control variables included, the specific functional form imposed, the sample analyzed, 
and the estimation technique applied. Moreover, meta-analysis requires all FDI 
determination regressions in meta-analysis are stable and the data sets used in regressions 
are independent. Card and Krueger (1995) points out that “Another possibility is that 
structural change may alter the statistical model. In this case, the t ratio might rise of fall 
with sample size.” More specifically, the character of data used in FDI determination 
model may also be noticed in meta-analysis. Are they FDI level data sets or FDI growth 
rates? Are they panel data, cross sections, or time series? Besides the above, the error 
term also includes all the other unobserved factors affect meta-analysis.   
If α1 > 0, then the positive relationship between sample size and the absolute t 
values indicates a genuine association in empirical effects. To be more specific, 
asymmetrically if α1 = 1, then there are obviously genuine empirical effects and no 
obvious publication bias in FDI literature. If 0<α1<1, then a genuine association and a 
potential publication bias may co-exist19. If α1 ≤ 0, it is suggested that a potential 
publication bias problem exists in the FDI literature because α1 ≤ 0 indicates an abnormal 
situation in which t statistics fall as sample size (degrees of freedom) rises. In other 
words, the explanation for smaller sample studies reporting larger t values is that some 
authors struggle to increase the chance of publication of their results. This is a typical 
case for publication bias.  
                                                 
19
 It is possible that α1 >1 in publication bias test when a genuine association and a potential publication 
bias may co-exist. In the empirical publication bias tests, it is rare to find α1 >1. 
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Because other factors may affect the relationship between sample size and t 
statistics, it is necessary to extend equation (2*) to incorporate other dimensions of FDI 
literature. Thus, the simple version of MST evolves into the following statistical 
hypothesis test:  
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where α and β are coefficients and Xi are the other attributes of FDI studies which may 
affect the absolute t value, such as differences in econometric methods, model 
specification, different data structure (panel or cross section), and dummy for a 
publication article (see Table 1). 
There are two conditions for the above test of publication bias. First, the structure 
of the FDI models, where the t values come from, is stable. Second, there are no data 
issues in the FDI models. In other words, there is no serial correlation or other data 
problem to affect the relationship between sample size (or square root of degrees of 
freedom) and t statistics. 
 
 
Publication Bias Analysis for Market Size: 
In order to explore the potential publication bias in the literature on the effect of market 
size on FDI, the level of GDP, GNP, industrial production and sales have been chosen to 
represent host countries’ market size. Most articles have consistently reported mainly 
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significant and positive effects of these variables on FDI, only a few studies show 
insignificant or ambiguous results, and only one presents negative effects. This 
dominance of the results showing a positive and significant relationship between market 
size and FDI suggests that the assumption of model stability for the publication bias test 
is satisfied. On the other hand, this may be a sign of potential publication bias, because 
researchers and editors may implicitly avoid challenging the prevailing assumption 
regarding the relationship between market size and FDI, and try to publish significantly 
positive results. 
In this meta-analysis of publication bias, 311 OLS regressions of FDI inflows in 
19 articles are collected, and all regressions include market size as an explanatory 
variable. 
The following equation (4), which is a detailed version of equation (3), has been 
applied to test for publication bias for market size.  
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The dependent variable in the above regression (4) is the logarithm of the absolute 
t value of market size in each FDI study. The most important independent variable is the 
logarithm of the square root of the degrees of the freedom in 311 regressions from 19 
articles, whose coefficient is expected to be significant and positive to be around 1. To 
control for other factors, such as different model specification and data structure, 13 more 
independent variables have been added in this meta-analysis (see Table 1).  
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The meta-analysis results are presented in Tables 1.2-1.5. Table 1.2 reports the 
publication bias test for the entire group of publications. Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show meta-
analysis results for literature on FDI in developing countries and developed countries, 
respectively. Table 1.5, like Table 1.3, summarizes the publication bias test for developed 
counties, but adds an article dummy. In each table, 14 regressions have been estimated in 
different forms of equation (4). First, following equation (2*), the simplest estimation is 
reported in the far left column entitled with “Regression 1” with only the square root of 
degrees of freedom as an independent variable. Then, following equation (4), 12 different 
control variables listed in Table 1 are added by turn in regressions 2 to 12 (Regression 12 
adds two new control variables for data type). Next, Regression 13 uses all control 
variables together. Finally, Regression 14 only adds all significant control variables. All 
14 meta-analysis regressions include the square root of degrees of freedom as the most 
important explanatory variable. The explanation of the independent variables is in Table 
1. 
 Table 1.2 summarizes the meta-analysis results for the entire group of 
publications. In the 12 out of 14 meta-analysis regressions, the effect of regressing the 
logarithm of the square root of degrees of freedom on the logarithm of the absolute t 
value is significantly positive, which clearly indicates a genuine association between 
market size and FDI inflows. Nevertheless, 13 out of 14 meta-analysis regressions reject 
the null hypothesis of coefficient of square root of degrees of freedom (α1) is equal to 1. 
Because this “strong” relationship between degrees of freedom (sample size) and t value 
is rejected, publication bias may co-exist with a genuine relationship in the FDI literature 
(0<α1<1 or α1>1). 
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 A smaller meta-analysis on only 56 regressions for FDI into developing countries 
is shown in Table 1.3. Because in this small data set, variables D3 (dummy for dependent 
variable is not level of FDI) and D11 (dummy for cross section data) are equal to 0 and 
variable D12 (dummy for panel data) is equal to 1, only 12 meta-analysis regressions can 
be estimated. All 12 yield a significant and positive relationship between the degrees of 
freedom and t statistics, unanimously indicating a genuine relationship between market 
size and FDI. Nonetheless, all 12 reject the null hypothesis of a “strong” relationship 
(slope coefficient equal to 1), which signals potential publication bias regarding FDI in 
developing countries. 
 Table 1.4 demonstrates meta-analysis of another small data set with 227 
regressions for FDI into developed countries. In this case, only 2 out of 12 meta-analysis 
regressions confirm a significant positive relationship between the degrees of freedom 
and t value, 9 out of 12 find the relationship insignificant, and a meta-analysis regression, 
“Regression 4”, even shows a significant negative relationship (the absolute value of the t 
statistic drops as sample size increases). This finding is consistent with a publication bias 
in the literature on FDI into developed countries. Furthermore, Table 1.4 also indicates 
that there is no genuine association between market size and FDI into developed 
countries. 
 For this meta-analysis regarding FDI in the developed countries, most of the 
regressions come from one article by Bandera and White (1968). Thus, a dummy 
variable, which is equal to 1 if the study comes from this article, is added into the meta-
analysis to control for the specific effect of this article. This new meta-analysis is 
summarized in Table 1.5. None of the 12 meta-analysis regressions in Table 1.5 reports a 
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significant and positive relationship between degrees of freedom and t statistics. On the 
contrary, four meta-analysis regressions even show a significantly negative relationship, 
which indicates that the larger the sample size, the smaller the t statistic. The remaining 
eight meta-analysis regressions show insignificant results. As with Table 1.4, this result 
also consistently confirms a publication bias instead of a genuine relationship between 
market size and FDI in the studies for developed countries.  
In conclusion, the meta-analysis of the effect of the host market size on FDI 
argues that there is a genuine association between market size and FDI in the literature 
for countries at all levels of development and in studies on FDI in developing countries 
because of the significantly positive relationship between the degrees of freedom and t 
value. On the other hand, the strong hypothesis that the slope coefficient of the degrees of 
freedom variable is equal to 1 does not hold in most cases (coefficients are positive but 
significantly different from 1). Hence, potential publication bias may co-exist with a 
genuine relationship. 
The meta-analysis also reveals that there is publication bias for the research on the 
effect of market size on FDI into developed countries. In addition, a genuine association 
between market size and FDI into developed countries cannot be confirmed. 
Two possible reasons for the existence of the publication bias (especially in 
literature concerning developed countries) are as follows: First, there is a real publication 
bias problem in the literature, in other words, there is a tendency to publish significant or 
popular results for developed countries because of the common assumption that host 
market size has a significantly positive effect on FDI into developed economies. Second, 
the two conditions for meta-analysis (stable structure and no data issues) may not be 
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satisfied for the meta-analysis in the “Developed Host” subset. Continued research on 
publication bias affecting studies of the effect of market size on FDI is in order. 
 
 
Publication Bias Analysis for Exchange Rates 
In this section, I test the potential publication bias in the studies on the effect of exchange 
rates on FDI, parallel to the above meta-analysis of market size. Exchange rates are 
defined as EX1 (FDI home country's currency over FDI host country's currency) or EX2 
(FDI host currency over FDI home currency). 
Due to the similarity between EX1 and EX2 and the relative small sample size for 
EX2, EX1 and EX2 are combined to undertake meta-analysis. Because EX1 and EX2 are 
mutually exclusive in each regression, a new variable, ex_g2, has been created to take 
either EX1 or EX2 value in 153 FDI regressions using exchange rates in 11 articles. 
 The meta-analysis results are summarized in Table 1.6. In 11 out of 13 meta-
analysis regressions, the effect of the logarithm of the square root of degrees of freedom 
on the logarithm of the absolute t value of exchange rates is significantly positive, which 
indicates a genuine association between exchange rates and FDI. Particularly, 12 out of 
13 meta-analyses regressions cannot reject the null hypothesis of a “strong” relationship 
(the slope coefficient of the degrees of freedom is equal to 1). This key finding clearly 
confirms that there is no publication bias in FDI literature on the effect of exchange rates. 
 
From the above meta-analyses, the two genuine relationships of market size and 
FDI as well as exchange rates and FDI have been confirmed in most cases, excepting 
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only the relationship of market size and FDI into the developed economies. In addition, 
meta-analysis concludes that there is no publication bias in the literature on the effect of 
exchange rates on FDI. Nevertheless, there is potential publication bias co-existing with 
genuine association in literature on market size’s effect on FDI for the full sample and in 
the sub-sample of developing countries. Especially in studies on market size’s effect on 
FDI into developed countries, publication bias is clearly identified by meta-analysis 
without genuine association between market size and FDI. 
Hence, as far as the use of empirical results is concerned, more attention should 
be paid and more cautious approaches to avoid publication bias should be taken on 
assessing the market size’s effect on FDI, especially for literature on FDI into developed 
countries. 
This publication bias test is only a beginning in the application of meta-analysis to 
evaluation of FDI literature and it deserves more efforts in the future. 
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Table 1: Independent Variables Used in Meta-Analysis of Publication Bias 
 
 
 
ln_df Logarithm of square root of Degrees of Freedom of the FDI determination regression.
D1 A dummy variable equal to 1 if Auto regression (AR1) is detected and 0 otherwise.
D2 A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if logarithm specification is used in model specification and 0 otherwise.
D3 A dummy variable equal to 1 if non-level of FDI as dependent variable, 0 otherwise.
D4 Number of explanatory variables in FDI model (excluding intercept).
D5
Number of independent variables other than the following 6 main categories: market size, exchange rate, human capital, international trade, tax 
(including tariff), and previous FDI.
D6
Number of the other market size independent variable (other than the level or growth rate of total host market size, or the host market size per 
capita).
D7
Total number of 6 specific recommended categories: market size (total level, growth rate and per capita average), exchange rate, human capital, 
international trade, tax & tariff, and previous FDI. The range is from 0 to 6.
D8 Total number of 6 generally recommended categories (independent variable can be any items in the big categories). The range is from 0 to 6.
D9 A dummy variable equal to 1 for model includes both FDI host and FDI home information as explanatory variables, 0 otherwise.
D10 A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if FDI determination model including dummies, 0 otherwise.
D11 A dummy variable equal to 1 if using cross section data, 0 otherwise.
D12 A dummy variable taking a value of 1 if using panel data, 0 otherwise.
D13 An article dummy variable equal to 1 for FDI determination model coming from article by Bandera and White (1968), 0 otherwise.
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Table 1.2: Meta-Analysis Results for Publication Bias on the Host Market Size (Full Sample) 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9
Regression 
10
Regression 
11
Regression 
12
Regression 
13
Regression 
14
0.6407** 0.66528** 0.70086** 1.44094** 0.51526** 0.5447** 0.84337** 0.85738** 0.73007** 0.52336** 0.45115** 0.69365** 1.18992** 1.2159**
[0.16209] [0.16292] [0.19127] [0.17845] [0.16257] [0.16531] [0.15783] [0.16715] [0.16378] [0.17326] [0.16211] [0.26691] [0.26492] [0.21184]
0.30343** 0.27503** 0.24409 -0.02012 0.54641** 0.42163** 0.40104** 0.49469** 0.50353** 0.42608** 0.5817** 0.25882 0.62335* 0.60868**
[0.09825] [0.10038] [0.14017] [0.09827] [0.11694] [0.10839] [0.09481] [0.10704] [0.12198] [0.11788] [0.11231] [0.22879] [0.25217] [0.14241]
0.50631   -0.11403  
[0.37795]   [0.3469]  
0.14584   -0.15452  
[0.24549]   [0.31281]  
-2.52128**
 
 -2.96121** -2.93415**
[0.31531]
 
 [0.3208] [0.31584]
-0.04186**
  -0.01212 -0.01912
[0.01142]
  [0.05175] [0.04279]
-0.03147*
  -0.04355 -0.03492
[0.01264]
  [0.05325] [0.04578]
-0.51399**
  -0.16705 -0.16898
[0.08769]
  [0.12608] [0.12118]
-0.31528**
  0.13519 0.09344
[0.07832]
  [0.18079] [0.16519]
-0.21099**  
  -0.14434 -0.1131
[0.07764]  
  [0.15404] [0.14530 ]
-0.41994
  -0.04716 0.0071
[0.22501 ]
  [0.27611] [0.25672 ]
-0.81067**  -1.12041** -1.04587**
[0.17401]  [0.28958] [0.25937 ]
 0.40042 0.12652  
 [0.52876] [0.65261]  
 -0.0183 0.16176  
 [0.34090] [0.41501]  
Adj R Square 0.0268 0.0293 0.0248 0.1915 0.0644 0.0429 0.1216 0.0724 0.0465 0.0346 0.0879 0.0246 0.3495 0.3571
Obs 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311
Test of 
coefficient of 
Log of square 
root of DF = 1 
(10% level) reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject can not reject reject
* Please see the notes in Table 1.
D4
D7
D2
Intercept
ln_df
D1
D3
D11
D12
D5
D6
D9
D10
D8
Standard errors for Meta-analysis are shown in brackets. If the independent var is significant at the level less than 10%, its standard error is in bold type.
** and * represent significence levels of less than 1% (p<0.01) and less than 5% (p<0.05), respectively.
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Table 1.3: Meta-Analysis Results for Publication Bias on the Host Market Size (Developing Countries Only) 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Regression 4 
(dropped, since 
all D3=0) Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9
Regression 
10
Regression 
11
Regression 12 
(dropped, since all 
D11=0 and D12=1)
Regression 
13 Regression 14
-3.8056** -3.61415** -3.94418** -4.10156** -4.62848** -5.39348** -4.75085** -3.77932** -4.34204** -4.40351** -11.20372** -5.58532**
[1.12201] [1.13022] [1.19313] [1.06692] [1.07574] [1.84568] [1.25729] [1.13248] [1.49562] [1.45756] [3.71223] [1.29832]
2.06857** 1.96347** 2.08997** 2.3593** 2.52149** 2.63669** 1.91736** 1.96434** 2.25091** 2.264** 3.35254** 2.7587*
[0.45641] [0.46371] [0.46384] [0.44484] [0.44857] [0.69504] [0.46018] [0.52415] [0.56756] [0.54917] [0.88361] [0.48169 ]
0.45547  -1.30312
[0.39019]  [0.78569]
0.11513  1.23222
[0.31541]  [1.30303]
-0.02966**  -0.10738 0.06715
[0.01094]  [0.11864] [0.05172]
-0.03417**  0.05496 -0.10173
[0.01105]  [0.12105] [0.05318]
0.26218  0.10878
[0.2422]  [0.95207]
0.61335  1.66547
[0.38721]  [1.10939]
0.0881   0.15372
[0.21245]   [0.95207]
0.18285  -0.27439
[0.33423]  [2.26196]
0.21167 1.14858
[0.32675] [1.27534]
Adj R Square 0.2622 0.2671 0.2501 0.3398 0.3632 0.2645 0.2822 0.2507 0.2525 0.2541 0.3995 0.3713
Obs 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Test of 
coefficient of 
Log of square 
root of DF = 1 
(10% level) reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject
* Please see the notes in Table 1.
Standard errors for Meta-analysis are shown in brackets. If the independent var is significant at the level less than 10%, its standard error is in bold type.
D6
Intercept
ln_df
D1
D2
D11
D12
D7
D8
D9
D10
D3
D4
D5
** and * represent significence levels of less than 1% (p<0.01) and less than 5% (p<0.05), respectively.
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Table 1.4: Meta-Analysis Results for Publication Bias on the Host Market Size (Developed Countries Only) 
 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2
Regression 3 
(dropped, since 
all D2=0) Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9
Regression 
10
Regression 
11
Regression 12 
(dropped, since 
all D11=0)
Regression 
13
Regression 
14
1.21248** 1.22748** 2.4796** 0.68918* 0.89065** 0.9227** 0.99193** 0.96543** 1.07159** 0.22586 1.27242* 1.20989*
[0.2985] [0.29936] [0.28964] [0.30866] [0.30163] [0.28477] [0.30092] [0.31629] [0.33261] [0.37431] [0.51973] [0.50305]
-0.20532 -0.22536 -0.88563** 0.76888** 0.33152 0.42568 0.39599 0.3462 -0.06515 0.85198* 0.38013 0.36927
[0.25326] [0.25475] [0.22849] [0.32422] [0.28277] [0.26281] [0.31287] [0.35371] [0.29231] [0.35393] [0.3847] [0.32394]
0.5806 -0.252
[0.73632] [0.61248]
-2.93265** -3.08627** -3.06541**
[0.31861] [0.35529] [0.34337]
-0.1718** -0.18717 -0.19555
[0.03787] [0.24542] [0.24248]
-0.27587** -0.20304 -0.16919
[0.07179] [0.24883] [0.24249]
-0.66406** -0.0727 -0.05973
[0.11814] [0.2865] [0.27894]
-0.32018** 0.40402 0.44316
[0.10132] [0.33768] [0.2913]
-0.23904* 0.18997 0.20707
[0.10798] [0.41331] [0.40986]
-0.50281 0.40096
[0.52326] [0.43604]
-1.32214** -1.24149 -1.37661
[0.31981] [0.88266] [0.81829]
-0.39745
[0.99819]
Adj R Square -0.0015 -0.0032 0.2701 0.0787 0.0562 0.1184 0.0369 0.0155 -0.0019 0.0653 0.4034 0.4086
Obs 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
Test of 
coefficient of 
Log of square 
root of DF = 1 
(10% level) reject reject reject
can not 
reject reject reject reject reject reject
can not 
reject
can not 
reject reject
D11
D12
D7
D8
D9
D10
D3
D4
D5
D6
Intercept
ln_df
D1
D2
* Please see the notes in Table 1.
Standard errors for Meta-analysis are shown in brackets. If the independent var is significant at the level less than 10%, its standard error is in bold type.
** and * represent significence levels of less than 1% (p<0.01) and less than 5% (p<0.05), respectively.
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Table 1.5: Meta-Analysis for Publication Bias on the Host Market Size with Article Dummy (Developed 
Countries Only) 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2
Regression 3 
(dropped, since 
all D2=0) Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9
Regression 
10
Regression 
11
Regression 12 
(dropped, since 
all D11=0)
Regression 
13 Regression 14
2.16555** 2.15648** 2.25783** 2.2351** 1.98974** 2.43728** 2.36452** 2.49772** 2.02973** 1.37256** 1.51062* 1.20989*
[0.43684] [0.43807] [0.37955] [0.39993] [0.42187] [0.39618] [0.42025] [0.42342] [0.46415] [0.43521] [0.61747] [0.50305]
-0.70361* -0.70584* -0.77058** 0.31286 -0.19694 -0.23831 -0.07683 0.13159 -0.57334 0.43512 0.31355 0.36927
[0.30106] [0.30163] [0.26158] [0.31491] [0.3115] [0.27937] [0.31814] [0.33791] [0.33641] [0.35046] [0.39619] [0.32394]
0.33197 -0.33729
[0.72992] [0.62462]
-3.08044** -2.96273** -3.06541**
[0.35817 ] [0.39528] [0.34337]
-0.25817** -0.19857 -0.19555
[0.03873] [0.24622] [0.24248]
-0.31042** -0.17537 -0.16919
[0.07056] [0.25209] [0.24249]
-0.84114** -0.08707 -0.05973
[0.11683] [0.28752] [0.27894]
-0.48145** 0.48403 0.44316
[0.10364] [0.35603] [0.29130]
-0.57097** 0.09168 0.20707
[0.12113] [0.43593] [0.40986]
-0.44794 0.40354
[0.51509] [0.43655]
-1.76818** -1.26585 -1.37661
[0.32083] [0.88431] [0.81829]
-0.11233
[1.07565]
-0.60942** -0.59814** 0.18264 -1.15672** -0.72856** -1.01787** -0.9487** -1.19913** -0.60283** -0.94606** -0.19353
[0.20687] [0.20872] [0.20190] [0.20636] [0.20072] [0.19519] [0.21102] [0.23397] [0.20712] [0.20388] [0.27011]
Adj R Square 0.0315 0.0281 0.2695 0.1888 0.1049 0.2107 0.113 0.1153 0.0305 0.1438 0.402 0.4086
Obs 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227
Test of 
coefficient of 
Log of square 
root of DF = 1 
(10% level) reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject reject
can not 
reject reject reject
Intercept
ln_df
D1
D2
D3
D4
* Please see the notes in Table 1.
D8
D13
D9
D10
D11
D12
D5
D6
D7
Standard errors for Meta-analysis are shown in brackets. If the independent var is significant at the level less than 10%, its standard error is in bold type.
** and * represent significence levels of less than 1% (p<0.01) and less than 5% (p<0.05), respectively.
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Table 1.6: Meta-Analysis Results for Publication Bias on the Exchange Rates (Full Sample) 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 Regression 9
Regression 
10
Regression 
11
Regression 12 
(dropped, since 
all D11=0)
Regression 
13
Regression 
14
-1.92985** -2.55557** -2.62285** -1.92865** -1.87893** -1.52646** -0.53032 -1.25149* -1.34534* -2.39145** -1.92662** -3.4937 -2.73277*
[0.46426] [0.52781] [0.45646] [0.46648] [0.46638] [0.4687] [0.50801] [0.53735] [0.56566] [0.51639] [0.46551] [2.04103] [1.13093]
1.0862** 1.46281** 1.13771** 1.08844** 1.2917** 0.58611* 0.72048** 1.049** 1.0534** 1.21807** 1.03726** 0.5582 0.57502
[0.2318] [0.27802] [0.21661] [0.23730] [0.29957] [0.27516] [0.2258] [0.22875] [0.23088] [0.23923] [0.25452] [0.63523] [0.54854]
-0.00894* 0.00467 0.00476
[0.00377] [0.00674] [0.00574]
0.95404** 1.82161 1.57147*
[0.19752] [0.94916] [0.61745]
-0.01004 0.1212
[0.21127] [0.87281]
-0.04796 0.04113
[0.04433] [0.07932]
0.14575** 0.06654 0.10382
[0.04609] [0.06732] [0.05847]
-0.70828** -0.31538 -0.29228
[0.13743] [0.25806] [0.21329]
-0.23641* 0.22729 0.40395
[0.09845] [0.58288] [0.21501]
-0.15925 0.06837 -0.08143
[0.08933] [0.31088] [0.16767]
0.41618* -0.09172 -0.1198
[0.21170] [0.41061] [0.29693]
0.12289 0.67999
[0.26060] [0.53296]
-0.46091 -0.11432
[0.64029] [0.59294]
Adj R Square 0.1212 0.1474 0.2344 0.1153 0.1222 0.1706 0.2484 0.1481 0.1337 0.1375 0.1166 0.292 0.2959
Obs 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
Test of coefficient 
of Log of square 
root of DF = 1 (10% 
level) can not reject reject can not reject can not reject can not reject can not reject can not reject can not reject can not reject can not reject can not reject can not reject can not reject
D1
D8
D2
D3
D5
D6
D7
D12
* Please see the notes in Table 1.
Standard errors for Meta-analysis are shown in brackets. If the independent var is significant at the level less than 10%, its standard error is in bold type.
D9
D10
D11
D4
Intercept
ln_df
** and * represent significence levels of less than 1% (p<0.01) and less than 5% (p<0.05), respectively.
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Chapter2: A Cluster Analysis of Foreign Direct Investment  
The World, 1980-2001 
 
This chapter applies nine Cluster Analysis methods to partition 208 economies in the 
world using data on 44 variables, regarding FDI (Foreign Direct Investment), from 1980 
to 2001. The key findings from the six snapshots of Cluster Analysis are: a) the top tier 
consists of the eight economies which are either the most developed economies or the 
large developing economies; b) the membership in the middle tier (“FDI Important”) is 
constantly changing; c) finally, Japan, China and India have a more dynamic record 
regarding migration among different clusters in the past 25 years. As explained latter, 
income level is still crucial to define clusters. This paper supports arguments of IDP 
(Investment Development Path), which emphasizes the income level in segmentation. 
This Cluster Analysis thus suggests that further studies on FDI should use 
econometric methods to control for different clusters’ uniqueness, especially with regard 
to income level. 
 FDI inflows are motivated by various interests. The attributes used in cluster 
analysis are closely correlated with FDI determinants which have been discussed in the 
other chapters, such as market size (GDP or GNI), exchange rate, interest rate, and other 
relevant attributes. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The main reason for the necessity of applying Cluster Analysis in FDI studies is the 
heterogeneity of FDI inflows across 208 economies. According to the World 
Development Indicator (WDI) 2003, the size of global FDI inflows increases 
dramatically from 1970 to 2001 (Figure 2). Surprisingly, both maximum and minimum 
values which country-level FDI inflows had ever reached before 2001 occur in 2000 
when the U.S. attracted a phenomenal level of $307.74 billions of FDI. In contrast, 
Indonesia divested20 $4.55 billions of FDI in that year. The stability of FDI inflows also 
varies dramatically among economies. For example, in Sierra Leone, the coefficient of 
variation of the time series of FDI (standard deviation over mean) is 45.9, an extremely 
high value, compared to the low value of USA’s 1.43, and the even lower value of 0.37 in 
Tajikistan (Appendix 2.1). 
In order to measure the degree of inequality in FDI’s distribution across the 
world, a Quasi-Gini coefficient for FDI is calculated applying the Gini coefficient 
formula and is presented in Figure 1. The cumulative percentage of economies ranked by 
FDI is shown on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis marks the cumulative percentage of 
FDI inflows. The Quasi-Gini coefficient for FDI is the ratio of the shaded area (between 
the Quasi-Lorenz Curve and the diagonal line) to the total triangular area below and to 
the right of the diagonal. This Quasi-Gini coefficient reached 0.61 in 2000 and 0.51 in 
2001, indicating an uneven distribution of FDI around the world.  
                                                 
20
 Divest means the decreases of investment, i.e. the withdrawal of the previous FDI. 
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FDI’s heterogeneous nature clearly suggests the need to classify economies by 
their FDI related characteristics21 in order to get a true picture of FDI. 
Hitherto there have been few FDI theories on the classification of the world’s 
economies. The most important is “the investment development path” (IDP) theory 
developed by Dunning (Dunning, 1981). Based on the relationship between FDI per 
capita and GDP per capita, IDP classifies the economies into five different stages (or 
groups): the first stage consists of LDC (Low Development Countries) with small FDI 
inflows (e.g. Bangladesh, Ethiopia). Other developing countries with FDI inflows belong 
to the second stage (e.g. China and India). Higher income countries with FDI outflows 
are in the third stage (e.g. Argentina and Mexico). Developed countries with FDI 
outflows exceeding inflows are in stage four (e.g. Republic of Korea). In the fifth stage, 
the most advanced countries’ FDI outflows are prone to be matched by FDI inflows (e.g. 
U.S. and U.K.).  
A recent extension of IDP includes more variables and applies Cluster Analysis to 
make the conclusion more robust (Duran and Ubeda, 2001). They find that variables 
related to education level, R&D and patents, tariff and tax, and health help to define the 
development level more precisely.  
However, IDP and its extension focus on FDI stocks, which, in contrast to FDI 
inflow, have limited variation through time. Also, IDP mainly focuses on GDP per capita 
to indicate level of development. And its extension, although including more variables, is 
limited to the cross section data.  
This paper will conduct Cluster Analysis to place 208 economies into different 
groups (from new angles). According to a literature review and meta-analysis based on 
                                                 
21
 FDI related characteristics in this paper refer to 44 selected variables which are listed in Appendix 2.2. 
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over 150 articles, 44 FDI-related variables have been selected for Cluster Analysis 
(Appendix 2.2). Moreover, unlike other studies on IDP, this analysis uses the 208 
economies’ time series from 1980 to 2001, instead of presenting only one cross-section 
view. 
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2.2 Methods and Data 
The Cluster Analysis is a procedure to divide a population of observations based on the 
homogeneity or similarity of the observations’ measured characteristics, using a set of 
statistical methods.  
 Cluster Analysis is different from regression method, e.g. OLS, because the goal 
of Cluster Analysis is to segment the data set which regression aims to discover the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables. 
Each observation is a small cluster at the beginning. Then, the distances between 
clusters are calculated and two closest clusters are merged to form a new bigger cluster. 
This hierarchical merging procedure is repeated until all observations are merged into a 
huge and final cluster, the whole population. 
Unlike other subjective methods of grouping, Cluster Analysis provides a set of 
statistical classification tools that are quantitative, systematic, objective, and repeatable. 
“An advantage of Cluster Analysis is that it explicitly recognizes the multivariate 
relationships among class variables. Moreover, Cluster Analysis minimizes research bias 
by not specifying classes according to prespecified conceptions.” (Rosenberg and Turvey, 
1991) 
Cluster Analysis receives great attention in various fields such as finance, 
business, and marketing, but it is seldom applied in analyses of FDI. The only case found 
is the work of Duran and Uberda (2001), who use Cluster Analysis as an alternative tool 
to research the “Investment Development Path” (IDP) associated with FDI.  
The variables used in Cluster Analysis are listed in Appendix 2.2. They are 
chosen based on the commonly used categories which are identified in a literature survey 
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of over 150 articles on FDI. The selection of variables also connects with the meta-
analysis and theoretical foundation of FDI estimates. Literature review discovers 
commonly used FDI determinants, among them: market size, human capital and 
employment, international trade, previous FDI, taxation and tariff, exchange rate, interest 
rates, and dummies for time and region. This set of findings is supplemented by a meta-
analysis, which shows generally no obvious publication bias in the FDI literature 
concerning market size and exchange rates, thus corroborating the credibility of the 
findings reported in the literature with respect to these variables.  
Various statistical methods are available to calculate distances between 
observations (or clusters) in Cluster Analysis. Each method has its own formula and its 
own advantage for calculating distance. In order to get robust segmentation results, nine 
different methods are applied in this paper (Appendix 2.3 and 2.4). The final 
classification is based on the combination and comparison of the results from the nine 
methods. 
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2.3 Cluster Analysis 
In this Cluster Analysis, the data containing 44 variables for 208 economies are extracted 
for six cross-sections: 2001, 2000, 1995, 1990, 1985, and 1980. There are missing values 
in the data set, especially for the earlier years. Cluster Analysis will automatically put the 
economies with missing values into a special cluster which is dropped from the normal 
cluster procedure. In the extreme cases of too many variables with missing values, 
Cluster Analysis even fails. A balance of selection of more variables and inclusion of 
more countries would make the Cluster Analysis both robust (using more variables) and 
geographically adequate (covering more countries). Based on this consideration, a 
smaller subset of variables is selected from 44 candidate variables in some cross-sections 
to make sure the top 12 FDI host economies and some especially important economies 
(e.g. Japan, India, and Germany) are included. Then, nine different methods of Cluster 
Analysis are applied to the six cross-section data sets. The classification of the countries 
in the world is based on the aggregated summary of the nine results of the Cluster 
Analysis. 
 
The results of the first Cluster Analysis, which uses the data for 1980, are reported 
in Table 2.1 and the comparison of the means of variables among clusters is shown in 
Appendix 2.522.  
As shown in the cluster tree in Table 2.1, the USA is different from all other 
countries in the 1980 cross-section. The comparison of means in Appendix 2.5 shows that 
the USA attracts the highest value of FDI inflows in the world in 1980 and keeps this No. 
                                                 
22
 The missing-FDI-variable group misses some important FDI-related variables, but not all variables. 
Hence, the means for no missing observations are reported in Appendix 2.5. The missing-FDI-variable 
group and the FDI-standard group are merged into one big cluster to report average values. 
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1 position in all five later cross-sections. The USA also has the largest economy in the 
world. Other characteristics worthy of note are its large population and very high per 
capita output. However, it has a huge trade deficit23.  
Japan (JPN) also forms a separate cluster. It has the highest nominal GDP per 
head in 198024, the second largest economy size and a large population of over 110 
million. Yet, its FDI inflows are low, in fact, much lower than the global average, despite 
Japan’s size and economic development level. 
Four developed economies in Europe, Germany (DEU), France (FRA), Italy 
(ITA), and United Kingdom (GBR), also distance themselves from the others as the 
“Traditional Developed Powers” group, due to their large economies and population, 
high development levels, huge FDI inflows, and high trade deficits.  
These six economies are classified as “top tier” in the Cluster Analysis. 
The next tier contains five economies with relatively large size and high level of 
FDI inflows. This group contains the “FDI Important” sub-group that includes Canada 
(CAN), Spain (ESP) and Mexico (MEX), each having relatively high per capita income; 
and the “Developing Giant” sub-group, consisting of Brazil (BRA) and India (IND), with 
relatively large populations and economies but much lower income (GDP or GNI) per 
head.  
The rest are grouped into either “FDI moderate” economies with 75 economies or 
the “FDI missing” group with 122 economies (including China). The characteristics of 
                                                 
23
 Trade deficit generally has a negative effect on an economy in the long run. But when a trade deficit is 
used to create a long term growth engine in the economy (as did Japan and South Korea), importing 
international technologies and know-how when the economy took off, this can actually help economic 
development in the long term. Many developed economies have a trade deficit which usually can be 
financed by a capital account surplus.  
24
 Japan GDP per capita in PPP was lower than U.S.A in all six cluster snapshots. 
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this huge cluster (“FDI moderate” and “FDI missing”) are smaller economies, lower 
economic development level, and smaller FDI inflows. However, the economies in this 
cluster generally have trade surpluses. 
 
Table 2.2 illustrates the clusters in 1985. The pattern is almost the same as in 
1980, except for the middle tier. China (CHN) opened its door to international direct 
investors at the end of the 1970s and started formal surveys of FDI at the beginning of the 
1980s. Thus, in the tree of 1985, China enters the list as a member of the “Developing 
Giants” group with India (IND). China and India are both low-income economies with 
large populations and relatively high FDI inflows. In addition, Brazil (BRA) shifts to the 
“FDI Important” cluster from “Developing Giants” because Brazil has a per capita output 
higher than the global average, a larger economy than India, and a trade surplus.  
Another interesting change is that the top tier’s “Traditional Developed Powers” 
group (including Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom) combines with the 
“FDI Attractive” group (middle tier) to build a bigger cluster. This occurs because the 
similarities between the “Traditional Developed Powers” and “FDI Attractive” groups are 
increasing. This structural change may come from the faster growth of the economies, 
population, and FDI inflows in the “FDI Attractive” cluster.  
 
The tree of Cluster Analysis for 1990, presented in Table 2.3, brings in a new 
pattern of characteristics. The USA is no longer unique. Because the Japanese Yen 
appreciated significantly in the late 1980s, the difference between the USA and Japan in 
the size of the economy (calculated in US$) shrinks so much that they form a single 
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cluster. The ratio of the Japanese GDP to the USA GDP (valued in constant 1995 US$) 
increases from 70% in 1985 to 76% in 1990, and the ratio for GDP per capita (PPP)25, 
from 73% to 80% or more. This “Economic Super” cluster attracts the highest FDI 
inflows in the world, and has the largest economies, plus large populations, and very high 
per capita output. The cluster, on the whole, has both a huge trade deficit (because of the 
USA) and high net FDI outward flows (due to Japan).  
In addition, the “Developing Giants” group (China and India) combines with the 
European “Traditional Developed Powers” to compose a special cluster, “FDI large, Big 
Powers”. Faster economic growth in China and India diminishes the difference between 
the developing and developed giants in the size of their economies. For example, the 
GDP ratio of “Developing Giants” to “European Developed” rises from 19% to 23%. In 
addition, both groups have a trade surplus.  
The middle tier, “FDI Important” in Table 2.3, is especially unstable: two Latin 
American economies, Mexico and Brazil, drop out of the table for the 1990 cross-section 
because important information is not available, while Australia (AUS), Belgium (BEL), 
Indonesia (IND), Korea (KOR), Netherlands (NLD), Sweden (SWE), and Switzerland 
(CHE) are new member, and Canada (CAN) and Spain (ESP) continue in their 
membership. The nine countries in this cluster have relatively large economies, a high 
economic development level, and large FDI inflows, but report trade deficits.  
 
Cluster Analysis for world economies in 1995, depicted in Table 2.4, shows 
almost the same picture as 1990. The only significant difference is in the middle cluster 
“FDI Important”. Russian FDI inflows were first reported as a positive value in 1994 and 
                                                 
25
 Japan nominal GDP per capita was higher than U.S.A. in both 1985 and 1990. 
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in 1995. Russia attracted $2.1 billion FDI in 1995, a figure above the global mean. Large 
size and a huge trade surplus, indications of economic potential, put Russia in the “FDI 
Important” cluster. Mexico returns to the tier with Indonesia, Korea, Spain and Canada 
still in the group. This change is partially due to the uneven growth of the countries. 
 
Changes in economies are reflected in the Cluster Analysis for 2000, shown in 
Table 2.5. After economic stagnation in Japan during the 1990s, the difference between 
the USA and Japan widens. The Japan/USA GDP ratio (in constant 1995 US$) decreases 
from 72% in 1995 to 63% in 2000, the ratio for GNI (in current US$) goes down from 
73% in 1995 to 49% in 2000, and the ratio for GDP per capita (PPP)26 drops from 80% in 
1995 to about 74% in 2000. Thus, the picture of 2000 with only the USA in the “FDI 
Max” cluster shows a continued dominance of USA over all the other economies. Japan 
drops to the 2nd cluster (“FDI Peculiar”). It still forms a separate cluster as in the 1980s, 
with the second largest economy in the world, very high per capita output, and a huge 
trade surplus, which indicate the high FDI inflow potential. But actually, Japan has 
extremely low FDI inflows and large FDI net outflows.27  
As in 1995 and 1990, the “FDI large, Big Powers” cluster in 2000 consists of two 
developing giants (China and India) and four European traditional developed powers 
(Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy). But their difference in economic size 
keeps shrinking: the ratio of GDP between the “Developing Giants” and European 
                                                 
26
 In term of nominal GDP per capita, Japan was still higher than U.S.A. in both 1995 and 2000. 
27
 One possible result from trade surplus is negative net FDI flows (outflows higher than inflows). Even 
though this is an explanation for Japanese high FDI outflow, it can not fully explain the extremely low FDI 
inflows to Japan. 
62 
 
“Developed Powers” increases from near 34% in 1995 to 43% or more in 2000, and the 
ratio of GNI between the two groups jumps from nearly 34% to about 54%.  
Moreover, the middle cluster “FDI Important” in Table 2.5 remains unstable: 
Indonesia drops out of the cluster because its economy suffered significantly from the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, and in 2000 Indonesia has not fully recovered. For 
example, Indonesian GNI in 2000 is only 72.0% of the 1995 level, and GDP per capita in 
2000 is still 3.3% lower than 1995. In addition, starting from 1998, Indonesia has 
experienced four successive years of FDI divestment with total loss value of $10.9 
billion, around 30% of FDI stock in 2007 when Indonesian FDI stock peaks28. And since 
Mexico lacks data on net FDI, it is placed in the FDI missing group. Brazil, however, 
reports the full set of FDI related variables, and thus appears again in the “FDI 
Important” cluster. 
 
Only one year after the 2000 cross section, the 2001 Cluster Analysis, reported in 
Table 2.6, shows a new finding: after the USA and Japan, China becomes the third 
economy to form a separate cluster. After almost two decades’ rapid growth, the Chinese 
economy has the same size as the European traditional powers and double the size of the 
“Developing Giants” cluster member- India. Its FDI inflows are also very important in 
the world, with annual inflows of near $47 billion in 2001, the 6th largest in the world and 
the largest among developing economies, even more than the total value of FDI inflows 
into South America in 2001.  
Mexico returns to the middle cluster, “FDI Important”, because it reported values 
for the full set of FDI-related variables in 2001.  
                                                 
28
 Indonesian FDI stock comes from World Investment Report (WIR) 2007. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
In classifying global economies, IDP theory and its extension focus on the relation 
between FDI and income (development level). The foregoing six snapshots of Cluster 
Analyses have drawn a different picture.  
The top tier consists of eight economies which are either the high-income, most 
developed economies or the largest developing economies. The USA is a cluster of one - 
distinct from all other economies in most cross-sections. After the USA, Japan is also a 
unique economy. China also stands out in the cross-section of 2001. After these three 
special individual countries, India and four European traditional developed economies 
form the “FDI Large” cluster. This top tier is relatively stable. The middle tier, “FDI 
Important”, however, keeps changing its membership. Finally, two large categories of 
“FDI Standard” and “Missing Values” are found in the bottom tier.  
Besides economies in the unstable middle tier “FDI Important” (which are 
migrating among clusters regularly), three countries have obviously shifted clusters: 
Japan, which enters the “Super Economies” cluster with the USA in the 1990 and 1995 
cross sections, then returns to its own cluster in 2000 and 2001. China and India come 
from an unstable “FDI Important” cluster and jump up to join the traditional European 
powers’ “FDI Large, Big Powers” group in the 1990, 1995, and 2000 pictures. At the 
end, China advances a step further to form an individual cluster in the top tier in the 2001 
cross-section.  
These findings prompt the following questions: How are the USA, Japan and 
recent China unique? Why are they unique? Why is the top tier (with eight economies) 
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relatively stable but the middle tier changing? Why are three Asian countries (Japan, 
China and India) more dynamic than other global economies? 
The previous analysis shows that the USA has the largest economy in the world, 
the highest FDI net inflows for most years, and a remarkably high economic development 
level. Politically stable and mature economic policies make the USA a FDI paradise in 
the world. It also has a huge trade deficit which may need high FDI inflows to 
compensate29. These unique characteristics make the USA outstanding among the 
economies in the world. 
Japan is the second largest economy in the world, with an even higher nominal 
GDP per capita than the USA in all six cluster snapshots. But Japanese FDI inflow is 
especially low considering its high weight in GDP and trade in the global economy. 
China, with the largest population in the world, has a large economy. It is also 
growing rapidly and attracting a particularly high level of FDI, especially the green field 
FDI (new plants instead of Mergers & Acquisitions).  
The top tier includes consistently and obviously unique economies in the world. 
But the middle tier is between the unique top tier and standard economies in the third tier. 
The middle tier members keep evolving in an unstable pattern.  
The relatively high economic growth rate and large size of the three Asian 
economies (Japan, China, and India) make them move very sharply and significantly 
across the clusters. Russia, also a large economy with a fast growth rate, may show an 
equally dramatic shift. 
                                                 
29
 A way to finance a trade deficit is to have positive net FDI flows (FDI inflows larger than FDI outflows). 
Thus, a trade deficit often drives high FDI inflows. 
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The three big tiers of clusters produced by this empirical analysis show that 
income level is the crucial factor in defining the clusters. Even though this paper did not 
yield the same conclusion, IDP’s concentration on the income level in segmentation is 
still confirmed by this paper. 
This Cluster Analysis, from a simple and clear way, proves that segmentation of 
economies in the world is necessary to study FDI inflows. Moreover, from the pictures of 
clusters, the income related variables should be used in segmentation. 
Some econometric methods, such as dummy variables, separate models for 
different economic groups, and fixed-effect regressions can be applied to future FDI 
analyses to take care of the clusters’ particularity. 
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Table 2.1: Tree Diagram of Cluster Analysis of World Economies in 1980 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: Tree Diagram of Cluster Analysis of World Economies in 1985 
 
 
 
Tree Diagram of Clusters of 208 Economies in 1980
CL1
USA: FDI Max CL2
JPN: FDI Peculiar CL3
CL4: Traditional Develped Powers CL5
DEU ITA FRA GBR CL6: FDI Attractive CL9: All Other Countries
CL7: Develping Giants CL8: FDI Important FDI Moderate (75) FDI Missing (122)
BRA IND MEX, ESP, CAN
Tree Diagram of Clusters of 208 Economies in 1985
CL1
USA: FDI Max CL2
JPN: FDI Peculiar CL3
CL4: FDI Large, Big Powers CL5
CL6: Traditional Develped Powers CL7: FDI Attractive CL9: All Other Countries
DEU ITA FRA GBR CL5: Develping Giants CL8: FDI Important FDI Moderate (102) FDI Missing (94)
CHN IND MEX, ESP, CAN, 
BRA
  
67 
Table 2.3: Tree Diagram of Cluster Analysis of World Economies in 1990 
 
 
 
Table 2.4: Tree Diagram of Cluster Analysis of World Economies in 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tree Diagram of Clusters of 208 Economies in 1990
CL1
Economic Super: USA, JPN CL2
CL3: FDI Large, Big Powers CL4
CL5: Develping Giants CL6: Develped Powers CL7: FDI Important CL8: All Other Countries
CHN IND DEU ITA FRA GBR FDI Moderate (53) FDI Missing (138)CAN,ESP,IDN,KOR,AUS,
NLD,BEL,CHE,SWE
Tree Diagram of Clusters of 208 Economies in 1995
CL1
Economic Super: USA, JPN CL2
CL3: FDI Large, Big Powers CL4
CL5: Develping Giants CL6: Develped Powers CL7: FDI Important CL8: All Other Countries
CHN IND DEU ITA FRA GBR FDI Moderate (90) FDI Missing (104)RUS,MEX,IDN,KOR,
ESP,CAN
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Table 2.5: Tree Diagram of Cluster Analysis of World Economies in 2000 
 
 
 
Table 2.6: Tree Diagram of Cluster Analysis of World Economies in 2001 
 
Tree Diagram of Clusters of 208 Economies in 2000
CL1
USA: FDI Max CL2
JPN: FDI Peculiar CL3
CL4: FDI Large, Big Powers CL5
CL6: Develping Giants CL7: Develped Powers CL8: FDI Important CL9: All Other Countries
CHN IND DEU ITA FRA GBR FDI Moderate (50) FDI Missing (145)RUS, KOR,ESP, 
CAN, BRA
Tree Diagram of Clusters of 208 Economies in 2001
CL1
USA: FDI Max CL2
JPN: FDI Peculiar CL3
CHN: Emerging FDI Host CL4
CL5: FDI large, Big Powers CL6
IND: Develping Giants CL7: Develped Powers CL8: FDI Important CL9: All Other Countries
DEU ITA FRA GBR FDI Moderate (61) Missing Values (133)RUS, KOR, MEX, 
ESP, CAN, BRA
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Figure 1: Quasi Lorenz Curve for Distribution of FDI Inflows in 2001 
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Chapter 3: The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
Inflows: Do Different Average Income Levels Matter?  
(Blundell-Bond System GMM Estimations) 
 
A large number of studies emphasize FDI determinants but ignore the income distribution 
on the results, which biases the estimates. I correct for heterogeneity due to income 
distribution by using the Blundell-Bond System GMM (Generalized Method of 
Moments), which controls for endogeneity problem as well. I categorize the countries 
according to their level of development: high, middle and low income. I further break 
down the middle income category into upper and lower segments. I consider level effects 
and various interactive effects.  
I find that income levels play a significant role in FDI determination model. 
Controlling for income levels corrects the sign and the magnitude of a number of 
estimates. In particular, results show that low income countries attract more FDI, ceteris 
paribus. This result is in stark contrast with the traditional consensus that capital flows to 
rich countries (Lucas 1990). Moreover, modeling income levels shows that lagged FDI 
has consistently positive effect on FDI, which is a dynamic model structure. Consistent 
with the literature, market potential and education boost FDI and results are robust to 
income levels. FDI increases with risk levels because during financial or economic crises 
it replaces other investments. Tax rates overall exert downward pressure on FDI, but 
mostly when the middle and low income levels are controlled for. This article also 
supports the Tariff Jumping FDI argument in middle and low income economies, 
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according to which, FDI is a potential substitute for international trade. My results reject 
the hypothesis of the wealth effect of exchange rate, and there is weak evidence that the 
depreciation of local currency discourages FDI in particular in poorer countries. Results 
are broadly robust to the modelization of income dummies; in other words, results are 
stable for different specifications of income dummies (one intercept dummy, two 
intercept dummies, and slope dummies, etc).  
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3.1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is widely perceived as a critical and powerful 
development engine for many countries. Its importance stems not only from adding to 
gross capital formation, improving balance of payments, and creating employment in the 
FDI receiving (host) countries, but also from a spillover of technological know-how and 
business skills, as well as increase of competition and efficiency, which is crucial for a 
quick take–off for development. At the firm level, many FDI enterprises have become the 
market leaders and technology pioneers in FDI host economies. Comparing with other 
types of international investment, FDI has some unique advantages. For example, FDI 
inflows are much less volatile than short-term investment (Albuquerque, 2003), because 
FDI is mainly private and stimulated by business motivation with the long-term30 goal of 
acquiring control over enterprises.31  
The purpose of this paper is to propose and test a FDI determination model, 
controlling for country income levels (dummies proposed in previous Chapter 2), which 
includes the most commonly-used variables which are found in previous Chapter 1 and 
applies to a large panel data. 
 There is a large volume of literature examining the determinants of FDI. 
Unfortunately, almost all analyses are fragmented and focus on restricted regions and a 
subset of important explanatory variables. There are very few articles that 
comprehensively study FDI inflows based on the global panel data with various 
                                                 
30
 FDI is generally considered long term international investment because the acquisition process may 
exceed one year, and more important, the holding time is generally longer than one year, which is clearly 
different from international indirect investment. 
31
 The benefits of FDI are focal points here. FDI does have some negative effects for some specific 
industries in the short term. However, on the whole, FDI produce net benefits for both home and host 
economies in the long run.  
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commonly-used variables. Moreover, FDI inflows clearly differ across economies in 
terms of level, growth rate and volatility. Government policy towards FDI is also diverse 
among economies. In addition, the Cluster Analysis in the previous Chapter 2 
recommends grouping global economies according to their income levels. Therefore, it is 
necessary to carefully segment economies to study global FDI inflows.   
My study tries to answer the following questions. Is there a general FDI 
determination model for the full sample of global economies or does one find different 
models for economies with different income levels? In other words, does controlling for 
the income level affect the FDI model? 
Traditional OLS (random effect) and fixed effect regression methods are not good 
tools to answer these questions and estimate panel data with different time spans, a 
lagged dependent variable and potential endogeneity problems. Fortunately, the new 
Blundell-Bond system GMM method has been introduced into FDI determination 
research, e.g., Carstensen and Toubal (2004) and Anghel (2006).32 The method uses all 
available information in the panel data without bias and consistently estimates the model 
using a lagged dependent variable. It effectively applies instrument variables to solve 
endogeneity problems. This paper will apply the Blundell-Bond system GMM method to 
estimate the FDI determination model. But unlike Carstensen and Toubal (2004) and 
Anghel (2006), who concentrate on Central and Eastern Europe and transition economies, 
this paper will expand FDI studies into the full sample of global country-level panel data.  
I find a negative correlation between the level of average income (dummies) and 
the FDI flows, but no significant relation with the middle average income level. This 
                                                 
32
 Blundell-Bond system GMM is also used to study the effect of FDI in Uctum and Doytch (2008). 
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result only partially supports the Investment Development Path (IDP) theory33 with 
respect to the highest income level but not for the middle and low income levels.  
Consistent with the literature, GDP and human capital are significant attractors of 
FDI at all income levels. The positive relation between FDI and country risk suggests that 
FDI substitutes for other investment flows in periods of financial instability. Similarly, 
the positive relation between tariffs and FDI suggests that FDI is a potential substitute for 
international trade. When middle and low income levels are controlled for, evidence 
suggests that an increase in taxes and depreciation of the currency exert downward 
pressure on FDI flows. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II summarizes major advances in 
the literature on FDI determinants. And Section III proposes a new model. Then the 
stylized facts on FDI are introduced in Section IV. Section V briefly explains the new 
Blundell-Bond system GMM econometric method, and Section VI describes the data 
used in GMM estimations. The empirical econometric results are reported and discussed 
in Section VII. Then Section VIII tests the robustness of the model by analyzing two 
model variations with additional explanatory variables. Section IX presents a general 
conclusion with policy implications. 
 
 
  
                                                 
33
 IDP theory proposes a unique relationship between FDI and host income level: FDI is very small for a 
low income economy; it increases quickly as host incomes grow (for Middle and Low-end of High Income 
economies); but for the topmost income niche, FDI does not keep the same robust trend and sometimes 
declines. For details, see Dunning (1981, 1986) and Dunning et al (2001). 
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3.2 A Short Literature Review 
The FDI literature starts with the articles by Scaperlanda (1967), Wallis (1968), d'Arge 
(1969, 1971a, 1971b) and Schmitz (1970), which focus the relationship between 
international trade (especially when Customs Unions are included) and FDI. Meanwhile, 
Bandera and White (1968) are among the first to establish the importance of host market 
size (GNP) as a major determinant of FDI. 
From the 1980s onwards, an extensive literature has begun to examine the 
influences of exchange rate (Cushman, 1985) and interest rates (Cushman, 1985, and 
Culem, 1988). The first manifestation of inflation rate and political variables, e.g. the 
type of government and political system, also goes back to the 1980s in work by 
Schneider and Frey (1985). And host labor cost is introduced in Culem’s model (1988).  
Since the 1990s, taxation has been extensively analyzed by many researchers, e.g. 
Hines and Rice (1994), Altshuler and Grubert (1996), Wei (1997a, 1997b, 2000), Lipsey 
(1999a), Klein and Rosengren (2000), and Bandelj (2002). Host tariff is found to be 
positively correlated with FDI by Grubert and Mutti (1991), Jun and Singh (1996), and 
Hasnat (1997), although some researchers do end with mainly insignificant results. 
Lagged FDI, a lagged dependent variable, is generally a significant and positive 
determinant of FDI (Tu and Schive, 1995, Barrell and Pain, 1996, 1998, Kogut and 
Chang, 1996, List, 1999, Lopez-Duarte and Garcia-Canal 2002). Education also has a 
positive effect in Eaton and Tamura (1994, 1995, and 1996), Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), 
Castellani and Zanfei (2002). Dummy variables (time, region, or country dummies, etc) 
are also applied in many FDI determination models.  
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In a recent development of econometric methodology, the Blundell-Bond system 
GMM approach has been used by Carstensen and Toubal (2004) and Anghel (2006) in 
dynamic models to study FDI. The method is also applied by Uctum and Doytch (2008) 
to analyze the effect of FDI. Similarly, I apply the Blundell-Bond system GMM method 
to the study of FDI. Carstensen and Toubal (2004) focus on FDI in Central and Eastern 
European countries and Anghel (2006) concentrates in transition economies. The main 
contribution of this paper is to provide a comprehensive study of country level FDI in the 
world.  
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3.3 Stylized Facts 
Actual global FDI inflows are soaring dramatically. The sum of global FDI inflows was 
less than US$13.5 billion in 1970; in 2007, it has risen to a record level of around US$ 2 
trillion, which is almost 3.4% of global GDP and about 14.8% of global gross fixed 
capital formation (UNCTAD). One obvious attribute of FDI is that its remarkable growth 
is far from a straight line. Global FDI inflows were around US$ 400 billion in 1996. 
Then, FDI inflows grew rapidly in 1997-1999 and peaked in 2000 with nearly US$1.4 
trillion. However, they had dropped for the next three years to around US$ 564 billion in 
2003, less than half of the previous peak, due to the economic downturn in the U.S. and 
other developed economies. Since then, FDI inflows have recovered for four consecutive 
years and set a new record level in 2007 (Figure 2).  
Another feature of FDI is that they are so different across economies. Both the 
maximum and minimum country level FDI inflows in FDI history were marked in 2000: 
the U.S. attracted $307.74 billion (21.8% of global FDI) of FDI while Indonesia divested 
$4.55 billion of FDI. According to WDR 2009, when global economies are divided into 
three groups by their gross national income (GNI) per capita in 2007: high income (HIC, 
$11,456 and above), middle income (MC, $936-$11,455), and low income (LIC, $935 or 
less), then FDI inflows to high income countries accounted for nearly 73.8% of global 
FDI in 2006, the middle income group attracted 24.7% of total FDI in 2006, while the 
low income group only received about 1.5% (Figure 3). FDI’s heterogeneity, which is 
significant across time and countries, makes it necessary to carefully segment the panel 
data by including time and country group dummies into the model. 
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3.4 Model Specification  
According to Chapter 1, various forms of the dependent variable have been used in the 
literature on FDI determination, e.g. the level of FDI inflows, the level of annual FDI 
adjusted for inflation (GDP deflator), annual FDI inflow/GDP, FDI stock (by year end), 
and the number of annual FDI projects. In this model, the dependent variable is the level 
of annual FDI inflows that is the most commonly selected in the FDI literature.34  
The FDI determination model is based on the proposition that FDI is a function of 
the following eleven explanatory variables, which recommended in Chapter 1.  
Market size, which can be represented by host GDP or GNI (Gross National 
Income), has been identified as one of the most important explanatory variables. It is 
expected to be positively related to FDI inflows35. The size of host GDP or GNI indicates 
the FDI host country’s general economic conditions. Specifically, a larger GDP or GNI 
represents a larger potential demand for FDI enterprises’ output in the host economy that 
results in achieving economies of scale. Ito and Rose (2002) and Bevan et al. (2002) have 
also proposed that a larger host market allows the co-existence of multiple FDI firms.  
Previous FDI stands as another very important variable expected to have a 
positive sign in the model. Wheeler and Mody (1992), Lee and Mansfield (1996), and 
Dilyard (1999) have summarized agglomeration economies for FDI, which are the 
increasing benefits to co-location by FDI enterprises.36 Moreover, Ito and Rose (2002) 
                                                 
34
 Scaperlanda (1967, 1968), Goldberg (1972), Summary and Summary (1995), Lipsey (2000a), Dunning 
(2001) are leading researchers who use level of FDI inflows as dependent variable in the FDI determination 
models. For a full list of studies using level of FDI inflows as dependent variable, please see Appendix 3.6. 
35
 According to Grubert and Mutti (1991), Lee and Mansfield (1996), Lipsey (1999a), Billington (1999), 
Dilyard (1999), and Fung et al. (2002). 
36
 This co-location benefit exists in both manufacturing and service industries, making production costs 
lower (in manufacturing) and providing a larger market for customers (in retail, hotel and other service 
industries). 
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proposed a learning curve hypothesis regarding FDI: Foreign investors with previous FDI 
have more relevant experience and knowledge that are positively associated with their 
tendency to have additional FDI in the future. Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) propose that an 
oligopolistic reaction, in which market competitors tend to match each other’s FDI, may 
be a reason for the strong explanatory power of previous FDI. Examples include 
European, American and Japanese FDI in the automobile, food, detergent, and retail 
industries in China. 
Also relevant to FDI level are production factors, such as wage rate, education 
(for quality of labor), and real interest rate (as capital price). They should be added to the 
model. The argument on wage’s effect on FDI is two-pronged. Labor cost or wage in the 
host country has been found to be a major component of FDI cost, implying that higher 
labor cost (wage) will deter FDI inflows. In other words, FDI inflows chase cheap labor. 
However, higher labor cost in the host country may represent higher quality of human 
capital and greater productivity of FDI, hence more FDI inflows.  
Education should increase FDI because education improves human capital. 
Nevertheless, research on the effect of school enrollment has not always yielded positive 
conclusions. 
Host interest rate may have a positive effect on FDI inflows, as has been 
demonstrated by several studies which analyze the costs of borrowing that an 
international investor faces in securing funds for FDI: if host interest rate is low (relative 
to home interest rates), foreign investors will raise more funds within the host country for 
their investments and a smaller FDI will flow in.  
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Tax rate is also added to the model with a negative sign since tax is seen by FDI 
investors as a burden on their business.  
FDI, as international investment, could be expected to be correlated with three 
international economic components: exchange rates (local currency per US$), tariffs and 
the host openness to trade (indicated by imports or foreign trade as a proportion of GDP). 
The expected effect of exchange rate on FDI is twofold. Cushman (1985), Froot and Stein 
(1991), and Goldberg and Klein (1997) argue that currency depreciation in the host 
country will generally lower production cost relative to the home country, resulting in 
higher FDI. In addition, lowering the value of that currency raises the wealth of foreign 
investors relative to that of domestic (FDI host) investors, thus stimulating FDI. 
However, if the production inputs are imported, then the depreciation will increase 
production cost, which may harm the FDI enterprises and hurt FDI inflows. Another 
argument for host currency depreciation’s negative effect is that it is perceived as 
financial weakness which may both alarm foreign direct investors and hurt them 
financially. For example, during the financial crises in Mexico in 1984 and in Indonesia 
and the other southeastern Asian economies in 1997, dramatic local currency depreciation 
was followed by sharp drops in FDI inflows. Hence, the sign of the exchange rate / FDI 
relation is an empirical matter.  
Tariff rate (import duties) has two possible counter-effects on FDI. According to 
Grubert and Mutti (1991), tariffs on foreign goods and services in the host country may 
encourage FDI because tariff, as a trade barrier, may protect foreign investors’ activities 
in the local market. In addition, a higher tariff raises import prices and makes 
international trade more costly. In order to maintain their market share in a promising 
81 
 
economy, former exporters may be forced to undertake FDI to avoid the tariff or other 
trade barriers. This behavior has been very common in the history of FDI in the United 
States (Wilkins, 1989).  
Tariffs, however, have other potential effects that may discourage FDI. A higher 
tariff is not only a financial burden to business, but also may be an unfavorable indicator 
of macro-economic conditions: it may suggest lack of freedom of enterprises’ activities. 
Tariffs are often accompanied by other restrictive measures which dampen profits and 
distort resource allocation. In some extreme cases, tariffs may cause trade partners to take 
retaliatory actions which directly depress the FDI enterprises’ potential to export to the 
global market. Hence, tariff’s net effect on FDI depends on the sum of the two counter-
forces. 
The trade openness (imports or foreign trade as a proportion of GDP) of the host 
economy is expected to increase FDI inflows. Morisset (2000) suggested that a high 
degree of openness should positively influence foreign investors through trade 
liberalization and more competition. Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) showed that open 
economies encourage more confidence and FDI since even in host countries with small 
domestic markets, FDI enterprises can reap economies of scale and scope, by increasing 
participation in international trade and regional integration schemes. 
In investigating the effect of country characteristics on FDI, a country risk 
variable (represented by investment profile) and dummies for income groups are also 
important explanatory variables. A country risk index (higher score means lower risk) is 
expected to have a positive correlation with FDI in the model, if FDI investors are risk 
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averse. Country income group dummies can also help to test Dunning’s IDP (Investment 
Development Path) theory on the relationship between FDI and income level.  
In addition, time (year) dummies are added to the model to control for time -
specific effects.  
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3.5 Methodology 
The Pooled OLS or the Random Effect method is not unbiased or consistent because the 
assumption that individual effect is uncorrelated with the other regressors for OLS and 
Random Effect is not valid any more in the dynamic FDI determination model including 
lagged dependent variable. 
The Fixed Effects method also has the problem of “within transformation” which 
takes deviations from time-averaged sample means. This “within transformation” may 
increase standard errors by exacerbating any measurement errors and may be not 
informative when dealing with variables with little time variation or ones that are 
infrequently measured. 
Moreover, certain variables in the model may have endogeneity problems, such as 
GDP, real interest rate, and openness of the economy, since the dependent variable FDI 
in the host economy may affect these explanatory variables, due to its far-reaching 
influence on the host economy. The usual Pooled OLS, the Random and Fixed Effects 
methods are inappropriate to deal with endogeneity problems.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) have created a generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation to specifically solve the issues in the unbalanced (different time 
spans) panel data with lagged dependent variables. Because Arellano and Bond (1991) 
have designed a new set of instrumental variables, their method offers a solution to 
potential endogeneity.  
As specified in Section 2, the new FDI model can be written as: 
Y i,t+1 = γi  + Y i,tα +  X’i,t  β +W’ i,t γ + εi,t  ,                            (1) 
and εi,t  =ζi, +ωi,t                                                               (2) 
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where subscript i=1,…,95 which denotes the 95 FDI host economies and another 
subscript t is the time dimension of the panel data, ranging from the year 1984 to the year  
2000. Thus, γi stands for the country-specific effect. Y i,t+1 is the dependent variable, FDI 
inflows into economy i in the year t+1. And Y i,t is the lagged dependent variable. α is 
the stationary parameter measuring the self-adjustment of FDI across different time 
periods.  
Xi,t is the “traditional” vector of explanatory-variables. It contains, according to 
the model specification, independent variables as follows: exchange rate (Exchange 
Rate), and the following host country measures, GDP in current billion US$, tax rate 
(Tax), wage rate (Wage), real interest rate (Real Interest Rate), tariff (Import Duties or 
Tariff), Openness (Open), education (School Enrollment), and political risk (Risk).  
In addition, W’
 i,t  denotes the host economy’s income dummies, high income 
(HIC), low income (LIC), middle income (MC), upper middle income (UMC), lower 
middle income host economy (LMC). Lastly, time (year) dummies are also included to 
capture time-specific effects.  
Equation (2) represents the error structure: ζi, stands for the time-invariant 
country-specific component and ωi,t  is a pure stochastic error term, which is assumed to 
be uncorrelated with i and t.   
 Arellano and Bond (1991) apply the GMM method to transform equation (1) into 
the following first differences (3): 
∆Y i,t+1 = ∆ Y i,tα+ ∆ X’i,t  β +∆ωi,t ,                            (3) 
One advantage of the first-difference form is that the individual economy’s 
specific effect item γi is eliminated. Arellano and Bond (1991) use all appropriate lags of 
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Y i,t and Xi,t  (as well as W’ i,t) to generate the instruments on the assumption that there is 
no autoregression. The following matrix of instruments is used to estimate coefficients: 
 
                0                            …             …                                                      0 
            Y i,1  Xi1 Wi1                              0                             …                         0 
Z i =        0                             Y i,1  Xi1 Wi1 Y i,2  Xi2 Wi2      …                          0    
           ………………………………………………………………………. 
                0                               …                       Y i,1  Xi1 Wi1 … Y i,t-2  Xit-2  Wi t-2 
 
For predetermined variables in Xit , Arellano and Bonds (1991) use two moment 
conditions: E[Xit-1 ∆ωi,s ] = 0 and E[Yit-2 ∆ωi,s ] = 0 for t≤s. The procedure just discussed 
is called Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation. 
However, when the autoregressive parameter is fairly large and the number of 
time series observations is fairly small, the Arellano-Bond estimator has large finite-
sample bias which resulting in poor precision in simulation studies (Alonso-Borrego and 
Arellano, 1996). Furthermore, if the dependent variable follows a random walk, then its 
first lag (t-1) is a poor instrument. Moreover, if the explanatory variables are persistent 
over time, their lagged levels provide weak instruments according to Alonso-Borrego and 
Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
To solve these issues, Blundell and Bond (1998) extend the Arellano-Bond 
method by adding lagged differenced variables as instruments for equation (1) and 
thereby dramatically improve efficiency. This system GMM method can apply 
information on cross-country differences, which is unavailable with the difference GMM 
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method. The additional moment conditions are: E[∆Xit-1 εi,t ] = 0 and E[∆Yit-1 εi,t ] = 0. 
The system GMM method requires two additional conditions: first, the error term is not 
serially correlated. Second, even though the unobserved country-specific effect may be 
correlated with the levels of the explanatory variables, there is no correlation between the 
difference in the explanatory variables and the error term. 
The new instrument matrix for this system GMM is: 
              Z i                             0…             …                                                       0 
               0                                ∆ Y i,1 ∆ Xi1                                                          0               
Z i+ =      0                             0            0        ∆Y i,2 ∆ Xi2        …                          0    
           …………………………………………………………………………. 
                0                               …   0                …                                  ∆Y i,t-1 ∆ Xit-1 
 
where Z i  is defined in the previous page.                            
In order to validate the assumptions of no series correlation, the AR(2) test is also 
established in Blundell-Bond system GMM method. 
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3.6 Data 
This paper analyzes panel data on global FDI inflows covering 95 economies in the world 
from 1984 to 2001. These 95 economies are divided into the following three income 
groups according to their 2001 gross national income (GNI) per capita: low income 
(LIC), $745 or less; middle income (MC), $746–$9,205, and high income (HIC), $9,206 
or more. In some cases, the middle income (MC) group has been further divided into 
lower middle income (LMC, $746-$2,975) and upper middle income (UMC, $2,976–
9,205). Five dummies for different income groups (HIC, LIC, MC, LMC and UMC) are 
created for the regressions, with one intercept dummy only, or with both an intercept 
dummy and one set of slope dummies. In addition, three income dummies (HIC, LIC, and 
MC) figure in the scenario, including two intercept dummies.  
As the dependent variable in the FDI determination model, FDI inflows refer to 
the annual international investment (in current millions of U.S. dollars37), used to acquire 
a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock)38 in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvested earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the 
balance of payments.  
Most of the explanatory variables used in this paper come from the World 
Development Indicators (2003). They are all for FDI host economies. These variables 
include the host’s GDP in current billions of US$; the official exchange rate (the FDI 
                                                 
37
 FDI can be in current US$, in real terms (adjusted by the GDP deflator), or normalized by GDP. This 
paper’s usage of FDI in current US$ follows the setup of the dependent variable by Scaperlanda (1967, 
1968), Bandera and White (1968), Summary and Summary (1995), Lipsey (2000a), and Dunning et al. 
(2001). For a full list of studies on FDI in current US$, please see Appendix 3.7. 
38
 The 10 percent threshold is determined by the IMF and the UN and is commonly used by most countries 
in the world. The optimal definition (the percentage of voting shares) for FDI is an interesting topic in 
literature. 
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host’s currency per US$); the host tax rate calculated by the share of net taxes in GDP 
(both in current US$); the host wage rate created by the share of the wage bill in GDP in 
basis points; the host real interest rate (the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as 
measured by the GDP deflator); the host tariff represented by import duties (% of tax 
revenue); and the host openness measured by the value of imports (of goods and services) 
divided by GDP. 
Host education is represented by secondary school enrollment ratio (the number 
of students enrolled in the secondary school, regardless of age, as a percentage of the 
population of the official secondary school age). This variable has been compiled from 
the World Development Indicators (2003) and the web site of United Nation Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization. 
The country’s political risk variable in the model is referred to as Investment 
Profile in ICRG (International Country Risk Guide). It is a measure of the government’s 
attitude to inward investment as determined by four sub-components: the risk to 
operations, taxation, repatriation, and labor costs, with a higher value standing for lower 
risk in each case. 
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3.7 Empirical Results 
Estimation results for the Blundell-Bond system GMM with one income dummy are 
presented in Table 3.1, with three panels for different income dummies (High Income, 
Middle Income, and Low Income). Each column represents results for instrument 
variables (IVs) with different lags indicated at the top of the column. I also broke down 
the Middle Income group into Lower Middle Income (LMC) and Upper Middle Income 
(UMC) economies, results are reported in Appendixes 3.1 and 3.2. As previously pointed 
out, the inclusion of different income dummies can clarify the effect of income class on 
FDI and evaluate the robustness of the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimation more 
explicitly. 
Furthermore, estimation using different IV (instrument variable) lags can take 
advantage of the sophistication of the Blundell-Bond system GMM method with respect 
to IV lags, and assess the robustness and stability of the model which captures the 
traditional determinants for FDI inflows. Time (year) dummies have also been added to 
all regressions to account for time-specific effects, such as legal and political changes, 
threshold effect, and structural changes. 
The Arellano-Bond AR(2) statistics are computed to test the restriction of no 
autocorrelation for the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimation. As shown at the bottom 
of Table 3.1, all specifications can not reject the null hypothesis of absence of 
autocorrelation at the 10% significance level. Therefore, the result of the AR(2) test 
supports the use of the Blundell-Bond system GMM method in the FDI model.  
Income levels play a significant role in FDI determination model. If I do not 
control for income levels, results give unintuitive coefficient estimates for determinants 
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such as Openness, lagged FDI and education.   Including income dummies keeps the 
significance of the coefficients of GDP, Tax, and Risk Index but affects their magnitude. 
This change reflects a misspecification problem when the model does not include income 
level dummies, because the GMM estimates become biased.  
In all Blundell-Bond system GMM specifications, the lagged dependent variable 
is significant and positive, consistently confirming the dynamic model structure. This 
finding also shows hysteresis in the behavior of FDI, which is again consistent with 
previous literature. The range of the coefficients of lagged FDI is very similar across 
different income dummies, regardless of the different model specifications. The 
coefficients range from 0.43 to 0.44 with the “High Income” dummy (left panel in Table 
3.1) and between 0.43 and 0.46 in the scenario with the “Low Income” dummy (right 
panel of Table 3.1). The coefficient increases marginally to the range 0.45 - 0.49 for the 
case with the “Middle Income Group” dummy (middle panel in Table 3.1). To see behind 
these results, I broke down the middle income category into Upper-Middle income and 
Lower-Middle income. I find similar results to aggregate “Middle Income Group” case 
(Appendixes 3.1 and 3.2 for cases with Lower-Middle Income and Upper-Middle Income 
dummies), indicating the robustness of the results. 
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable indicate that current FDI 
inflows will induce FDI inflows in the next period by the amount which is equal to about 
46% of the current FDI inflows.  
This conclusion is marginally larger than other researchers’ findings, such as 
Carstensen and Toubal (2004) and Anghel (2006), which using similar GMM method. 
This difference may be due to the different regression data bases. They are estimating 
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country-level FDI in Central and Eastern European countries or firm-level FDI in 
transition economies. Before these economies experienced reform and became open to 
the world, they had little FDI. Thus, the industrial agglomeration effect of FDI is very 
small a priori. Another traditional reason for FDI is a reaction to competition: a 
company’s FDI is triggered by its competitors’ FDI. In order to defend its position in 
fierce competition, a company usually follows its main competitors’ footprints in foreign 
investment (Oligopolistic Reaction39). In transitional economies, the existing FDI stocks 
are much smaller, resulting in smaller FDI driven by market competition. In addition, the 
shorter FDI history and smaller scale of FDI could make potential international investors 
worry about the FDI environment in these transitional economies. Small FDI inflows in 
Russia at the beginning of the 1990s can be served as evidence on this argument. 
In contrast to Carstensen and Toubal (2004) and Anghel (2006), the present paper 
extends the FDI analysis to all income groups. All high income countries and many 
middle income economies have a long history of welcoming FDI, which may ease the 
international investors’ political or legal concerns. In addition, the extensive existing FDI 
stocks may induce more FDI either through the industrial agglomeration effect or the 
“Oligopolistic Reaction”. Therefore, the estimation for the effect of a lagged dependent 
variable is larger for the full sample than that for transition economies. 
In the FDI literature, market potential, which can be represented by host 
economies’ GDP, has a consistently positive effect on FDI inflows. This paper clearly 
supports this conclusion from a standpoint of global economies. On the whole, if host 
total GDP increases by US$1 billion, we find that the FDI inflows will increase by about 
                                                 
39
 Oligopolistic Reaction Theory is introduced by Knickerbocker (1973) to explain why firms follow rivals’ 
investment into foreign markets. 
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US$8.5 million, which is the simple average of all coefficients of GDP in Table 3.1. 
Among different income group dummies in Table 3.1, the value of the coefficient is very 
similar, indicating the robustness of the model specification.  
Education traditionally supports FDI according to the literature. This paper 
reaches the same conclusion that secondary school enrollment rate has a positive effect 
on FDI inflows in all regressions. The estimated parameters suggest that a percentage 
point increase in secondary school enrollment will lift FDI inflows by about US$145 
millions. International investors fully understand the long-term benefits of education 
expenditure: good education not only provides high-quality labor for FDI projects, but 
also intensifies the other FDI drivers, for example improving domestic market potential 
through the increased productivity of an educated labor force.  
Income group dummies are the focus of this analysis. The empirical results show 
that ceteris paribus, FDI will be lower by US$ 8.7 billion or so for high income 
economies compared to all the other economies, but FDI will be higher by about US$ 5.9 
billion for low income economies compared to all the others. The coefficients are 
insignificant for the middle income group dummies. For the relationship between FDI 
and host income level, according to Dunning’s Investment Development Path (IDP) 
theory (Durrning, 1981 and 1986), FDI is very small for the low income economies; it 
increases quickly as host incomes grow (for middle and some high income economies); 
but for the very top income niche, FDI inflows more slowly or sometime are lower. This 
paper’s empirical results partially support Dunning’s theory with respect to the highest 
income level but not for the middle and low income levels.  
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The potential explanation for this result is that IDP theory assumes a static and 
simple relationship between country’s income level and FDI. By contrast, this paper is 
controls for eleven factors affecting FDI, and by using a dynamic approach, it also takes 
into account the income growth. The actual FDI trends in the world have generally 
supported most of the IDP theory, but few studies try to isolate the income level effect 
from the other FDI triggers, especially host market size. Thus, even though FDI inflows 
to high income economies are substantial, this is due, not to their income level, but to the 
other determinants: a vast domestic market, high previous FDI inflows, etc. In this 
analysis, FDI does not keep a linear relationship with host income. In high income 
economies, the big market potential and high historical FDI have already attracted very 
large FDI inflows, but FDI investors also cautiously constrain their investment in these 
economies. This can be seen from the negative sign of the high income dummy, which 
can also be regarded as setting a maximum for FDI. But in the low income group, the 
much smaller host market, sparse previous FDI and other social and economic barriers 
severely curtail FDI in these poor economies. But international investors eventually take 
the calculated risk and invest more than what the other variables predicted. This is 
reflected by the positive low income group dummy. FDI investors in the low income 
group presumably expect higher returns from taking higher risk. This can be seen as a 
floor effect (setting minimum) on FDI. 
Country risk is also analyzed here. Surprisingly, low risk level, represented by a 
higher index score of the investment profile, has an adverse effect on FDI. In other 
words, on average, FDI increases by about US$ 810 million as the investment profile 
index score decreases by 1 (indicating a worse investment profile). The coefficients are 
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higher for the low income and middle income dummies and lower for the high income 
dummy. This result can be interpreted as follows: FDI replaces other investment flows 
when the market environment is unfavorable, because by controlling companies (through 
voting stock) in host economies, FDI investors obtain more say in their management and 
a safer situation for operation. Moreover, in a riskier situation, the project’s price may be 
lower than its intrinsic value and the future appreciation potential is far greater. This is 
consistent with the rises in FDI in Southeastern Asian countries after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. 
Tax rates exert significant pressure on FDI in most cases with middle and low 
income dummies, and in some cases for high income dummies. With a percentage point 
increase of host tax rate, calculated by net tax value over GDP, the FDI will decline by 
about US$ 160 million. From the averages of coefficients in Table 3.1, this negative 
effect is equivalent to the effect of a decrease of US$ 356 million in previous FDI 
inflows, or loss of almost US$ 18.8 billion host GDP, or the adverse effect of a 1.1 
percentage point decrease in school enrollment.  
Tariff has a positive effect in scenarios with middle or low income dummies. This 
supports the Tariff Jumping FDI argument that FDI is a potential substitute for 
international trade. One reason why international entrepreneurs build FDI enterprises to 
produce in foreign countries instead of exporting to these economies is avoidance of 
tariffs or other trade barriers. A higher tariff will intensify this FDI motivation, and if 
tariffs increase by one percentage point, then FDI will go up by over US$ 8 million. 
The effect of the exchange rate, defined as local currency per US dollar, is 
ambiguous. The coefficient is negative in the scenario with the low income group 
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dummies and in some cases with the middle income dummy. Hence this analysis rejects 
the wealth effect hypothesis due to the decline in the value of host currencies. Instead, the 
negative estimates for less wealthy countries are consistent with the view that prolonged 
depreciation discourages FDI for one of two reasons: prolonged depreciation may signal 
financial distress in the host economy, or increased prices of imported inputs may reduce 
profits of FDI enterprises. 
The three variables representing wage, interest rate, and trade openness are all 
insignificant. It is possible that the effects of some other significant explanatory variables 
dominate. Some other reasons are as follows. As for the first, the estimates of wage’s 
effect on FDI do not confirm either the “labor cost” or the “human capital” argument, 
possibly because these two opposite impacts cancel each other. As for the second, the 
interest rate, as a rental cost of FDI, does not contribute to explaining FDI well, a result 
that is inconsistent with the costs-of-borrowing argument. The reason may be that the 
interest rate has become a proactive financial policy tool for government instead of the 
outcome of supply and demand in the financial market, and no longer accurately reflects 
cost of capital. The last of these variables, trade openness, the ratio of imports to GDP, is 
not a significant determinant of FDI, because globalization bring almost all economies 
open and connected with each other which results in convergence of the value of this 
ratio.  
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3.8 Robustness Tests 
To test the robustness of the FDI determination model, I introduced two variations of the 
model specification a) by adding another income dummy (thus using two income 
dummies in one regression) and b) by including slope dummies (income dummy 
interacted with other independent variables).  
Table 3.2 describes the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimation for the new 
model specification with two income dummies. The new results unanimously confirm the 
key findings in the one-income-dummy specification in the previous round. The estimates 
of lagged FDI inflows, education, host GDP and tariff are still positive. In addition, the 
size of the coefficients for lagged FDI, education, and host GDP is similar to the one-
income-dummy case, especially for the coefficients of previous FDI inflows. The 
coefficient for tariff is marginally smaller in the two-income-dummy case. The results for 
income dummies (intercept dummies) are also in agreement with the one-income-dummy 
case. For example, in the middle panel of Table 3.2, dummies for HIC (High Income 
Countries) and LIC (Low Income Countries) reveal that compared with MC (Middle 
Income Countries), high income economies (HIC) have a negative effect and low income 
countries (LIC) affect FDI positively, which is exactly the conclusion in the one-dummy 
scenario.  
Nevertheless, some changes results from adding a second income dummy. The 
effect of Risk (Investment Profile) declines from about $810 million to around $745 
million, and tax is no longer significant. However, the exchange rate becomes negative, 
with much larger coefficients than in the one-dummy case. This empirical result does not 
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confirm the wealth-effect theory but instead supports the “financial distress” and 
“imported input” arguments. All regressions in the two-dummy case pass the AR(2) test.  
The results for another new model specification – the one with slope dummies -
are illustrated in Table 3.3. In addition to all the explanatory variables in the one-dummy 
case, the regressions in Table 3.3 also include 10 slope dummies, which are the 
interactions between the income dummy and each of the other ten individual regressors. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results for the High/Middle/Low income dummy in the left, 
middle, and right panels, respectively. The estimates for Lower Middle Income (LMC) 
and Upper Middle Income (UMC) are displayed in Appendixes 3.3 and 3.4.  
Parallel to the comparison between using a one-income dummy and two-income 
dummies, the new results in the slope-dummy scenario are broadly consistent with the 
core conclusion of the one-dummy case. Previous FDI inflows, education, and host GDP 
still affect FDI positively with coefficients of similar magnitude, except for the high-
income dummy case, where only previous FDI is significant. For the intercept income 
dummies, the result in the slope-dummy scenario is similar to the one-income case: the 
high-income dummy has a negative effect and the low income dummy, a positive one. 
The middle income dummy becomes significantly positive in most regressions to explain 
FDI. Overall, the estimations of the income dummy in the slope-dummy scenario still 
support the main ideas of IDP theory. 
The difference in results between slope-dummy and one-dummy cases is much 
wider than the difference between two-dummy and one-dummy. There are many fewer 
significant coefficients for the tax, education, and risk variables, and the coefficients are 
inconsistent among regressions, especially for risk.  
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This difference may come from two sources: a set of ten new interactive 
independent variables were added to the slope dummy regressions, which reduces both 
the degrees of freedom of the regression equation and the significance of some individual 
explanatory variables. Moreover, in the slope dummy case, the effect of each explanatory 
category (market size, tax, tariff, etc.) consists of two parts: the individual variable and 
the interactive variable. This is different from the one-dummy scenario, where the effect 
of each category on FDI comes solely from the individual variable. Thus, in the slope 
dummy case, the significance of an individual variable may be much smaller and its 
coefficient may change dramatically because the interactive variable may be a much 
more significant contributor to the aggregate effect. For example, even though the 
individual education variable in the “intercept and slope high income country dummy 
case” (the left panel of Table 3.3) is insignificant, the interactive variable of education 
and the high income dummy is very significant and positive that it makes the aggregate 
effect of education in the high income countries significant and positive. This result is 
consistent with the one income dummy case.  
Among the ten additional slope dummies, only the interactive variables of 
education and income group dummies are consistently significant. They have opposite 
signs to the intercept income dummies in each regression. In other words, since the high 
income intercept dummy has a negative effect on FDI, then the education and high 
income dummy interactive variable has a positive effect on FDI. With the same logic, for 
the interactive variable of the education and the low-income dummy, the sign is negative 
and statistically significant. So does the sign of another interactive variable of education 
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and the middle-income dummy. These results for the slope dummy of education are 
different from the previous conclusion in the case of the one-income dummy.  
On average, the absolute value of the education and income dummy interactive 
variables is around 200. It means that for high-income economies, FDI will increase by 
around US$ 200 million for each percentage point of secondary school enrollment. The 
interactive variable can be regarded as a “reacting variable”, working against the 
intercept dummies to mitigate their impact on FDI.  
The slope dummies for education can also be regarded as an additional part of the 
net marginal effect of education, which comes not only from the individual explanatory 
variable “education”, but also from the interactive variable of “education” and “income 
dummy”. In the high-income dummy case (left panel), education has a net positive effect 
on FDI in high income economies after its individual effect and the interactive effect with 
the high income dummy are combined. But with the low and middle income dummies, 
education’s net effect is much smaller, or even turns to negative, due to the negative 
coefficients of the interactive variables.  
The negative effect of education in low and middle income economies is at odds 
with the other studies in the FDI literature and dramatically different from education’s 
identical positive effect in the one-dummy case. From the one-dummy case, education on 
average increases FDI inflows. But in the slope-dummy case, education clearly attracts 
FDI only in high-income economies. In contrast, education’s effect in low and middle 
income economies can be negative. 
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Instead of using middle-income-group dummies, two new slope-dummy scenarios 
are generated to include upper-income-group dummies and lower-income-group dummy 
respectively. The estimates are displayed in Appendixes 3.3 and 3.4.  
Very similar with the other slope-dummy cases with high, low or middle income 
dummies, the two new scenarios confirm the positive effect of previous FDI inflows, 
education, and host GDP. Moreover, parallel to the previous slope-dummy results, most 
of the slope dummies in these two new scenarios are insignificant. And just like the 
previous results on the middle income slope dummies, only the interactive variables of 
education and lower or upper middle income group dummies are consistently significant 
and negative. However, these two new scenarios do yield some different results. First, the 
coefficients of risk (investment profile) become significant and negative in cases with 
upper or lower middle income slope dummies. These coefficients are insignificant in the 
case with aggregate middle income slope dummy. Second, the intercept upper middle 
income dummy turns into insignificant while the aggregate middle income intercept 
dummy is mainly significant positive. In general, the new scenarios with upper or lower 
middle income slope dummies confirms the previous conclusions in the cases with high, 
middle or lower income slope dummies and therefore shows the robustness of the model 
and conclusions.  
As in the two-dummy scenario, all regressions in the slope-dummy scenario pass 
the AR(2) test at the confidence level of 10%40.  
The above two-dummy and slope-dummy cases, generally have mimicked the 
previous one-dummy scenario with the following explanatory variables: lagged FDI, 
                                                 
40
 Most regressions in the slope-dummy case pass the AR(2) test at the confidence level of 5%. Only a few 
regressions fail the AR(2) test at 5%. 
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GDP, education and intercept income dummies with significant results; and wage rate, 
trade openness, and real interest rate with insignificant results. Three significant variables 
in the one-dummy case - risk, tax and tariff - become less significant but retain their 
signs. Exchange rate, which is insignificant in the one-dummy case, turns into mostly 
negative in the new cases, supporting the hypothesis that host currency depreciation will 
either hurt FDI enterprises’ imports or signal financial weakness. In the two-dummy case, 
the additional income dummy gets the same regression conclusions as one-dummy case. 
In the slope dummy case, only the education and income dummy interactive variables are 
significant, offsetting the individual income dummy and dampening the education’s 
effect. The reason why new specifications do not improve estimation may be that adding 
more variables introduces multicollinearity to depress the significance level of each 
explanatory variable.41 Moreover, in the two new specifications, all regressions pass the 
AR(2) test. In conclusion, the robustness tests basically confirm the stability, consistency 
and generality of the original one-dummy specification, and thus can be regarded as the 
recommended model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 The existence of multicollinearity problem can be confirmed by the obvious changes of the sign and 
significance of explanatory variables, after dropping the interactive variable of education and income 
dummies. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
From the above empirical estimation results for the FDI determination model, the 
questions raised in Section I can be answered. First, for the question on the existence of a 
general FDI determination model for global economies, there does exist a general FDI 
determination model which covers global economies in all income groups. This model 
performs robustly when applying the Blundell-Bond system GMM method, including 
traditional explanatory variables, and time and income group dummies.  
Second, the answer to the inquiry of the importance of the explanatory variables is 
that: the following seven explanatory variables, lagged dependent variable, host GDP, 
education, income group dummies, country risk, tax, and tariff, are statistically 
significant in the model, which generally confirms the conclusions in the previous 
literature. Exchange rate, however, only has significant results in some regressions, 
especially in the two-income-dummy scenario. Wage rate, interest rate, and openness are 
insignificant in the GMM estimations, even though they are influential according to some 
other studies.  
More specifically, the main findings in this article show that different average 
income levels do play a significant role in FDI determination model, which can be 
represented by adding income group dummies into the model.  
Ceteris paribus, high income level has a negative effect on FDI inflows, and low 
income level has a positive effect. But the effect of middle income on FDI is 
insignificant. These effects of income group dummies only partially support the 
Investment Development Path (IDP) theory with respect to the highest income level but 
not for the middle and low income levels. When I control for income dummies, I find that 
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lagged FDI has consistently positive effect on FDI. This hysteresis in FDI has indicated 
that the FDI model should use a dynamic structure. Consistent with the literature, market 
potential (GDP) and human capital (education) encourage FDI and the result is robust to 
all income dummies. FDI increases with risk levels because it presumably replaces other 
investments during financial instability. The positive relation between FDI and tariffs 
supports the Tariff Jumping FDI argument, suggesting that FDI is a potential substitute 
for international trade. When middle and low income levels are controlled for, evidence 
suggests that an increase in taxes and a depreciation of the currency exerts downward 
pressure on FDI flows. I do not find the wealth effect of exchange rate. On the contrary, 
there is weak evidence that the depreciation of local currency discourages FDI.  
The empirical results also shed light on government policy regarding promotion 
of FDI inflows. The results suggest that the government can proactively and consistently 
apply specific policies to attract FDI inflows. One of the most important strategies is to 
constantly follow the growth path to make the host market more enticing and vital for 
international investors. Another simple scheme to attract FDI is to lower the tax rate to 
establish a business-friendly environment. From the analysis, the FDI model is clearly 
dynamic, with the significantly positive effect of previous FDI. Accordingly, government 
should maintain consistent long-term efforts instead of short term one-shot speculation. 
The government should be very cautious on negative policy on FDI. Even though it may 
be a one-shot game, but FDI has memory and the negative effect may persist. Moreover, 
since the low income economy dummy is positive, no matter how low the previous FDI 
level or how poor the country’s economy, there will be some potential FDI, if the country 
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proactively opens the door to the world. At last, improvement of education level is an 
effective way to attract FDI inflows. 
The empirical results also suggest that further study is needed to improve the 
Blundell-Bond system GMM specification, especially on how to construct the 
instruments. Furthermore, economic growth rate may be more significant than the level 
of GDP to explain FDI. Similarly, the change of exchange rates may be more appropriate 
as FDI determinant than the level of exchange rate. In addition, the conclusions should be 
tested by the newest FDI data as they appear, particularly regarding the insignificant 
impact of wage, interest rate and trade openness on FDI; and also for new tariff data 
available in World Development Indicators. A very promising and interesting proposal is 
to test if this model is still robust for separated horizontal and vertical FDI if data are 
available. At last, for more accurate analysis, the definition and measurement of the 
variables should be standardized across countries, especially for FDI and wage.   
The FDI is a newly burgeoning strength in the global economy and the Blundell-
Bond system GMM sets up a new way to study this promising topic. Let us fully leverage 
this effective method and keep researching. 
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Table 3.1: GMM Result of FDI with One Income Dummy† 
High/Middle/Low Income Dummies, Dependent variable: FDI inflows 
 
 
 
 
Independent Var (ivlag=2 .) (ivlag=2 14) (ivlag=3 5) (ivlag=6 10) (ivlag=5 6) (ivlag=6 7) (ivlag=2 8) (ivlag=2 9) (ivlag=3 10)
Exchange Rate (EX) -0.290 -0.352 -0.337 0.276 -0.558 -0.424 -1.163* -0.999* -0.944*
(0.55) (0.65) (0.66) (0.56) (0.80) (0.77) (0.63) (0.55) (0.56)
Lagged FDI Inflows (FDIL) 0.436*** 0.433*** 0.438*** 0.492*** 0.449*** 0.463*** 0.434*** 0.456*** 0.458***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Tax Rate (Tax) -13803 -15793* -13616 -15469* -18496* -17377** -13344* -12111 -11445
(9425) (9415) (10403) (8543) (9325) (8456) (8018) (7529) (7538)
Wage Rate (Wage) -0.634 -0.155 -0.942 1.368 1.410 1.073 1.011 0.590 0.520
(0.74) (0.83) (0.90) (1.21) (1.29) (1.23) (0.82) (0.75) (0.78)
Real Interest Rate (r) -49.27 -41.25 -83.30 -80.33 -102.5 -72.21 -11.18 -30.83 -46.97
(33.6) (35.8) (63.0) (111) (137) (123) (43.0) (40.6) (55.2)
Import Duties (Tariff) 4.250 5.484 7.212 5.496 10.50* 10.33* 10.70** 11.85*** 11.62***
(3.43) (3.93) (4.70) (5.13) (5.34) (5.34) (4.14) (4.08) (4.15)
Openness (Open) 90.67 56.21 117.9 -63.72 -49.55 -23.81 -29.05 8.694 13.77
(68.5) (70.4) (74.9) (101) (126) (129) (73.2) (70.8) (78.1)
School Enrollment (EDU) 162.6*** 163.0*** 162.7*** 138.7** 142.1** 136.3** 160.7*** 153.5*** 152.5***
(39.4) (41.3) (39.4) (53.3) (55.3) (55.6) (45.2) (43.4) (44.6)
GDP 9.764*** 9.686*** 9.839*** 7.439*** 8.368*** 8.182*** 8.920*** 8.526*** 8.475***
(2.16) (2.07) (2.14) (1.27) (1.64) (1.40) (1.88) (1.77) (1.72)
HICD -9321*** -7640*** -9219***
(2315) (2340) (2529)
MCD -1117 -1421 -1289
(1130) (1323) (1281)
LICD 5616*** 5981*** 5978***
(2045) (1995) (2016)
Risk -374.7* -801.7** -788.3** -352.3 -1222*** -1260*** -1155*** -858.1*** -821.9***
(208) (322) (312) (258) (421) (418) (359) (256) (252)
# of Observations 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313
P-value of AR(2) test 0.215 0.120 0.163 0.506 0.182 0.245 0.156 0.369 0.348
All regressions include a constant term and time (year) dummies which are not reported in the table.
Each column represents results for instrument variables (IVs) with different lags indicated at the top.
EX, FDIL, r and EDU are Exchange Rate, Lagged FDI inflows, real interest rate, and school enrollment, respectively
***, ** and * represent significence levels of less than 1% (p<0.01), less than 5% (p<0.05), and less than 10% (p<0.1), respectively.
HICD, MCD, and LICD are country dummies for high, middle, and low income countries, respectively.
Left Panel
with dummy for HIC
Middle Panel
with dummy for MC
Right Panel
with dummy for LIC
All independent variables are lagged in one period.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3.2: GMM Result of FDI with Two Income Dummy† 
High/Middle/Low Income Dummies, Dependent variable: FDI inflows 
 
† See footnote in Table 3.1. 
Independent Var (ivlag=2  .) (ivlag=2 14) (ivlag=5 6) (ivlag=2 9) (ivlag=3 5) (ivlag=3 10) (ivlag=2 8) (ivlag=2 9) (ivlag=3 10)
Exchange Rate (EX) -0.888* -1.016* -1.083* -1.158* -0.962* -1.024* -1.187* -1.004* -0.943*
(0.47) (0.57) (0.65) (0.60) (0.56) (0.60) (0.61) (0.53) (0.54)
Lagged FDI Inflows (FDIL) 0.432*** 0.425*** 0.403*** 0.419*** 0.434*** 0.418*** 0.416*** 0.439*** 0.436***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Tax Rate (Tax) -6735 -8903 -8743 -8900 -7891 -8623 -9485 -7827 -6627
(7116) (7644) (8772) (8188) (8355) (8446) (8298) (7589) (7977)
Wage Rate (Wage) -0.455 -0.0560 -0.394 -0.0942 -0.689 -0.431 -0.0736 -0.461 -0.724
(0.62) (0.71) (0.98) (0.76) (0.74) (0.80) (0.76) (0.68) (0.75)
Real Interest Rate (r) -34.63 -23.46 -67.84 -22.73 -57.10 -16.95 -23.44 -49.33 -67.33
(32.8) (33.9) (128) (40.0) (60.7) (52.6) (40.2) (39.0) (55.4)
Import Duties (Tariff) 5.334** 6.475** 6.860** 7.326** 8.658** 7.262** 7.543** 8.664** 8.064**
(2.23) (2.94) (3.12) (3.28) (3.53) (3.20) (3.29) (3.40) (3.44)
Openness (Open) 72.39 44.10 101.8 43.56 98.17 90.32 44.27 65.44 94.68
(68.2) (70.5) (112) (76.1) (75.3) (94.1) (77.7) (66.8) (74.4)
School Enrollment (EDU) 171.2*** 173.3*** 176.1*** 174.6*** 171.6*** 175.2*** 174.1*** 170.8*** 171.1***
(37.0) (38.0) (41.3) (38.1) (36.9) (39.1) (38.6) (35.4) (35.6)
GDP 9.805*** 9.818*** 10.45*** 9.910*** 9.855*** 10.12*** 9.956*** 9.636*** 9.794***
(2.19) (2.11) (2.27) (2.17) (2.14) (2.18) (2.18) (2.13) (2.12)
HICD -13371*** -11812*** -13041*** -5661** -7154*** -6802***
(2884) (2888) (3335) (2155) (2017) (2241)
MCD -6069*** -5789*** -5950*** 5592** 6520*** 7256***
(1513) (1542) (1685) (2177) (2016) (2084)
LICD 5726*** 5881*** 5943*** 11290*** 12300*** 13144***
(1596) (1606) (1628) (3233) (3085) (3111)
Risk -208.1 -633.6* -849.8** -897.9** -660.2** -855.1** -924.9** -580.9** -556.5*
(199) (322) (418) (379) (307) (394) (386) (288) (288)
# of Observations 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313
P-value of AR(2) test 0.415 0.186 0.152 0.151 0.289 0.289 0.136 0.353 0.276
Middle Panel
with dummy for HIC & LIC
Right Panel
with dummy for MC & LIC
Left Panel
with dummy for HIC & MC
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Table 3.3: GMM Result of FDI with both Intercept and Slope Income Dummies† 
High/Middle/Low Income Dummies, Dependent variable: FDI inflows 
 
† See footnote in Table 3.1 and Appendix 3.3. 
Independent Var (ivlag=2 .) (ivlag=2 14) (ivlag=3 5) (ivlag=6 10) (ivlag=5 6) (ivlag=6 7) (ivlag=2 8) (ivlag=2 9) (ivlag=3 10)
Exchange Rate (EX) -1.150** -1.059** -1.367** 0.430 -0.847 -0.725 -1.564 -1.628 -1.580
(0.49) (0.49) (0.61) (1.03) (1.12) (1.18) (1.71) (1.46) (1.50)
Lagged FDI Inflows (FDIL) 0.928*** 1.213** 0.996*** 0.477*** 0.439*** 0.453*** 0.428*** 0.448*** 0.450***
(0.27) (0.59) (0.37) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Tax Rate (Tax) 6294 2012 3955 10448 -13002 -14845 -13301 -15226 -15024
(7998) (7680) (8526) (29084) (27351) (33414) (11126) (11242) (11739)
Wage Rate (Wage) -0.286 0.160 -0.631 1.483 1.869 1.769 0.271 0.00130 0.0360
(0.58) (0.62) (0.76) (2.92) (1.83) (1.71) (1.16) (1.02) (1.03)
Real Interest Rate (r) -24.06 -15.08 -32.34 -468.6* -211.0 -169.2 -21.52 -47.79 -57.11
(22.6) (23.7) (37.5) (259) (281) (362) (81.8) (88.8) (108)
Import Duties (Tariff) 3.727 5.551** 7.114* 3.363 10.01 10.20 149.8** 160.0** 157.7**
(2.71) (2.73) (4.01) (7.31) (6.17) (6.64) (61.7) (64.0) (63.6)
Openness (Open) 50.47 4.876 63.63 -133.8 -124.3 -106.2 -37.39 12.99 12.20
(35.8) (37.6) (46.2) (124) (157) (157) (106) (99.6) (102)
School Enrollment (EDU) -92.71 -78.80 -94.51 145.7** 150.4*** 146.7*** 169.5*** 161.3*** 161.6***
(56.8) (63.9) (67.1) (55.7) (55.7) (55.2) (43.3) (42.1) (42.7)
GDP 7.120 1.257 2.442 7.409*** 8.231*** 8.020*** 9.165*** 8.860*** 8.798***
(6.72) (14.8) (11.6) (1.28) (1.64) (1.43) (2.12) (1.98) (1.93)
HICD -35485*** -37805*** -34606***
(11652) (10115) (11796)
MCD 7903 11825* 11061**
(4869) (5962) (5464)
LICD 12946*** 13356*** 13368***
(4075) (3918) (3881)
Risk -362.7 -594.3 -686.4* -5.587 -927.1 -966.2 -893.8** -638.5** -618.3*
(250) (359) (375) (466) (646) (690) (444) (307) (318)
EX * HICD -0.285 -1.534 -1.603
(2.12) (2.38) (2.03)
FDIL * HICD -0.530* -0.834 -0.588
(0.32) (0.65) (0.40)
Tax * HICD -17506 -4362 -17771
(26680) (23478) (25912)
Wage * HICD 0.852 1.144 1.899
(2.41) (2.57) (2.85)
r * HICD 58.96 171.6 125.4
(303) (313) (332)
Tariff * HICD 93.99 125.1 200.4
(219) (260) (273)
Open * HICD -54.45 -22.73 -65.62
(36.0) (42.1) (42.3)
Edu * HICD 274.9*** 271.4*** 272.8***
(72.7) (69.9) (81.1)
GDP * HICD 2.494 8.741 7.069
(7.09) (15.5) (11.7)
Risk * HICD 2130* 2124** 1998*
(1131) (1042) (1166)
EX * MCD -1.030 -0.964 -0.836
(1.06) (1.06) (1.04)
FDIL * MCD -0.0116 -0.303 -0.217
(0.19) (0.25) (0.22)
Tax * MCD -11319 10449 13753
(29672) (27381) (32983)
Wage * MCD -2.458 -3.628 -3.850*
(2.99) (2.21) (2.14)
r * MCD 475.1* 219.7 174.0
(259) (286) (367)
Tariff * MCD 2.605 3.371 2.833
(14.3) (29.9) (29.6)
Open * MCD 151.3 163.1 140.9
(126) (168) (168)
Edu * MCD -161.5*** -225.5*** -214.0***
(56.8) (68.6) (67.1)
GDP * MCD 4.901 9.325 6.916
(3.80) (6.35) (5.43)
Risk * MCD -438.9 -473.8 -355.6
(513) (767) (740)
EX * LICD 0.644 0.718 0.686
(1.65) (1.42) (1.45)
FDIL * LICD 0.333 -0.0578 -0.0221
(0.82) (0.71) (0.70)
Tax * LICD 12836 18424 17906
(12305) (12858) (13308)
Wage * LICD 0.147 0.00130 -0.0103
(1.33) (1.14) (1.16)
r * LICD 29.07 34.26 46.10
(84.0) (87.0) (106)
Tariff * LICD -142.9** -153.1** -150.9**
(62.6) (64.5) (64.1)
Open * LICD 63.59 21.86 21.72
(110) (102) (111)
Edu * LICD -239.2*** -224.6*** -224.2***
(55.5) (49.3) (51.2)
GDP * LICD 2.124 0.759 0.765
(8.84) (7.44) (7.54)
Risk * LICD -200.8 -192.8 -204.1
(471) (369) (391)
# of Observations 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313 1313
P-value of AR(2) test 0.702 0.422 0.638 0.179 0.189 0.294 0.237 0.466 0.451
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Figure 2: Actual FDI Inflows, (1970-2007, Billions of US$)  
 
Source: UNCTAD, http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView.aspx.  And WIR 2008 pp.2 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Global FDI Inflows in 2006 by Income Groups  
       
 Source: World Development Report 2009, pp. 350 & 359 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1.1: Summary of FDI Studies on Market Size and Exchange Rate 
 
 
 
1. “+” refers to significant and positive results. 
2. “-” denotes to significant and negative results. 
3. “?” is for insignificant results. 
4. “Ambig” refers to ambiguous results. 
Mainly positive + Mainly negative - 
Mainly 
insignificant ? Ambiguous
host GDP (including 
log form, and host 
regional GDP) 
[22+.1-,2?, 
3"Ambig."]
Cushman (1985, some GNP), Grubert and Mutti (1991), 
Wheeler and Mody (1992), Hines and Rice (1994), Lee & 
Mansfield (1996), Wei (1997a, 1997b), Altshuler, et al. (1998), 
United Nations (1998), Lipsey (1999a), Dilyard (1999), 
Billington (1999), Smarzynska and Wei (2000), Wei (2000),   
Blonigen and Davies (2001), Manfra (2001), Chakrabarti 
(2001), Smarzynska and Wei (2001), Balasubramanyam, et 
al. (2002), Bevan, et al. (2002), Fung, et al. (2002), Ito and 
Rose (2002) Hines Jr. (1998), 
Baek and Kwok 
(2002), Jensen 
(2002)
Edwards 
(1990), 
Goldberg and 
Kolstad (1994), 
Morisset 
(2000),
previous host GDP 
(including log form) 
[4+,3?]
Goldberg & Klein (1997), Hasnat (1997), Ramirez (2002), 
Sun, et al. (2002)
Lipsey (2000), 
Kudrle (1995), 
Tuman and 
Emmert (1999)
host GNP [6+,1?]
Bandera & White (1968),     Scaperlanda & Mauer (1969 & 
1971),    Scaperlanda & Mauer (1972),     Scaperlanda & 
Balough (1983),      Lunn (1980 & 1983),  Buch (2001) Sagari (1992)
host GNP lagging 1 
period [3+]
Schmitz and Bieri (1972), Lunn (1980 and 1983), Culem 
(1988)
log of real output in 
host (UK) sectors. 
[1"Ambig"] Girma (2002)
host sales in product 
j [1+] Milner and Pentecost (1996)
host industrial value 
added output [1+] Barrell and Pain (1997)
host industrial 
production or 
enterprises' sales 
(current or previous) 
[2+] Boatwright & Renton (1975),      Gorecki (1976)
host industrial 
production index 
[1+] Buch (2001)
EX1: Direct Pricing 
(FDI home currency 
/ FDI host currency) 
[6-, 4?, 1"Ambig."]
Cushman (1985), 
Klein and Rosengren 
(1994), Blonigen and 
Feenstra (1996), 
Kogut and Chang 
(1996), Jun and 
Singh (1996), Hasnat 
(1997)
Goldberg and 
Kolstad (1994), 
Cassou (1997), 
Goldberg & Klein 
(1997), Tuman 
and Emmert 
(1999)
 Feliciano and 
Lipsey (2002)
EX2: Indirect 
Pricing (FDI host 
currency / FDI 
home currency) 
[2+, 1-, 1?] Blonigen (1997), Baek and Okawa (2001)
Summary and 
Summary (1995),  Kudrle (1995) 
Level of host 
countries' 
GDP, GNP, 
industrial 
sales, value 
added, or 
production: 
[40+, 1-, 6?, 4 
"Ambig."]
Exchange 
Rates: 
[2+, 7-,  5?, 
1"Ambig."]
Effect on FDI Explanatory variable
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Appendix 2.1: The Rank of Coefficient of Variation of FDI Inflows of 208 
Economies in the World 
Country Name
CV of FDI
(sd/avg) Country Name
CV of FDI
(sd/avg) Country Name
CV of FDI
(sd/avg)
Afghanistan Missing Kyrgyz Republic 0.96 India 1.60
American Samoa Missing Singapore 0.98 Netherlands 1.61
Andorra Missing Malaysia 0.99 Benin 1.61
Antigua and Barbuda Missing Lithuania 1.01 Brazil 1.62
Bahrain Missing Belarus 1.02 Congo, Rep. 1.63
Bermuda Missing China 1.02 Bulgaria 1.65
Brunei Missing Costa Rica 1.03 Bolivia 1.66
Cayman Islands Missing Armenia 1.03 Tanzania 1.66
Channel Islands Missing Papua New Guinea 1.03 Israel 1.67
Cuba Missing Vanuatu 1.03 Guinea 1.68
Faeroe Islands Missing Trinidad and Tobago 1.04 Central African Republic 1.71
French Polynesia Missing Switzerland 1.05 Uganda 1.72
Greenland Missing France 1.06 Nepal 1.73
Guam Missing Tonga 1.07 Argentina 1.73
Iraq Missing Georgia 1.08 Peru 1.77
Isle of Man Missing Spain 1.08 Malta 1.77
Kiribati Missing Malawi 1.10 Iceland 1.78
Korea, Dem. Rep. Missing Swaziland 1.10 Cape Verde 1.78
Libya Missing Guatemala 1.12 Nicaragua 1.79
Liechtenstein Missing Pakistan 1.12 Mozambique 1.79
Luxembourg Missing South Africa 1.13 Algeria 1.80
Macao, China Missing Maldives 1.14 Japan 1.80
Marshall Islands Missing Chad 1.16 Venezuela, RB 1.80
Mayotte Missing Vietnam 1.18 Guyana 1.84
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Missing Djibouti 1.19 Morocco 1.86
Monaco Missing Grenada 1.20 Lesotho 1.86
Namibia Missing Ecuador 1.22 Lao PDR 1.91
New Caledonia Missing Mexico 1.22 Mali 1.96
Northern Mariana Islands Missing Italy 1.23 Slovak Republic 1.96
Palau Missing Philippines 1.24 Cameroon 1.97
Puerto Rico Missing Belize 1.24 Finland 1.98
Qatar Missing Paraguay 1.25 Burundi 2.00
San Marino Missing Uruguay 1.25 Romania 2.02
Saudi Arabia Missing Sri Lanka 1.25 Lebanon 2.06
Suriname Missing Portugal 1.26 Ireland 2.09
Timor-Leste Missing Ghana 1.26 Panama 2.10
United Arab Emirates Missing Burkina Faso 1.29 Jordan 2.11
Virgin Islands (U.S.) Missing Thailand 1.32 Sweden 2.16
West Bank and Gaza Missing Poland 1.33 Denmark 2.20
Netherlands Antilles (7.14) Solomon Islands 1.34 Botswana 2.20
Tajikistan 0.37 Cote d'Ivoire 1.35 Guinea-Bissau 2.21
Cyprus 0.42 United Kingdom 1.35 Bangladesh 2.23
Greece 0.42 Honduras 1.36 Comoros 2.25
Ukraine 0.51 Cambodia 1.36 Ethiopia 2.31
Turkmenistan 0.52 Colombia 1.38 Belgium 2.32
Barbados 0.55 Syrian Arab Republic 1.39 Equatorial Guinea 2.38
Kazakhstan 0.56 Jamaica 1.40 Mauritius 2.51
Estonia 0.58 Norway 1.40 Sudan 2.58
St. Lucia 0.59 Turkey 1.41 Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 2.66
Latvia 0.61 Myanmar 1.42 Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.90
Eritrea 0.62 Angola 1.42 El Salvador 2.98
Slovenia 0.66 United States 1.43 Aruba 3.00
Hong Kong, China 0.68 Czech Republic 1.46 Germany 3.01
Oman 0.68 Fiji 1.46 Zimbabwe 3.05
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.75 Russian Federation 1.47 Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.06
Uzbekistan 0.75 Canada 1.48 Kuwait 3.28
Australia 0.79 Hungary 1.48 Congo, Dem. Rep. 3.42
Croatia 0.79 Senegal 1.50 Bhutan 3.48
New Zealand 0.82 Dominican Republic 1.52 Sao Tome and Principe 3.51
Rwanda 0.85 Chile 1.52 Indonesia 3.58
Nigeria 0.85 Togo 1.53 Samoa 4.42
Mongolia 0.88 Zambia 1.53 Liberia 4.72
Dominica 0.89 St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.54 Mauritania 6.09
Albania 0.92 Niger 1.54 Somalia 8.17
Azerbaijan 0.93 Madagascar 1.55 Yemen, Rep. 10.35
Seychelles 0.93 Austria 1.57 Gabon 12.58
Tunisia 0.94 Macedonia, FYR 1.57 Sierra Leone 45.90
Haiti 0.94 Bahamas, The 1.58
Kenya 0.94 Gambia, The 1.58
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.95 Korea, Rep. 1.59
Moldova 0.95
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Appendix 2.2: 44 Selected Variables for Cluster Analysis  
 
 
Variable In model Variable Name & Data Resources field name in WDI2003
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$, from WDI CD-ROM) BX_KLT_DINV_CD_WD
'Foreign direct investment, net (BoP, current US$)' BN_KLT_DINV_CD
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)' BX_KLT_DINV_DT_GD_ZS
'Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of gross capital formation)' BX_KLT_DINV_DT_GI_ZS
'Gross foreign direct investment (% of GDP)' BG_KLT_DINV_GD_ZS
Wages (labor cost) Wages and salaries (% of total expenditure) (from WDI CD-ROM) GB_XPC_WAGE_ZS
Deposit interest rate (%) WDI-CD-ROM FR_INR_DPST
Lending interest rate (%) WDI-CD-ROM FR_INR_LEND
Real interest rate (%) WDI-CD-ROM FR_INR_RINR
Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate)   WDI-CD-ROM FR_INR_LNDP
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) PA_NUS_FCRF
Real effective exchange rate index (1995 = 100) PX_REX_REER
PPP conversion factor to official exchange rate ratio PA_NUS_PPPC_RF
GDP (current US$) NY_GDP_MKTP_CD
GDP growth (annual %) NY_GDP_MKTP_KD_ZG
GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) NY_GDP_PCAP_KD
GDP per capita growth (annual %) NY_GDP_PCAP_KD_ZG
GDP, PPP (current international $) NY_GDP_MKTP_PP_CD
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) NY_GDP_PCAP_PP_CD
GDP (constant 1995 US$) NY_GDP_MKTP_KD
GNI (current US$) NY_GNP_MKTP_CD
GNI, Atlas method (current US$) NY_GNP_ATLS_CD
GNI, PPP (current international $) NY_GNP_MKTP_PP_CD
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) NY_GNP_PCAP_CD
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) NY_GNP_PCAP_PP_CD
Highest marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) GB_TAX_CMAR_ZS
Highest marginal tax rate, individual (on income exceeding, US$) GB_TAX_IMAR_CD
Highest marginal tax rate, individual rate (%) GB_TAX_IMAR_ZS
Other taxes (% of current revenue)* GB_TAX_OTHR_RV_ZS
Social security taxes (% of current revenue) GB_TAX_SSEC_RV_ZS
Tax revenue (% of GDP) GB_TAX_TOTL_GD_ZS
Taxes on goods and services (% of current revenue) GB_TAX_GSRV_RV_ZS
Taxes on goods and services (% value added of industry and services) GB_TAX_GSRV_VA_ZS
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of current revenue) GB_TAX_YPKG_RV_ZS
Export duties (% of tax revenue) GB_TAX_EXPT_ZS
Import duties (% of tax revenue) GB_TAX_IMPT_ZS
Taxes on international trade (% of current revenue) GB_TAX_INTT_RV_ZS
Net barter terms of trade (1995 = 100)* TT_PRI_MRCH_XD_WD
Net trade in goods (BoP, current US$)* BN_GSR_MRCH_CD
Net trade in goods and services (BoP, current US$) BN_GSR_GNFS_CD
Trade (% of GDP) NE_TRD_GNFS_ZS
Trade in goods (% of GDP) TG_VAL_TOTL_GD_ZS
Trade in goods (% of goods GDP) TG_VAL_TOTL_GG_ZS
Population Population, total SP_POP_TOTL
Note
1
2
3 Net trade in goods is the difference between exports and imports of goods.
International Trade
Other taxes include employer payroll or labor taxes, taxes on property, and taxes not allocable to other categories.
Net barter terms of trade are the ratio of the export price index to the corresponding import price index.
Tariff
FDI Predict Model Var Summary
cost of capital
Exchange rate
FDI inflow value
GDP/GNI/Income
Tax
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Appendix 2.3: Summary of Nine Methods in Cluster Analysis 
 
 
 
Summary of Nine Methods in Cluster Analysis 
Method Characters 
Average Link  
Average link tends to join clusters with small variances, and it is slightly 
biased toward producing clusters with the same variance. 
Centroid Method 
The Centroid method is more robust to outliers than most other 
hierarchical methods but in other respects may not perform as well as 
Ward’s method or average linkage. 
Complete Linkage 
Complete linkage is strongly biased toward producing clusters with 
roughly equal diameters, and it can be severely distorted by moderate 
outliers. 
EML Method 
The EML method is similar to Ward’s minimum-variance method but 
removes the bias toward equal-sized clusters. Practical experience has 
indicated that EML is somewhat biased toward unequal-sized clusters. 
Flexible-Beta 
method 
Developed by G. N. Lance and W. T. Williams in 1967, the distance 
between two clusters is defined combinatorially, that is, by an equation 
for updating a distance matrix when two clusters are joined. This method 
is very flexible because by changing Beta parameter, the combinatorial 
formula is also adjusted accordingly. 
McQuitty's 
Similarity Analysis 
Independently developed by R. R. Sokal and C. D. Michener in 1958 and 
L. L. McQuitty in 1966, this method defines a very simple cluster 
combinatorial formula that the distance between two clusters is the 
simple average of the distances among the elements of the two clusters. 
Median Method 
Median method was developed by J. C. Gower in 1967 which is an 
extension for McQuitty's Similarity Analysis. This method add a small 
adjustment element to the McQuitty's Similarity Analysis. 
Single Linkage  
Single linkage has many desirable theoretical properties but has fared 
poorly in Monte Carlo studies. By imposing no constraints on the shape 
of clusters, single linkage sacrifices performance in the recovery of 
compact clusters in return of the ability to detect elongated and irregular 
clusters. 
Ward's Minimum-
Variance Method 
Ward’s method tends to join clusters with a small number of 
observations, and it is strongly biased toward producing clusters with 
roughly the same number of observations. It is also very sensitive to 
outliers. 
  
Note: The detailed formulas are on SAS/STAT User’s Guide, Version 8, pp. 854-861. 
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Appendix 2.4: Formulas in Cluster Analysis 
 
(following the notation in SAS/STAT User’s Guide, Version 8. pp. 854-861) 
 
 
Notation: 
 
Lower-case symbols generally pertain to observations and upper-case symbols, to 
clusters: 
 
n: number of observations 
υ: number of variables if data are coordinates 
G: number of clusters at any given level of the hierarchy   
ix  or Xi: ith observation (row vector if coordinate data) 
CK: Kth cluster, subset of {1,2,…,n} 
NK: number of observations in CK 
−
:X sample mean vector 
−
:kX  mean vector for cluster Ck. 
||X||: Euclidean length of the vector X, that is, the square root of the sum of the squares 
of the elements of X 
T:  2
1
||||∑ =
−
−
n
i
XXi  
WK: ∑ ∈
−
−
Cki
XXi 2||||  
PG: ∑WJ, where summations over the G clusters at the Gth level of the hierarchy 
BKL: WM - WK- WL if CM= CK ⋃CL 
d (x, y) any distance or dissimilarity measure between observations or vectors x and y 
DKL: any distance or measure of dissimilarity between cluster CK and CL 
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Formulas: 
 
 
1. Average Linkage: 
 
The distance between two clusters is defined by  
 
DKL= 
LK N N
1
∑∑
∈ ∈K LCi Cj
ji xxd ),(  
 
 
 
2. Centroid Method 
 
The distance between two clusters is defined by  
DKL=
−−
− 2|||| LK XX  
 
 
 
3. Complete Linkage 
 
The distance between two clusters is calculated by  
 
DKL= ),(maxmax jiCjCi xxdLK ∈∈  
 
 
4. EML 
 
The distance between two clusters is given by  
 
DKL= ))ln()ln()ln((2)1ln( LLKKMM
G
KL NNNNNN
P
B
nv −−−+
 
 
 
5. Flexible – Beta Method 
 
The combinatorial formula is: 
DJM= bD
bDD KLJLJK +
−
+
2
1)(  
Where b is the value of the BETA=option, or -0.25 by default. 
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6. McQuitty’s Similarity Analysis 
 
The combinatorial formula is: 
DJM= 2
JLJK DD +
 
 
 
7. Median Method 
 
If d (x, y)=||x-y||2, then the combinatorial formula is  
 
DJM= 42
KLJLJK DDD −
+
 
 
 
8. Single Linkage 
 
The distance between two clusters is given by  
 
DKL= ),(minmin jiCjCi xxdLK ∈∈  
 
 
 
9. Ward's Minimum-Variance Method 
 
The distance between two clusters is defined by  
 
DKL= BKL = 
LK
LK
NN
XX
11
|||| 2
+
−
−−
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Appendix 2.5: Mean Comparison among Clusters (in each cross section snapshot, 1980-2001) 
 
 
 
 
Global
208 
Economies 1 (USA) USA-global 1 (JPN) JPN - global 
4 (DEU, ITA, 
FRA, GBR)
Cluster4-
global 
2 (BRA, 
IND)
Cluster7-
global 
3 (MEX,ESP,
CAN)
Cluster8 - 
global 197 Econs
Cluster9 - 
global 
GDP (billion constant 1995 US$) $133.2 $4,771.9 $4,638.7 $3,304.4 $3,171.2 $1,151.4 $1,018.1 $337.2 $203.9 $344.8 $211.6 $33.8 (99.4)$        
GNI, Atlas method (billion current US$) $84.8 $2,959.0 $2,874.2 $1,229.8 $1,145.0 $655.6 $570.8 $224.9 $140.1 $222.8 $138.0 $24.5 (60.3)$        
GNI, PPP (billion current international $) $92.9 $2,958.5 $2,865.5 $1,085.1 $992.2 $590.1 $497.1 $490.5 $397.6 $269.4 $176.5 $35.1 (57.8)$        
GDP, PPP (billion current international $) $93.9 $2,957.1 $2,863.2 $1,085.0 $991.1 $590.9 $497.0 $497.7 $403.8 $275.2 $181.3 $31.9 (62.0)$        
GNI (billion current US$) $72.3 $2,772.8 $2,700.5 $1,072.8 $1,000.6 $649.7 $577.4 $204.7 $132.4 $222.5 $150.2 $21.3 (51.0)$        
GDP (billion current US$) $71.1 $2,771.5 $2,700.4 $1,072.7 $1,001.6 $650.5 $579.4 $208.4 $137.3 $227.2 $156.1 $21.0 (50.1)$        
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, million current 
US$) $447.8 $16,930.0 $16,482.2 $280.0 (167.8)$        $3,578.7 $3,131.0 $995.1 $547.3 $3,132.0 $2,684.2 $123.1 (324.7)$      
Population, total (million) 22.9 227.2 204.4 116.8 93.9 61.2 38.4 404.5 381.6 43.2 20.3 15.8 (7.0)           
GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) 5,840$         21,001$         15,161$         28,296$      22,456$       18,388$       12,548$       2,242$       (3,598)$      10,227$         4,387$         5,113$     (727)$         
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 3,971$         13,020$         9,049$           10,530$      6,559$         10,460$       6,489$         1,230$       (2,741)$      6,550$           2,579$         3,594$     (378)$         
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 4,260$         13,010$         8,750$           9,290$        5,030$         9,588$         5,328$         2,305$       (1,955)$      7,490$           3,230$         3,907$     (352)$         
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 4,361$         13,020$         8,659$           9,290$        4,929$         9,573$         5,211$         2,240$       (2,121)$      7,330$           2,969$         4,046$     (315)$         
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) 43.424 1.000 -42.424 226.741 183.317 0.612 -42.813 3.931 -39.493 0.541 -42.883 44.990 1.566
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% of current 
revenue) 25.693 56.558 30.865 70.828 45.134 26.020 0.327 14.487 -11.207 36.630 10.936 24.816 -0.877
Trade in goods (% of GDP) 75.026 17.411 -57.615 25.331 -49.695 40.873 -34.154 16.044 -58.982 31.472 -43.554 78.758 3.731
Taxes on goods and services (% of current revenue) 22.714 4.411 -18.303 20.815 -1.899 26.647 3.933 37.304 14.590 26.537 3.824 22.352 -0.362
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 19.853 18.073 -1.779 10.850 -9.002 29.931 10.078 13.500 -6.353 17.059 -2.793 19.764 -0.089
Other taxes (% of current revenue) 4.250 1.174 -3.076 5.405 1.155 3.099 -1.151 2.100 -2.151 2.469 -1.781 4.412 0.162
GDP growth (annual %) 2.561 -0.240 -2.801 2.818 0.257 0.992 -1.569 7.900 5.340 4.260 1.699 2.505 -0.056
Taxes on goods and services (% value added of industry and 
services) 7.138 0.965 -6.173 2.475 -4.664 10.095 2.956 8.768 1.630 5.238 -1.900 7.155 0.017
Import duties (% of tax revenue) 20.378 1.483 -18.895 2.452 -17.927 0.051 -20.327 16.946 -3.432 5.927 -14.451 22.079 1.700
Taxes on international trade (% of current revenue) 20.899 1.392 -19.507 2.356 -18.543 0.047 -20.852 14.582 -6.317 5.933 -14.965 22.689 1.790
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.420 -1.193 -1.614 2.015 1.594 0.707 0.287 5.480 5.060 2.682 2.262 0.275 -0.145
PPP conversion factor to official exchange rate ratio 0.754 0.937 0.183 0.989 0.235 1.095 0.341 0.434 -0.320 0.828 0.074 0.742 -0.012
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of gross capital 
formation) 4.307 3.042 -1.265 0.081 -4.227 3.310 -0.997 1.858 -2.449 5.386 1.079 4.420 0.113
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 1.131 0.611 -0.520 0.026 -1.105 0.633 -0.497 0.428 -0.702 1.312 0.181 1.173 0.043
Social security taxes (% of current revenue) 8.662 28.224 19.562 0.000 -8.662 36.395 27.733 12.500 3.838 23.620 14.958 6.918 -1.744
Export duties (% of tax revenue) 4.439 0.000 -4.439 0.000 -4.439 0.000 -4.439 0.444 -3.994 0.672 -3.767 4.903 0.464
Net trade in goods and services (BoP, million current US$) (233.9)$        (18,930.0)$     (18,696.1)$     (9,990.0)$    (9,756.1)$     (1,297.2)$     (1,063.3)$     (6,264.5)$   (6,030.6)$   (2,041.9)$      (1,808.1)$    $181.0 $414.8
Comparison of Means of FDI Related Variables in Cluster Analysis in 1980 Cross Section
Name Cluster of USA Cluster of Japan
Cluster4: 
Developed Powers
Cluster7: 
Developing Giants
Cluster8: 
FDI Important
Cluster9: 
All Other Countries
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Global
208 
Economies 1 (USA) USA-global 1 (JPN) JPN - global 2 (CHN, IND)
Cluster5 - 
global 
4 (DEU, ITA, 
FRA, GBR)
Cluster6-
global 
4 (MEX,ESP,
CAN,BRA)
Cluster8 - 
global 
196 
Econs
Cluster9 - 
global 
 GDP (billion constant 1995 US$) $138.1 $5,563.5 $5,425.4 $3,884.9 $3,746.8 $237.9 $99.8 $1,250.1 $1,111.9 $422.5 $284.4 $33.5 (104.6)$    
 GNI (billion current US$) $77.1 $4,188.5 $4,111.4 $1,370.9 $1,293.8 $266.1 $189.0 $530.8 $453.8 $224.3 $147.2 $18.1 (58.9)$      
 GDP (billion current US$) $75.6 $4,174.9 $4,099.3 $1,365.8 $1,290.2 $266.1 $190.5 $532.5 $456.9 $232.5 $156.9 $18.0 (57.5)$      
 GNI, Atlas method (billion current US$) $82.5 $4,034.6 $3,952.1 $1,335.5 $1,253.0 $260.9 $178.4 $539.6 $457.1 $222.9 $140.4 $19.9 (62.6)$      
 GNI, PPP (billion current international $) $117.4 $4,035.2 $3,917.8 $1,492.4 $1,375.0 $811.7 $694.3 $750.3 $632.9 $400.5 $283.1 $40.2 (77.2)$      
 GDP, PPP (billion current international $) $119.2 $4,022.1 $3,902.9 $1,486.9 $1,367.7 $812.0 $692.8 $752.7 $633.5 $416.4 $297.2 $35.5 (83.7)$      
 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, 
million current US$) $379.6 $20,010.0 $19,630.4 $637.7 $258.1 $882.6 $502.9 $2,409.3 $2,029.7 $1,687.4 $1,307.7 $124.1 (255.6)$    
Population, total (million) 24.9 237.9 213.1 120.8 95.9 908.1 883.2 61.5 36.7 68.8 43.9 11.6 (13.2)        
 GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) 5,595$          23,384$          17,789$          32,172$     26,578$       262$           (5,332)$       19,865$         14,271$      9,127$          3,532$         4,856$     (739)$       
 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 3,358$          16,960$          13,602$          11,060$     7,702$         285$           (3,073)$       8,645$           5,287$        5,365$          2,007$         3,009$     (349)$       
 GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 4,928$          16,960$          12,032$          12,360$     7,432$         915$           (4,013)$       12,118$         7,189$        7,798$          2,869$         4,543$     (386)$       
 GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 4,932$          16,900$          11,968$          12,310$     7,378$         920$           (4,012)$       12,163$         7,230$        8,038$          3,105$         4,508$     (425)$       
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.366 2.900 2.535 3.728 3.363 7.729 7.364 2.454 2.088 3.016 2.650 0.091 -0.275
GDP growth (annual %) 2.152 3.816 1.664 4.364 2.212 9.565 7.413 2.597 0.445 4.410 2.258 1.950 -0.202
PPP conversion factor to official exchange rate 
ratio 0.570 1.038 0.468 0.919 0.348 0.326 -0.244 0.708 0.138 0.584 0.014 0.562 -0.008
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
GDP) 0.797 0.479 -0.318 0.047 -0.751 0.295 -0.502 0.503 -0.294 0.813 0.016 0.824 0.026
Gross foreign direct investment (% of GDP) 1.948 1.121 -0.827 0.522 -1.426 0.389 -1.559 1.492 -0.456 1.384 -0.564 2.025 0.077
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
gross capital formation) 4.685 2.375 -2.310 0.165 -4.520 0.819 -3.866 2.593 -2.091 3.954 -0.731 4.911 0.227
Trade in goods (% of GDP) 58.603 13.684 -44.919 22.525 -36.077 17.396 -41.206 37.070 -21.533 30.819 -27.784 61.235 2.633
Trade (% of GDP) 72.982 17.253 -55.729 24.959 -48.023 19.137 -53.844 52.180 -20.801 35.311 -37.671 76.434 3.452
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period 
average) 88.061 1.000 -87.061 238.536 150.475 7.653 -80.408 1.160 -86.901 0.661 -87.400 93.289 5.228
 Net trade in goods and services (BoP, million 
current US$) (210.5)$         (121,117.0)$    (120,906.5)$    $45,687.8 $45,898.3 (9,616.5)$    (9,406.0)$    $8,185.9 $8,396.4 $7,409.9 $7,620.4 $14.9 $225.4
Comparison of Means of FDI Related Variables in Cluster Analysis in 1985 Cross Section
Name Cluster of USA Cluster of Japan
Cluster5: 
Developing Giants
Cluster6: 
Developed Powers
Cluster8: 
FDI Important
Cluster9: 
All Other 
Countries
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Global
208 
Economies 2 (USA, JPN)
USA & JPN - 
global 2 (CHN, IND)
Cluster5 - 
global 
4 (DEU, ITA, 
FRA, GBR)
Cluster6-
global 
9 (IDN, ESP, CAN, 
KOR, AUS,NLD,
BEL,CHE,SWE)
Cluster7-
global 191 Econs
Cluster8 - 
global 
GDP (billion constant 1995 US$) $148.2 $5,728.2 $5,580.1 $336.4 $188.2 $1,453.4 $1,305.3 $338.4 $190.2 $31.3 (116.9)$       
GNI, Atlas method (billion current US$) $132.4 $4,596.9 $4,464.5 $349.4 $216.9 $1,168.5 $1,036.0 $285.8 $153.4 $23.8 (108.7)$       
GNI (billion current US$) $124.4 $4,410.2 $4,285.8 $334.4 $210.0 $1,243.4 $1,119.0 $297.9 $173.4 $27.5 (97.0)$         
GDP (billion current US$) $121.3 $4,401.4 $4,280.2 $335.8 $214.5 $1,249.1 $1,127.8 $302.2 $180.9 $27.3 (94.0)$         
GNI, PPP (billion current international $) $161.1 $4,095.6 $3,934.4 $1,411.9 $1,250.7 $1,078.6 $917.5 $296.4 $135.3 $57.3 (103.8)$       
GDP, PPP (billion current international $) $165.4 $4,089.1 $3,923.6 $1,417.9 $1,252.5 $1,084.0 $918.5 $301.6 $136.2 $58.8 (106.7)$       
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, 
million current US$) $1,365.9 $25,133.7 $23,767.8 $1,861.9 $496.0 $13,907.5 $12,541.6 $6,472.0 $5,106.1 $253.2 (1,112.7)$    
Population, total (million) 27.0 186.5 159.5 992.4 965.4 62.6 35.7 38.3 11.4 12.9 (14.1)           
GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) 5,766$          33,048$           27,282$       337$               (5,429)$          22,695$          16,929$          20,489$                  14,723$        4,213$            (1,554)$       
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 5,053$          25,270$           20,217$       355$               (4,698)$          18,390$          13,337$          16,870$                  11,817$        3,660$            (1,392)$       
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 6,446$          21,210$           14,764$       1,440$            (5,006)$          17,138$          10,691$          14,867$                  8,420$          5,507$            (939)$          
GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 6,481$          21,155$           14,674$       1,450$            (5,031)$          17,245$          10,764$          14,974$                  8,494$          5,510$            (971)$          
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 0.176 2.824 2.648 2.991 2.815 1.684 1.508 2.754 2.578 -0.090 -0.266
GDP growth (annual %) 2.192 3.538 1.347 4.804 2.613 2.151 -0.041 3.767 1.575 2.048 -0.143
PPP conversion factor to official exchange rate 
ratio 0.611 1.147 0.536 0.251 -0.360 1.149 0.538 1.065 0.454 0.557 -0.054
Real interest rate (%) 5.278 5.145 -0.133 4.436 -0.842 6.869 1.591 8.200 2.922 4.974 -0.304
Gross foreign direct investment (% of GDP) 2.896 2.242 -0.654 0.595 -2.301 3.582 0.686 4.362 1.466 2.814 -0.082
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
GDP) 1.812 0.451 -1.362 0.529 -1.284 1.300 -0.512 2.123 0.310 1.849 0.036
Export duties (% of tax revenue) 1.802 0.000 -1.802 0.031 -1.771 0.005 -1.797 0.022 -1.780 2.168 0.366
Tax revenue (% of GDP) 19.606 15.336 -4.270 7.041 -12.565 32.700 13.094 26.863 7.257 18.606 -1.000
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
gross capital formation) 7.098 2.485 -4.613 1.570 -5.528 6.179 -0.918 8.737 1.640 7.176 0.078
Import duties (% of tax revenue) 20.080 1.537 -18.543 28.924 8.844 0.006 -20.074 4.055 -16.025 23.019 2.939
Trade in goods (% of GDP) 59.737 16.484 -43.253 22.456 -37.281 39.074 -20.663 56.266 -3.471 61.688 1.950
Lending interest rate (%) 61.734 8.480 -53.254 12.930 -48.804 12.751 -48.983 14.214 -47.520 69.617 7.883
Trade (% of GDP) 76.116 20.216 -55.900 24.527 -51.588 46.951 -29.165 67.279 -8.837 78.875 2.760
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period 
average) 161.492 72.896 -88.595 11.143 -150.348 0.710 -160.782 284.733 123.242 161.572 0.080
Foreign direct investment, net (BoP, million 
current US$) (282.1)$        (18,714.8)$       (18,432.8)$   $1,377.0 $1,659.1 (7,726.7)$        (7,444.6)$        $621.7 $903.7 $174.1 $456.1
Net trade in goods and services (BoP, million 
current US$) (35.1)$          (27,237.0)$       (27,201.9)$   $1,105.5 $1,140.6 $7,475.4 $7,510.5 (620.1)$                  (585.0)$        $175.2 $210.3
Comparison of Means of FDI Related Variables in Cluster Analysis in 1990 Cross Section
Name
Cluster of USA & Japan
Cluster5: 
Developing Giants
Cluster6: 
Developed Powers
Cluster7: 
FDI Important
Cluster8: 
All Other Countries
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Global
208 
Economies 2 (USA, JPN)
USA & JPN - 
global 
2 (CHN, 
IND)
Cluster5 - 
global 
4 (DEU, ITA, 
FRA, GBR)
Cluster6-
global 
6 (IDN, ESP, 
CAN, KOR, 
RUS, MEX)
Cluster7-
global 194 Econs
Cluster8 - 
global 
 GNI (billion current US$) $157.3 $6,332.4 $6,175.0 $520.2 $362.9 $1,549.8 $1,392.5 $405.5 $248.2 $37.5 (119.9)$        
 GDP (billion current US$) $155.7 $6,315.1 $6,159.4 $527.7 $372.0 $1,560.9 $1,405.2 $413.5 $257.8 $37.4 (118.3)$        
 GDP (billion constant 1995 US$) $158.1 $6,315.1 $6,157.0 $527.7 $369.7 $1,560.9 $1,402.8 $413.5 $255.5 $37.8 (120.2)$        
 GNI, Atlas method (billion current 
US$) $158.8 $6,301.8 $6,142.9 $486.4 $327.6 $1,489.6 $1,330.7 $414.3 $255.5 $36.6 (122.2)$        
 GNI, PPP (billion current international 
$) $202.5 $5,170.7 $4,968.1 $2,467.8 $2,265.2 $1,317.6 $1,115.0 $618.3 $415.7 $63.4 (139.1)$        
 GDP, PPP (billion current 
international $) $204.5 $5,162.9 $4,958.4 $2,502.1 $2,297.6 $1,327.7 $1,123.2 $632.5 $427.9 $64.4 (140.1)$        
 Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(BoP, million current US$) $1,934.8 $28,919.7 $26,984.8 $18,996.4 $17,061.6 $15,572.9 $13,638.0 $5,554.9 $3,620.1 $867.5 (1,067.3)$     
Population, total (million) 29.0 195.1 166.1 1,068.5 1,039.5 63.7 34.7 90.9 61.9 12.8 (16.2)            
 GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) 5,979$          34,949$        28,970$        481$        (5,498)$      23,906$        17,927$        8,672$          2,693$        5,167$     (812)$           
 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current 
US$) 5,864$          34,545$        28,681$        450$        (5,414)$      22,745$        16,881$        8,603$          2,739$        5,058$     (806)$           
 GNI per capita, PPP (current 
international $) 7,486$          25,520$        18,034$        2,290$     (5,196)$      20,565$        13,079$        10,573$        3,088$        6,859$     (627)$           
 GDP per capita, PPP (current 
international $) 7,526$          25,445$        17,919$        2,320$     (5,206)$      20,725$        13,199$        10,797$        3,271$        6,891$     (635)$           
PPP conversion factor to official 
exchange rate ratio 0.556 1.423 0.867 0.208 -0.347 1.151 0.596 0.670 0.114 0.528 -0.027
Real interest rate (%) 5.741 5.197 -0.543 2.499 -3.242 6.543 0.802 15.986 10.245 5.269 -0.472
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2.035 1.284 -0.751 7.541 5.506 2.107 0.071 1.156 -0.879 2.008 -0.027
GDP growth (annual %) 3.688 2.135 -1.554 9.090 5.402 2.305 -1.383 2.091 -1.597 3.732 0.044
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP) 3.000 0.394 -2.606 2.861 -0.138 1.093 -1.907 1.522 -1.477 3.147 0.148
Gross foreign direct investment (% of 
GDP) 4.410 1.453 -2.957 3.307 -1.104 3.401 -1.010 2.432 -1.979 4.594 0.183
Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(% of gross capital formation) 10.964 2.174 -8.790 7.406 -3.558 5.919 -5.045 6.692 -4.272 11.468 0.504
Lending interest rate (%) 28.769 6.168 -22.601 13.759 -15.009 9.556 -19.213 70.906 42.138 27.949 -0.819
Trade in goods (% of GDP) 63.381 16.597 -46.784 31.374 -32.008 40.695 -22.686 41.115 -22.266 65.710 2.329
Trade (% of GDP) 82.887 20.118 -62.769 35.631 -47.256 49.762 -33.124 57.313 -25.574 86.030 3.143
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, 
period average) 590.264 47.530 -542.734 20.389 -569.875 0.742 -589.522 505.497 -84.767 619.528 29.264
 Net trade in goods and services (BoP, 
million current US$) $618.9 (10,967.6)$    (11,586.5)$    $200.8 (418.1)$      $22,094.4 $21,475.5 $4,609.7 $3,990.9 $61.5 (557.4)$        
Comparison of Means of FDI Related Variables in Cluster Analysis in 1995 Cross Section
Name
Cluster of USA & Japan
Cluster5: 
Developing Giants
Cluster6: 
Developed Powers
Cluster7: 
FDI Important
Cluster8: 
All Other Countries
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Global
208 
Economies 1 (USA) USA-global 1 (JPN) JPN - global 2 (CHN, IND)
Cluster6 - 
global 
4 (DEU, ITA, 
FRA, GBR)
Cluster7-
global 
5 (BRA, ESP, 
CAN, KOR, 
RUS)
Cluster8 - 
global 195 Econs
Cluster9 - 
global 
 GNI (billion current US$) $171.8 $9,928.5 $9,756.7 $4,824.9 $4,653.1 $759.3 $587.5 $1,418.8 $1,247.1 $505.9 $334.1 $38.6 (133.2)$       
 GDP (billion current US$) $170.1 $9,810.2 $9,640.1 $4,765.3 $4,595.1 $768.5 $598.4 $1,418.6 $1,248.4 $516.5 $346.3 $39.0 (131.1)$       
 GNI, Atlas method (billion current US$) $172.8 $9,700.6 $9,527.8 $4,493.3 $4,320.5 $758.4 $585.7 $1,539.2 $1,366.5 $510.5 $337.8 $39.2 (133.6)$       
 GNI, PPP (billion current international $) $261.6 $9,700.0 $9,438.5 $3,247.4 $2,985.9 $3,704.8 $3,443.2 $1,557.6 $1,296.1 $884.9 $623.4 $79.9 (181.7)$       
 GDP, PPP (billion current international $) $263.5 $9,584.5 $9,321.0 $3,207.3 $2,943.9 $3,748.4 $3,485.0 $1,558.2 $1,294.7 $906.9 $643.4 $81.7 (181.8)$       
 GDP (billion constant 1995 US$) $188.1 $8,986.9 $8,798.8 $5,680.6 $5,492.5 $754.2 $566.2 $1,742.1 $1,554.0 $635.6 $447.5 $43.4 (144.7)$       
 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (million 
BoP, current US$) $8,720.9 $307,740.0 $299,019.1 $8,227.2 (493.7)$        $20,357.2 $11,636.3 $95,999.4 $87,278.5 $29,544.9 $20,824.0 $3,720.7 (5,000.2)$    
 Foreign direct investment, net (BoP, million 
current US$) $846.1 $129,450.0 $128,603.9 (23,306.6)$   (24,152.7)$   $19,914.6 $19,068.5 (29,202.7)$    (30,048.9)$     $7,218.6 $6,372.5 $329.4 (516.7)$       
Population, total (million) 29.3 282.2 252.9 126.9 97.6 1,139.2 1,109.9 64.4 35.1 86.8 57.5 13.7 (15.5)           
 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 5,899$          34,370$          28,471$           35,420$        29,521$       645$            (5,254)$         23,613$        17,713$         10,162$         4,263$       5,058$      (841)$          
 GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 8,655$          34,370$          25,715$           25,600$        16,945$       3,200$         (5,455)$         24,115$        15,460$         14,788$         6,133$       7,837$      (817)$          
 GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) 6,622$          31,843$          25,221$           44,775$        38,153$       642$            (5,980)$         26,469$        19,847$         12,132$         5,510$       5,662$      (960)$          
 GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 8,867$          33,960$          25,093$           25,280$        16,413$       3,235$         (5,632)$         24,113$        15,246$         15,062$         6,195$       8,063$      (804)$          
Highest marginal tax rate, corporate rate (%) 28.326 35.000 6.674 30.000 1.674 34.800 6.474 31.075 2.749 30.200 1.874 27.909 -0.417
PPP conversion factor to official exchange rate 
ratio 0.484 1.024 0.540 1.486 1.002 0.198 -0.286 0.912 0.428 0.594 0.110 0.462 -0.022
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 2.493 2.865 0.372 2.184 -0.310 4.733 2.240 2.954 0.460 5.616 3.123 2.363 -0.130
GDP growth (annual %) 3.947 4.175 0.229 2.361 -1.586 5.977 2.031 3.173 -0.773 6.276 2.330 3.880 -0.067
Real interest rate (%) 7.205 6.796 -0.409 4.132 -3.073 6.407 -0.798 6.040 -1.165 9.679 2.474 7.184 -0.021
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
GDP) 4.779 3.137 -1.642 0.173 -4.607 2.031 -2.748 6.014 1.234 4.901 0.121 4.821 0.041
Gross foreign direct investment (% of GDP) 8.109 5.438 -2.671 0.945 -7.163 2.457 -5.651 17.098 8.989 9.023 0.914 7.939 -0.170
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
gross capital formation) 21.485 15.134 -6.350 0.665 -20.819 6.034 -15.451 29.942 8.457 21.900 0.415 21.644 0.159
Lending interest rate (%) 18.937 9.233 -9.703 2.067 -16.870 9.071 -9.866 7.143 -11.794 20.451 1.514 19.588 0.651
Trade in goods (% of GDP) 67.959 20.799 -47.160 18.021 -49.938 32.256 -35.703 48.812 -19.148 54.272 -13.687 69.895 1.935
Trade (% of GDP) 90.414 26.197 -64.217 20.095 -70.319 39.802 -50.612 59.133 -31.281 65.465 -24.949 93.547 3.133
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period 
average) 4,118.897 1.000 -4,117.897 107.766 -4,011.131 26.610 -4,092.286 0.979 -4,117.917 232.698 -3,886.199 4,418.990 300.093
 Net trade in goods and services (BoP, million 
current US$) (107.2)$        (378,680.0)$    (378,572.8)$     $69,090.5 $69,197.7 $8,490.8 $8,598.0 $2,638.3 $2,745.5 $16,775.0 $16,882.2 $1,146.2 $1,253.4
Comparison of Means of FDI Related Variables in Cluster Analysis in 2000 Cross Section
Name
Cluster of USA Cluster of Japan
Cluster6: 
Developing Giants
Cluster7: 
Developed Powers
Cluster8: 
FDI Important
Cluster9: 
All Other Countries
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Global
208 
Economies 1 (USA) USA-global 1 (JPN) JPN - global 1 (CHN) CHN-global 1 (IND) IND-global 
4 (DEU,ITA,
FRA,GBR)
Cluster7-
global 
6 (BRA, ESP, 
CAN, KOR, 
RUS, MEX)
Cluster8 - 
global 
194 
Econs
Cluster9 - 
global 
 GDP (billion current US$) $173.5 $10,065.3 $9,891.8 $4,141.4 $3,967.9 $1,159.0 $985.5 $477.3 $303.8 $1,417.2 $1,243.7 $521.5 $347.9 $36.4 (137.1)$      
 GNI (billion current US$) $172.8 $10,053.2 $9,880.4 $4,209.9 $4,037.1 $1,139.9 $967.1 $474.6 $301.8 $1,417.7 $1,244.9 $510.2 $337.4 $35.8 (137.0)$      
 GNI, Atlas method (billion current US$) $175.1 $9,780.8 $9,605.8 $4,523.3 $4,348.2 $1,131.2 $956.1 $477.4 $302.3 $1,480.2 $1,305.2 $508.3 $333.2 $36.6 (138.5)$      
 GDP, PPP (billion current international $) $277.8 $9,792.5 $9,514.6 $3,193.0 $2,915.2 $5,111.2 $4,833.4 $2,930.0 $2,652.1 $1,589.2 $1,311.4 $920.1 $642.2 $80.5 (197.4)$      
 GNI, PPP (billion current international $) $275.2 $9,780.7 $9,505.5 $3,245.8 $2,970.6 $5,026.7 $4,751.5 $2,913.4 $2,638.3 $1,589.1 $1,314.0 $898.0 $622.8 $78.8 (196.3)$      
 GDP (billion constant 1995 US$) $194.4 $9,013.9 $8,819.4 $5,647.7 $5,453.2 $1,117.2 $922.8 $492.5 $298.1 $1,766.6 $1,572.2 $604.7 $410.3 $42.9 (151.5)$      
 Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, 
million current US$) $4,501.3 $130,800.0 $126,298.7 $6,191.3 $1,690.0 $44,241.0 $39,739.7 $3,403.0 (1,098.3)$    $40,503.3 $36,002.0 $17,001.9 $12,500.6 $1,964.2 (2,537.1)$   
 Foreign direct investment, net (BoP, million 
current US$) $975.5 $2,960.0 $1,984.5 (32,306.1)$   (33,281.6)$   $37,357.0 $36,381.5 $3,300.0 $2,324.5 (4,981.7)$   (5,957.2)$    $5,359.9 $4,384.3 $860.6 (115.0)$      
Population, total (million) 29.6 285.3 255.7 127.0 97.4 1,271.9 1,242.2 1,032.4 1,002.7 64.6 34.9 89.3 59.7 13.5 (16.1)          
 GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) 5,593$         34,280$         28,687$         35,610$        30,017$       890$          (4,703)$        460$          (5,133)$       22,700$      17,107$      9,340$           3,747$      4,731$    (863)$         
 GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) 8,510$         34,280$         25,770$         25,550$        17,040$       3,950$       (4,560)$        2,820$       (5,690)$       24,548$      16,038$      13,940$         5,430$      7,630$    (880)$         
 GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) 8,727$         34,320$         25,593$         25,130$        16,403$       4,020$       (4,707)$        2,840$       (5,887)$       24,543$      15,815$      14,210$         5,483$      7,859$    (868)$         
 GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$) 6,489$         31,592$         25,103$         44,458$        37,969$       878$          (5,610)$        477$          (6,012)$       26,787$      20,298$      10,860$         4,371$      5,496$    (993)$         
PPP conversion factor to official exchange rate 
ratio 0.475 1.028 0.553 1.297 0.822 0.227 -0.248 0.165 -0.310 0.893 0.418 0.592 0.117 0.452 -0.023
GDP per capita growth (annual %) 1.480 -0.788 -2.267 -0.708 -2.188 6.508 5.028 3.722 2.243 1.282 -0.198 1.320 -0.160 1.473 -0.007
GDP growth (annual %) 2.924 0.300 -2.624 -0.579 -3.503 7.300 4.376 5.400 2.476 1.595 -1.329 2.239 -0.686 2.978 0.053
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of 
GDP) 4.032 1.300 -2.732 0.149 -3.882 3.817 -0.215 0.713 -3.319 2.878 -1.153 2.952 -1.079 4.177 0.145
Real interest rate (%) 9.729 4.525 -5.204 3.440 -6.289 5.847 -3.882 8.293 -1.436 5.112 -4.617 11.137 1.409 9.949 0.220
Lending interest rate (%) 16.787 6.922 -9.865 1.970 -14.817 5.850 -10.937 12.083 -4.703 7.148 -9.638 18.014 1.227 17.345 0.559
Trade in goods (% of GDP) 65.906 18.986 -46.921 18.172 -47.734 44.322 -21.584 19.531 -46.375 48.268 -17.638 51.761 -14.145 67.999 2.092
Official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period 
average) 7653.105 1.000 -7652.105 121.529 -7531.576 8.277 -7644.828 47.186 -7605.919 1.012 -7652.093 222.422 -7430.683 8281.836 628.732
 Net trade in goods and services (BoP, million 
current US$) (183.6)$        (358,290.0)$   (358,106.4)$   $26,480.3 $26,663.9 $28,084.0 $28,267.6 (8,500.0)$   (8,316.4)$    $10,300.5 $10,484.1 $9,734.7 $9,918.3 $1,189.3 $1,372.8
Comparison of Means of FDI Related Variables in Cluster Analysis in 2001 Cross Section
Cluster of USA Cluster of Japan Cluster of China Cluster of India
Cluster7: 
Developed Powers
Cluster8: 
FDI Important
Cluster9: 
All Other Countries
Name
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Appendix 3.1: GMM Result of FDI with One Lower Middle Income Dummy 
Dependent variable: FDI inflows  
 
Appendix 3.2: GMM Result of FDI with One Upper Middle Income Dummy† 
Dependent variable: FDI inflows  
 
† See footnote in Appendix 3.1. 
UMCD is country dummy =1 if being UMC (Upper Middle Income Country), =0 otherwise. 
Independent Var (ivlag=2 .) (ivlag=4 .) (ivlag=6 10)
Exchange Rate (EX) 0.334 -0.0793 -0.220
(0.52) (0.64) (0.74)
Lagged FDI Inflows (FDIL) 0.488*** 0.466*** 0.466***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Tax Rate (Tax) -16101* -17721* -17504**
(8857) (9141) (8697)
Wage Rate (Wage) 1.204 0.604 0.944
(1.03) (1.05) (1.14)
Real Interest Rate (r) -18.21 -69.19 -47.08
(33.0) (66.8) (105)
Import Duties (Tariff) 5.814 7.760 10.11*
(5.23) (5.36) (5.53)
Openness (Open) -33.94 24.43 -15.62
(80.7) (117) (118)
School Enrollment (EDU) 136.9*** 130.9** 138.6**
(50.8) (53.3) (53.6)
GDP 7.690*** 8.111*** 8.168***
(1.46) (1.59) (1.40)
LMCD -759.4 -255.9 -839.9
(1070) (1357) (1417)
Risk -499.5*** -676.3** -1218***
(179) (274) (416)
# of Observations 1313 1313 1313
P-value of AR(2) test 0.526 0.376 0.278
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All regressions include a constant term and time (year) dummies which are not reported in the table.
Each column represents results for instrument variables (IVs) with different lags indicated at the top.
LMCD is country dummy =1 if being LMC (Lower Middle Income Country), =0 otherwise.
EX, FDIL, r and EDU are Exchange Rate, Lagged FDI inflows, real interest rate, and school enrollment, respectively
All independent variables are lagged in one period.
***, ** and * represent significence levels of less than 1% (p<0.01), less than 5% (p<0.05), and less than 10% (p<0.1), respectively.
Independent Var (ivlag=3 6) (ivlag=3 5)(2209) (2210)
Exchange Rate (EX) 0.255 0.252
(0.50) (0.50)
Lagged FDI Inflows (FDIL) 0.494*** 0.494***
(0.12) (0.12)
Tax Rate (Tax) -18206* -18110*
(9194) (9160)
Wage Rate (Wage) 1.046 1.049
(0.92) (0.91)
Real Interest Rate (r) 2.237 2.396
(11.7) (11.7)
Import Duties (Tariff) 5.564 5.573
(4.35) (4.36)
Openness (Open) -26.42 -27.64
(80.5) (80.3)
School Enrollment (EDU) 133.1** 133.4***
(50.7) (50.6)
GDP 7.551*** 7.550***
(1.31) (1.31)
UMCD -863.5 -858.0
(805) (805)
Risk -431.3*** -427.2***
(132) (132)
# of Observations 1313 1313
P-value of AR(2) test 0.576 0.576
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Appendix 3.3: GMM Result of FDI with Slope Lower Middle Income Dummy† 
Both Intercept and Slope Income Dummies, Dependent variable: FDI inflows 
 
† See footnote in Appendix 3.1. 
EX*LMCD is the interactive variable (slope dummy) between EX (exchange rate) and LMCD (country 
dummy for lower middle income county). Similarly hereinafter. 
 
 
Independent Var (ivlag=2 .) (ivlag=4 .) (ivlag=6 10)
Exchange Rate (EX) 0.158 -0.353 -0.617
(0.54) (0.67) (0.74)
Lagged FDI Inflows (FDIL) 0.484*** 0.464*** 0.463***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Tax Rate (Tax) -17810 -16552 -20768*
(10874) (10771) (12122)
Wage Rate (Wage) 1.415 0.953 1.528
(1.12) (1.14) (1.17)
Real Interest Rate (r) -26.82 -77.43 -3.465
(53.4) (82.6) (132)
Import Duties (Tariff) 5.573 8.146 10.64**
(4.98) (5.00) (5.14)
Openness (Open) -48.58 -19.78 -69.58
(86.7) (132) (143)
School Enrollment (EDU) 140.4*** 134.9** 145.3***
(50.5) (53.9) (53.9)
GDP 7.716*** 8.025*** 8.064***
(1.48) (1.61) (1.40)
LMCD 6118*** 9322*** 9602**
(2133) (3238) (3683)
Risk -534.8** -661.1** -1201**
(212) (325) (486)
EX * LMCD -0.233 -0.401 0.0196
(0.56) (0.61) (0.68)
FDIL * LMCD -0.929** -1.139** -1.702**
(0.47) (0.52) (0.85)
Tax * LMCD 15646 6712 10782
(12287) (16320) (20028)
Wage * LMCD -2.798* -2.579 -4.649**
(1.45) (1.67) (1.97)
r * LMCD 34.70 66.52 2.253
(54.7) (79.9) (126)
Tariff * LMCD 1.251 6.557 14.66
(11.2) (28.7) (34.2)
Open * LMCD 82.02 105.1 162.5
(93.0) (144) (162)
Edu * LMCD -148.7*** -196.2*** -204.5***
(49.9) (59.6) (64.6)
GDP * LMCD 4.693 8.891 8.166
(7.56) (7.46) (10.3)
Risk * LMCD 174.7 161.7 186.1
(254) (327) (487)
# of Observations 1313 1313 1313
P-value of AR(2) test 0.571 0.470 0.318
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Appendix 3.4: GMM Result of FDI with Slope Upper Middle Income Dummy† 
Both Intercept and Slope Income Dummies, Dependent variable: FDI inflows 
     
† See footnote in Appendix 3.1, 3.2, & 3.3. 
 
Independent Var (ivlag=3 6) (ivlag=3 5)
Exchange Rate (EX) 0.216 0.211
(0.52) (0.52)
Lagged FDI Inflows (FDIL) 0.496*** 0.497***
(0.12) (0.12)
Tax Rate (Tax) -24211** -24082**
(9898) (9855)
Wage Rate (Wage) 1.359 1.360
(0.95) (0.95)
Real Interest Rate (r) 1.244 1.457
(11.1) (11.0)
Import Duties (Tariff) 5.868 5.870
(4.27) (4.27)
Openness (Open) -39.76 -41.67
(95.7) (95.5)
School Enrollment (EDU) 132.7** 133.0**
(53.3) (53.2)
GDP 7.443*** 7.438***
(1.22) (1.22)
UMCD 3366 3363
(2358) (2368)
Risk -416.3*** -410.6***
(148) (148)
EX * UMCD -0.582 -0.567
(0.79) (0.78)
FDIL * UMCD 0.0823 0.0820
(0.15) (0.15)
Tax * UMCD 24266** 24237**
(10354) (10343)
Wage * UMCD -1.675 -1.668
(1.14) (1.13)
r * UMCD 10.11 9.815
(26.5) (26.4)
Tariff * UMCD 3.077 3.058
(22.8) (22.9)
Open * UMCD 52.73 54.94
(92.6) (92.5)
Edu * UMCD -126.1*** -126.3***
(47.7) (47.7)
GDP * UMCD 6.229* 6.309*
(3.27) (3.28)
Risk * UMCD 168.7 163.3
(206) (207)
# of Observations 1313 1313
P-value of AR(2) test 0.704 0.703
In
di
v
id
u
al
 
In
de
pe
n
de
n
t V
ar
Sl
o
pe
 
D
um
m
ie
s 
o
r 
In
te
ra
ct
iv
e 
Va
r
125 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.5: Country List 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High Income Group
Middle Income 
Group Low Income Group
Upper Middle Income 
Group
Lower Middle 
Income Group
21 43 31 20 23
Australia Argentina Azerbaijan Argentina Bulgaria
Austria Bulgaria Burkina Faso Brazil Belarus
Belgium Belarus Bangladesh Botswana Bolivia
Canada Bolivia Côte d'Ivoire Chile Colombia
Switzerland Brazil Cameroon Costa Rica Dominican Republic
Germany Botswana Congo, Rep. Czech Republic Algeria
Denmark Chile Ethiopia Estonia Ecuador
Spain Colombia Ghana Gabon Egypt, Arab Rep.
Finland Costa Rica Guinea Croatia Guyana
France Czech Republic Gambia, The Hungary Jamaica
United Kingdom Dominican Republic Guinea-Bissau Lebanon Jordan
Greece Algeria Haiti Lithuania Kazakhstan
Ireland Ecuador Indonesia Latvia Sri Lanka
Italy Egypt, Arab Rep. India Mexico Peru
Korea, Rep. Estonia Kenya Malaysia Philippines
Norway Gabon Moldova Panama Paraguay
New Zealand Guyana Madagascar Poland Romania
Portugal Croatia Mali Trinidad and Tobago Russian Federation
Slovenia Hungary Malawi Uruguay El Salvador
Sweden Jamaica Nigeria Venezuela, RB Thailand
United States Jordan Nicaragua Tunisia
Kazakhstan Pakistan Turkey
Lebanon Papua New Guinea South Africa
Sri Lanka Senegal
Lithuania Sierra Leone
Latvia Togo
Mexico Uganda
Malaysia Ukraine
Panama Yemen, Rep.
Peru Congo, Dem. Rep.
Philippines Zimbabwe
Poland
Paraguay
Romania
Russian Federation
El Salvador
Note: Middle Income group can be discomposed into Upper Middle Income group and Low Middle Income group.
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Appendix 3.6: List of Studies Using Level of FDI Inflows as Dependent Variable 
 
The FDI researchers apply the level of FDI inflows as dependent variable include 
Scaperlanda (1967, 1968), Bandera and White (1968), Wallis (1968), Scaperlanda and 
Mauer (1969,1971), Goldberg (1972), Boatwright and Renton (1975), Ray (1977), Lunn 
(1980,1983), Culem (1988), Tsai (1991), Lucas (1993), Eaton and Tamura (1994), 
Kudrle (1995), Summary and Summary (1995), Tu and Schive (1995), Lee and 
Mansfield (1996), Milner and Pentecost (1996), UNCTAD (1998), UN (1998), Sarno and 
Tauylor (1999), Lipsey (2000a), Morisset (2000), Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000), Wei 
(2000), Baek and Okawa (2001), Dunning et al. (2001), Balasubramanyam et al. (2002), 
Bandelj (2002), Fung et al. (2002), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Harms and Ursprung 
(2002), Quiroga and Miguel (2002), Ramirez  (2002), Sun et al. (2002), Janicki and 
Wunnava (2004), and Carstensen and Toubal (2004), etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.7: List of Studies on FDI Inflows in current US$ 
 
FDI can be in current US$, in real term (adjusted by GDP deflator), or normalized by 
GDP. The studies on FDI in current US$ are as follows: Scaperlanda (1967, 1968), 
Bandera and White (1968), Wallis (1968), Scaperlanda and Mauer (1969,1971), 
Goldberg (1972), Boatwright and Renton (1975), Ray (1977), Lunn (1980,1983), Culem 
(1988), Tsai (1991), Lucas (1993), Eaton and Tamura (1994), Kudrle (1995), Summary 
and Summary (1995), Tu and Schive (1995), Lee and Mansfield (1996), Milner and 
Pentecost (1996), UNCTAD (1998), UN (1998), Sarno and Tauylor (1999), Lipsey 
(2000a), Morisset (2000), Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000), Wei (2000), Baek and Okawa 
(2001), Dunning et al. (2001), Balasubramanyam et al. (2002), Bandelj (2002), Fung et 
al. (2002), Habib and Zurawicki (2002), Harms and Ursprung (2002), Quiroga and 
Miguel (2002), Sun et al. (2002), Janicki and Wunnava (2004), and Carstensen and 
Toubal (2004), etc. 
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